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ABSTRACT
During the three decades of British rule in Palestine 
(1918-1948), the question of Jewish immigration played 
a major role in the political arena of the country. As 
far as the Zionists were concerned, Jewish immigration 
was a vital and indispensable condition to the growth and 
strengthening of the Yishuv (Jewish community in Palestine), 
to the x^^osperity of the country and to the building up 
of the Jewish National Home. On the other hand, the 
Palestinian Arabs saw in Jewish immigration the most 
dangerous and tangible threat to their political existence. . 
and their economic, social and religious position. The 
British Government, which, according to the Balfour 
Declaration and the Mandate, took upon itself to assist 
the establishment of the Jewish National Home by 
facilitating Jewish immigration, was well aware of the 
controversial nature of this question and devoted 
considerable endeavour to finding a solution satisfactory 
to all parties concerned.
The present study examines the making of 
immigration policy during the first five years of the 
Civil Administration, which correspond to Sir Herbert 
Samuel's rule in Palestine. This includes an analysis 
of the different approaches and contributions of the 
various bodies and. individuals which took x^ art in the 
framing of the policy; an examination of the political, 
administrative arid legal patterns, procedures and 
schemes of immigration; and finally, the implementation
3.
of the schemes and their subsequent effects on the 
official policy.
With regard to the participants in this process, 
one can point to three political factors which acted 
concurrently in three different arenas: Jerusalem,
London and the immigration centres in Europe. The first 
network consists of the Palestine Administration and the 
British Government: the High Commissioner, the Chief 
Secretary, the Legal Department, the Department of 
Immigration and Travel, the Sub-Department of Labour 
and various economic departments of the Palestine 
Administration; the British Cabinet, the Colonial Office, 
the ' Hone Office, the Foreign Office and British 
Consuls in Europe, mainly those situated in the 
immigration centres: Warsaw, Constantinople, Vienna and 
Trieste.
The second network includes the corresponding bodies 
of the Zionist Organisation: the Zionist Executive in 
London, the Zionist Commission to Palestine and later, 
the Palestine Zionist Executive and the branches of the 
Zionist Organisation in Europe.
An additional network is the supreme body of the 
.Palestine Arab national movement - the Palestine Arab 
Congress, its Executive Committee and the several 
Delegations which were despatched to London during this 
period for negotiations witn the Colonial Office.
From a chronological and substantial point of view, 
this research is divided into two principal periods.
The first is from July 1920, the date of the setting up
Ao
of the Civil Administration, until the May Disturbances of 
1921. During this period, the primary political, 
administrative and legal patterns concerning immigration 
took shape, namely, crystallisation of concepts, outlining 
of policy, setting up of the Department of Immigration 
and Travel and legislation of the first Immigration 
Ordinanceo(Chapter 1). The later period runs between 
June 1921 until the middle of 1923, the end of Samuel's 
rule in Palestine0 During this period a revision was 
made of the concepts and schemes of the policy (Chaj^ter 3); 
nep:otiations regarding constitutional reforms in control 
of immigration took place (Chapter 9-); the Immigration 
Department and machinery of control were reorganised 
(Chapter 5); legislation of the second Immigration 
Ordinance (Chapter 6); and finally, an examination of the 
principle of Economic Absorptive Capacity as an indico.tor 
for immigration (Chapter 7)«
PREFACE
Among the numerous historical works on Mandatory 
Palestine, studies dealing with policy-making arc 
relatively scarce in comparison with those dealing with 
general political questions. Until recent years, various 
economic questions, land settlement, colonization, 
immigration, education, social welfare policy etcetera, 
have not had much profound or exhaustive research devoted 
to them. Although these topics were dealt with in British 
official publications in the form of reports and surveys, 
they generally go no further than descriptions of the facts 
and events, without analysing the concepts, motives or 
contributions of tho bodies and individuals which took part 
in outlining the policy. On the other hand, memoirs, 
monographs and general books wholly or partly dealing with 
those subjects usually have a rather tendentious approach 
which spotlights tho political aspects of the problem or 
emphasises the different viewpoints of their authors. A 
serious obstacle which stood in the way of researchers 
until recent years was the unavailability of archival 
material which is indispensable to studios of policy-making.
The recent opening; to the public of archival material 
of the period concerned has made possible direct access to 
the official files of the bodies which participated in, or 
had certain influence upon, making of immigration policy.
The five principal bodies concerned were the Palestine- 
Administration, the Colonial 0ffi.ee, the Foreign Office, the 
Zionist Executive in London and the Palestine Zionist 
Executive.
6The material of the Palestine Administration is kept 
in the Israel State Archives (I.S.A.), in Jerusalem.
The relevant material mainly includes the files of the 
Immigration Department, the Chief Secretary and 
correspondence between the High Commissioner and the 
Colonial Office. The latter correspondence, and in 
addition, internal minutes and memoranda of the Colonial 
Office are also kept in London, at the Public Record 
Oflice (P.R.O.). Also available at the Public Record 
Office is the correspondence between the Colonial Office 
and the Poreign Office and the Foreign Office with the 
British Consuls, regarding control of immigration.
Zionist material is concentrated in the Central 
Zionist Archives (C.Z.A.),in Jerusalem. This material 
includes correspondence of the Palestine Zionist 
Executive with the Palestine Administration and the 
Zionist Executive in London, as well as correspondence 
between the latter body with the Colonial and the Foreign 
Office. Particularly important arc the confidential 
Minutes of the Zionist Executive and the Palestine 
Zionist Executive, which were both closed until recent 
years.
Complementary to the Zionist material are the 
private papers of Chaim Weizmann, the President of the 
Zionist Organisation, during the period concerned, which 
are kept at the Weizmann Memorial, in Rehovot, Israel.
When referring to archival sources I have given full 
details of the documents in the following order: sender, 
addressee, number and date and then, archival group, serial
7number, volume, file and paper. Most of the material is 
in English. Translations of quotations from Hebrew are 
my own and from Atahic according to the official English 
translations as they appear in the files.
I have supplemented the archival material with 
official publications of the Palestine and British 
Governments and the Zionist Organisation. The particular 
importance of these sources is their ability to reflect 
the official policy in the form of statements, laws and 
statistical data. In most cases I preferred the 
reliability of archival material to the official 
publications.
Although memoirs and biographies have provided me 
with much fascinating historical material, these are 
at times of limited reliability. Nevertheless, I was 
able to make use of diaries, in particular those of 
Colonel Kisch and Dr. Ruppin of the Palestine Zionist 
Executive.
The contribution of general books and monographs to 
my study is not very significant as most of them seem to 
have been based exclusively on official publications. 
However, doctoral theses written in recent years on 
various Palestine questions have been of great assistance 
to me.
Published material is referred to in the footnotes 
by the author's name and title in brief. Full details 
of these sources may be found in the bibliographical list.
8Finally, I wish to express my thanks to the Director 
and staff of the Public Record Office, for their kind 
permission to consult material and for their help; to 
Dr. M. Heimann and Mr. I. Philip of the Central Zionist 
Archives, Jerusalem; to Mr. Julian L. Meltzcr and 
Mrs. L. Calcf of the Weizmann Archives, Rehovot; to 
Mr. H. Solomon and Miss Y. Teslitski, my colleagues at 
the Israel State Archives and particular^ to Dr. P.A. 
Alsbcrg, the Israel State Archivist.
I am fortunate to have had the guidance and 
encouragement of my supervisor Professor Elio Kedourie, 
to whom I owe special thanks. I am also most grateful 
to my good friends Dr. Neil Caplan and Mr. Chaim Earam, 
who took the trouble to go through this study and gave 
me a great deal of sound advice. And most of all, to 
my wife, Marlene, without whose patience and constant 
support this work would not have been completed.
This research was made possible by the generous 
support of the following bodies:- The Jewish Agency, 
Jerusalem; the Jewish Memorial Council, New York;
The E'nai B'rith and Anglo-Jewish Association, London; 
and the Central Research Fund of the University of 
London.
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Chapter One
PRIMARY FORMATION OF IMMIGRATION POLICY 
A: SAMUEL 1S ROUTE TO JERUSALEM
On the morning of April 24th 1920, one day before
the Allied Powers at the San Remo Peace Conference assigned
the mandate over Palestine to Groat Britain, the heads
of the British Delegation to the Conference - Prime
Minister Lloyd George and Foreign Secretary Lord Curzon -
decided to end the Military Administration in Palestine
and to appoint Herbert Samuel head of the new Civil
1Administration. The political implications of this 
decision were of crucial importance, in particular to the 
Zionist cause: Palestine was assigned de facto to Britain, 
without waiting for the Peace Treaty to be signed with 
Turkey and before the Mandate was approved by the League 
of Nations; the country was transferred from the 
supervision of the G.H.Q. in Cairo and the War Office to 
the Eastern Department of the Foreign Office, which tended 
to show more sympathy with Zionism; martial law was to 
be abolished and with it the necessity of keeping to the 
status quo ante belum, which was used by the Military 
Administration to justify the curbing of the Zionist 
enterprise in Palestine. Thus, some of the legal and 
political obstacles in the way of the building up of the 
Jewish National Home were formally removed.
1. Samuel, Memoirs, p.150 .
Not less significant was the decision to appoint
Herbert Samuel as first High Commissioner to Palestine.
Samuel, one of the principal loaders of the Liberal
Party, was the first professing Jew ever to sit in a
British Cabinet, a fact which he greatly appreciated,
being proud of his origin. Although ho testified in his ,
memoirs that he had taken no special interest in the idea
of Jewish nationalism until the First World War, as any
2practical outcome of Zionism seemed to him "remote", at 
his fix'st meeting with Veizmann in December 191A, he 
admitted that "he was not a stranger to Zionist ideas; he 
had been following them up a little of late years and 
although he had never mentioned it, ho took a considerable 
interest in the question."^
At any rate, Britain’s declaration of war on Turkey 
in November 19I4, and with it, her intention of destroying 
the Ottoman Empire, immediately spurred Samuel on to open 
Zionist activity.
It would seem that these events gave Samuel a 
suitable opportunity of releasing his hitherto latent 
sympathy towards Jewish nationalism, since he became an 
active Zionist without external pressures and before he 
had met with any Zionist leaders. Convinced of the great 
and variegated talents of the Jewish "race" and of the 
contribution that a Jewish State in Palestine would make 23
2. Ibid, p.139.
3. Stein, The Balfour Declaration, p.138«.
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to the strategic interests of the British Empire, Samuel 
began, as early as November i9"l4-jto recruit supporters 
of his idea from among his colleagues in the Cabinet.
His main efforts were focused upon convincing the Prime 
Minister, Herbert Asquith and the Foreign Secretary,
Edward Grey, to accept his plan.^ Later on, after he 
had met with Zionist leaders and learned of the poor 
conditiors in Palestine and the limited abilities of the 
Zionist movement at that time, he withdrew his radical 
plan for a Jewish State and suggested establishing a 
British protectorate over Palestine where "under British 
rule, facilities would be given to Jewish organisations 
to purchase land, to found colonies, to establish 
educational and religious institutions, and to co-operate 
in the economic development of the country, and that 
Jewish immigration, carefully regulated, would be given 
preference, so that in the course of time the Jewish 
inhabitants, grown into a majority and settled in the 
land, may be conceded such degree of self-government as 
the conditions of that day might justify".
Samuel failed to gain any substantial support from 
his colleagues for-his proposals. The British Zionists, 
however, were understandably most enthusiastic. After his 
first interview with Samuel in December, Weizmann, deeply 
impressed-by Samuel's ardent Zionist views, confessed:
"If I were a religious Jew I should have thought the • 
Messianic times were near".^ Three months later he was *56
4-. Samuel, Memoirs, pp. 14-0-144; Weizmarm, Trial and Error 
pp.1 9 1 - 1 ^  ---------------
5. See Samuel's memorandum in Bowie, Viscount Samuel -
a Biography, pp.175-176. '
6. Stein, The Balfour Declaration, p.139.
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able to consider Samuel his confidant, tolling him of all
recent developments and added, "you were good enough to
guide us up to now, and I am sure you will continue to
help us. We look to you and to your historical role which
"7you are playing and will play in the redemption of Israel.
Out of Office from December 1916, Samuel continued to 
exert his still considerable influence in the same direction 
as before. In October 1917» when the fate of the Balfour 
Declaration was in balance, he was consulted by the War 
Cabinet and in his reply set out the case for the policy 
which he had consistently advocated for nearly three years. 
Though he was not a member of the Zionist Organisation in 
the years 1918 and 1919, he was closely co-operating with 
the Zionists and acting as their adviser on economic and 
political natters and as Chairman of internal committees 
of the Organisation. In fulfilling these roles, he acted 
with the co-operation and the confidence of both the 
Zionist Organisation and tho British Government. By 
virtue of this confidence and his personal qualities and 
experience, he was sent by the Foreign Office to Palestine 
in December 1919 to report upon "financial and 
administrative conditions there, and to advise concerning 
the line of policy to be followed in future in these
prespects, should the mandate fall to Great Britain". 78
7. Ibid, p.116.
8. Samuel, Memoirs, p.148; on the various contacts 
previous to this visit, see letter of Richard 
Meineitzhagen, Political Officer at G.H.Q. Cairo to.F.O.
2.12.19., I.S.A. 2/241; also Major General Bols, 
Military Administrator ©B Palestine to W.O., 21.12.19., 
F„0.371/44-26 file El64218/476/44.
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During this entire period the Zionists did not conceal
their desire to see Samuel as the head of the future Civil
Administration of Palestine.*^ The fact that he was an
avowed Zionist not only did not disqualify him in the eyes
of the British, but added to his credit. "It is essential",
the Prime Minister told Samuel in San Remo, when offering
him the post in Palestine, "to have someone who is
interested in making the policy a success". Samuel,
however, had serious doubts concerning the political wisdom
of appointing a Jew for such a delicate post. Although he
believed that he could be 'Useful" and being deeply
interested in the Zionist idea he would would be willing
"to make any sacrifice to promote its success", he revealed
his fears to the Prime Minister that "such an appointment
was open to the danger that measures, v/hich the non-Jewish
population would accept from a British Christian Governor,
11might be objected to if adopted by a Jew". Nevertheless, 
the next day, following long discussions with the Zionist 
leaders, who exerted great pressure on him to take up the 
post, he wrote to the Prime Minister, accepting the offer. 
In his letter, ho substantiates his consent with the 
additional advantage to the fulfillment of the Zionist 
programme, which must, "from the nature of the case, be 
gradual and very considerate for the interests of the Arabs 
and Christians". "Jewry in Palestine and throughout the 9*1
9. Aharon_Aharonson, member of the Zionist Commission'in 
Palestine had already noted in his diary in December 
1918, that he was aware- of a conversation between 
Weizmann and Lloyd Georgo, in which the question of • 
Samuel|s appointment as High Commissioner of Palestine 
had arisen. Priesel, Weizmann’s First Steps, p.118, also Mcdzini, Esser Shanim~.'"n. 154.
"IO. Bowles, . Viscount Samuel, pp. 189-190.
11. Samuel, Memoirs, p .150
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world", he wrote, "would be more likely to practice 
patience, without losing enthusiasm, if the pace were set 
by an Administrator who was known to be in full sympathy 
with the ultimate aim, than if it were set by anyone 
else ... 1,12
Samuel's reasons in both directions for rejecting 
the post and for accepting it epitomise the problems of 
his future five year rule in Palestine.
E: OUTLINING OF THE POLICY
From San Remo, Samuel hastened to London for 
consultations. The formulation of immigration policy 
became one of the main issues of his intensive discussions 
v/ith the Foreign Office and the Zionist Executive in 
London. Samuel chose to meet first with the Zionists in 
order to learn their demands and to formulate accordingly 
the policy he intended to present to the Government.
On 4-th June, he met Dr. Weizmann, Nahum Sokolov/ and 
other representatives of the Zionist Organisation. The 
Zionist leaders put forward three rno.in principles which, , 
according to them were vital for constructive implementa­
tion of immigration policy: first, that the entry of Jews 
into Palestine should be facilitated; second, there should 
bo no 'brganised immigration" into Palestine unless with 
the consent of the Zionist Organisation; third, that the 12
12. Ibid, p.151
Zionist Organisation would be authorised to permit entry 
to Palestine of all Jews if in its opinion they had 
"independent means of subsistence or a reasonably assured 
opportunity of sustaining themselves by their own labour". . 
Samuel accepted the Zionist demands in principle and 
suggested establishing half yearly schedules for labour 
immigration to those whom, the Zionist Organisation could 
guarantee a livelihood for one year. In this manner, he 
believed, tho Zionist Organisation would bo authorised 
to select Jewish immigration according to their own 
discretion and to prevent tho entry of undesirable elements 
from an economic or political point of view. In his 
opinion, this could also contradict any claims from 
"opponents to Zionism", that the Zionists wore bringing 
in a mass of destitute refugees who would bo a burden on 
tho inhabitants of the country. Samuel pointed out, and 
Dr. V/cizmann agreed, that the Zionists' guarantee was also 
necessary to strengthen the hands of the Organisation 
itself in refusing applications of those who, in its 
judgement, would not be able to find employment in tho 
country.
Thus both Samuel and tho Zionists wore unanimous in 
their opposition to "free immigration", at least "for a 
gradual transition period of a few years." Nevertheless, 
Samuel gave his word that Jews would have preference over 
non-Jews by their exclusive right to apply to the Zionist
^3. See minutes of meeting, C.Z.A. Zd/3766. Zionist 
memorandum submitted to Samuel one <3r.y previous to 
the meeting was not found, but its main principles appear in the above-mentioned minutes.
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Organisation for permits«, "In practice”, ho promised,
"the Zionists would get what they wantod by their right 
of franhing any number of immigrants so long as they were 
capcblo of being sustained in Palestine".
A further Zionist demand to set up a Joint 
Immigration Board of equal representation of the 
Administration and the Zionist Organisation, was rejected 
by Samuel as unwise from a political point of view, since 
if such a board were established other political interests 
such as the Palestinian Arabs would ask for similar 
representation. Samuel assured the Zionists that their 
intcr'ests "would be equally well served by informal 
consultation".
On the basis of the Zionist demands and the 
agreement reached with them, Samuel presented a memorandum 
containing his own proposals for control of immigration 
into Palestine to the Foreign Office. His proposals were 
based on the assumptions that "it is essential to make 
a beginning as soon as possible with the establishment of 
the Jewish National Home", that there is a "considerable 
demand for various kinds of labour in Palestine" and if 
immigration will not be permitted "the economic 
development of the country will be retarded". According 
to his scheme, the Zionist Organisation would be asked 
to present half-yearly labour schedules which would be 
chocked by the Palestine Administration,who would 
ultimately decide the numbers. The Organisation would be 
authorised to issue recommendations to the British Consuls 
up to that number; the Consuls would be instructed to
21
accept those recommendations’ and to issue visas "in every
case unless there was a definite reason to the contrary".
Other people, (Jews or non-Jews) may apply to the
Consuls who would be instructed to give visas to such
persons whom they considered to be self-supporting or
1J-could find employment in Palestine.
Samuel’s proposals, ■after being approved by the 
Poreign Office,  ^outlined the general nature of the first 
Palestine Immigration Ordinance and the first Instructions 
(of the Foreign Office) to His Majesty's Consuls.
C: THE FIRST IMMIGRATION ORDINANCE
When Civil Administration was set up in Palestine,
first priority was given to the drafting of the Immigration 
16Ordinance, in order to fill in a void left by the 
abolition of the military permits s y s t e m . T h e  political 
importance of the entire question oblig;ed the Legal 
Department, when drafting the Ordinance, to co-operate 
with the Civil Secretary, (later known as Chief Secretary) 
and with the High Commissioner himself. This work was 
facilitated by the fact that an ardent Zionist, Norman 
Bentwich, stood at the head of the Legal Department. 14567
14. See Samuel's memorandum "Immigration into Palestine", 
16.6.20., P.0.371/5183 file E6531/476/44.
15. F.O. to Samuel (Jerusalem), 5-7.20., F.0.371/5183, file E7141/764/44.
16. Second in a long list of new Ordinances.
17. See "Military Regulations Governing Admission of 
Civilians into Palestine, 31.5-20. iff.O. 371 .vol. 3 
5183, pp. 135-187. These Regulations were in actual 
fact of little significance as they were not enforced 
until one month before the setting up of the Civil Administration.
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In fact, Bentwich was inclined to favour the Zionist
demands in order to facilitate immigration into Palestine.
The drafting of the Ordinance was accompanied by
frequent consultations with the Zionist Commission, the
local representation of the Zionist Organisation in
Palestine. Dr. Eder, the Political Secretary of the
Commission who presented its reservations on the draft
Ordinance, suggested only the inclusion of a list of
illnesses, sufferers from which would not be permitted
entry to Palestine, and that persons who had obtained
Palestinian citizenship, although five years had not
elapsed since their entry to Palestine, should not be
expelled. These two reservations were accepted, .in
additional request for the right to appeal of anyone
19expelled was rejected.  ^ The trivial nature of these 
amendments pointed to the Zionists' general satisfaction 
with the draft.
Simultaneously with the drafting of the Ordinance 
in Jerusalem an Inter-Departmental Committee in London 
was at work. The participants of this Committee were 
representatives of the Eastern o,nd Passport Control 
Departments of the ’Foreign Office and representatives of 
the florae Office, who were invited to advise the Committee 
on outlining, of immigration policy. The extensive 189
18
18. Legal Secretary to Civil (Chief) Secretary, 29.7.20.,11/1 „
19. Ibid, ibid.
23.
representation in the Conraittee testifies to the importance
which the Foreign Office attached to the question. The
final draft of the Ordinance, as drafted in Jerusalem, was
discussed by the Committee, which suggested a few minor •
amendments to prevent possible misunderstandings or
loopholes in the law. Following approval of the Foreign
Office, the Ordinance was published in Palestine and
21enforced as from 1st September 1920.
In general, one may say that the Ordinance was 
extremely liberal, permitting; immigration to anyone who 
was healthy in body and mind and assured of a livelihood, 
provided he did not pose any political or crimino.1 danger 
to society.
D: FORMING OF THE DEPARTMENT OF IMMIGRATION AND TRAVEL
To carry out immigration policy, Samuel set up an 
Immigration and Travel Department. In the formal hierarchy 
of the Administration, the now department was a. lesser one 
and belonged to the group of minor departments, together
ppwith the Department of Ports and Land Registration. This 
inferiority was rather semantic; however the exclusion 
of the Director of the Immigration Department from the 
Palestine Advisory Council was significant. Members of this 
body included, as well as District Governors, a considerable 201
20. F .0. to Samuel, 23.3.20., ■Jf.0.37V5'184 file E9773/476/44
21. See Appendix 1.
22. See list of Major and Minor Departments of Palestine 
Government in I.S.A. 2/67 . undated.
number of heads of Department, among them even the
Directors of the Post and Telegraph and Public Works.
This was rather surprising considering the great
importance which Samuel attached to the immigration
question. It appears that he wished to play down the whole
question of immigration intentionally and to limit the
tasks of the Department to control of immigration only, by
leaving policy-making to himself and his senior officials,
while unofficially consulting the Zionists, as he had
24-promised then ^ at the meeting of 4-th Juno.
In accordance with its functions, the Department's
budget was reduced to less than 1% of the Administration's
total budget.^ The Department's expenses were designed
to be met by revenues coming from registration and landing 26fees. /my claims that the Department's expenses were a 
burden on the Palestinian taxpayer could thus be 
disproved. ^
A certain bias was apparent in choosing senior staff 
for the Department. The fact thevt three out of the five 
senior officials were British Jews stood out:- IT.I. Mindel 23*56
23. See list of members of .Advisory Council, C.O. 814-/3.
24-. See note 13 above.
25. £21,4-92 as against £2,286,133, the total estimated 
budget for the year 1921/22. Samuel to Curzon, 
16.2.21., C.O.733/1 file 10319.
26. See "Memorandum on Palestine Estimates 1921/22",C.O.733/1 file 1204-.
2?. See Chapter 5 below,pp. 1yA-135.
23
25.
the Immigration Officer in Jaffa, the main port of 
immigration; Dennis Cohen, the Immigration Officer in 
Jerusalem; and Albert Hyamson, the Assistant Director of 
the Department. Hyamson, one of the central activists of 
the Zionist movement in Great Britain and a member of
28Weizmann's "inner circle" during the First World War,
was brought especially for this post. Major Morris,
Director of the Department, was posted as a temporary
member of the establishment, whereas Hyaason was offered-
permanent employment from the outset.^ Several years
later this fact became a pretext for removing Morris from
50the Directorship and appointing Hyamson in his place.
E: IMPLEMENTATION OF THE POLICY
"The San Reno Resolution”, a brilliant diplomatic 
achievement for the Zionists, presented the greatest 
practical challenge they had ever had - the building up of 
the Jewish National Home. Yet the joy of victory was 
clouded by doubts concerning their limited abilities.
"The fate of all Zionism depends on this", wrote Weizmann 
prior to the Resolution, "since when the mandate is handed 
over to England, it will be necessary to make immediate 
arrangements for immigration to Palestine, and in order to 28930
28. Stein, The Balfour Declaration, p.10l, p.172
29. List of Immigration Department Officials, 5-12.20.,
C.O. 7p3/8 file 65915»
30. See Samuel to the Duke of Devonshire, Secretary of State 
for the Colonies, 1.6.23., C.O.733/15 file 29127.
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begin, ibis, we need. £1 million sterling at least. Only 
the Anericans com produce such a sum, and if this amount 
is not collected, then we shall be in trouble. England 
will see the Jews as fanciful, and not to bo taken 
seriously, i.o„ the end of all our hopes".
Those hopes were fern from being fulfilled. At the 
Zionist Conference hold in London in July 1920 controversy 
broke out between the "American group", headed by 
Justice Lrandeis, and the "European group",headed by 
Weizmann, concerning the Organisation's budget. Weizmann 
set this at something in the neighbourhood of £2 million 
a year, assuming that the major part of the sun would 
come from American Jewry. The Americans, shocked by this 
•"astronomical figure", could not guarantee more than
~7
£100,000.^  This state of affairs more than anything 
else, determined Zionist immigration policy for the 
coming decade.
Nevertheless, both the enthusiasm of the Zionist 
movement after San Remo and the appointment of Herbert 
Samuel as "first High Commissioner for Judea" encouraged 
the Zionist leadership to initiate a daring and large-seal 
policy on immigration. It will be remembered that Samuel 
proposed permitting the Zionists to admit a set number of 
immigrants, who wore certain of obtaining employment and 
a living. This schedule had already been considered at 
Samuel's first meeting with the Zionist Commission. 31*
31. Nordau, Zichronoth, p„ 274-
First Stop^ p p  T O - P*327; Pricsel, Weizmann' s
2?.
Dr. Ruppin, the economic expert of the Commission, suggested 
that the schedule for the first year should allow up to 
10,000 working immigrants, to be employed in forcotry,
(5,000), building (5,000), and roads (2,000).^ Later on,  ^
the Zionist Commission presented a more enlarged and 
detailed programme which raised the number ox worming 
immigrants to 1?,000. 55 The schedule was generally 
approved by the Government and fixed at 16,500 for the 
first year. It was also agreed that those immigrants 
could be accompanied by their families, i.e. wife and 
children under 16 and persons wholly dependent upon them, 
but for the purposes of the schedule members of the xdnily 
would not count.^ The number of labour immigrants 
including their families was likely to reo.ch 70,000, thus 
doubling the Jewish community in Palestine in the course of 
one year.
Encouraging reports of great enthusiasm for immigration 
to Palestine,from Zionist Offices in Europe, assured the 
Zionists that they could easily fulfill the proposed 
schedule. Furthermore, Samuel agreed to a request from 
the Zionist Commission'that all immigrants who had boon 
detained in Europe and neighbouring countries of Palestine 
during the Military Administration should bo allowed to 
enter without restrictions before the enforcement of the *356
3A. Minutes of Samuel’s interview with members of Z.C.,
2.7«20., I.S.A. 2/53.
35. Z.C. to Morris, 18.7*20., I.S.A« 11/3/3«
36. "Instructions.to Consuls", 20.8.20«,see appendix
28«
Immigration Ordinance.^ This liberal policy - which
continued also alter the Ordinance became valid on 1st
September 1920 - brought 4-,000 immigrants to Palestine by
the end o! October, almost all of them with the sanction of
38 1the Zionist Commission.
, Although these numbers were still far less than agreed 
in the schedule, the Zionist Commission very soon found 
itself in serious difficulties in providing employment and 
minimum means of subsistence for the new arrivals. These 
difficulties placed the Commission in a grave dilemma..
On the one hand they did not dare to ask the Government to 
restrict 'immigration, o.pparently to avoid bringing their 
failure into the open and thus creating a dangerous 
precedent of restrictions. On the other hand, to leo.ve the 
flow of immigration as it was, could only worsen the 
situation;. The most honourable way out was to report to ' 
the Zionist Executive in London and ask them to post pane, 
labour immigration for a tine. "The present mode of 
immigration" stated a report from Palestine "means nothing 
loss than an early collapse, an early .emigration and the 
destruction of every possibility to create in the near 
future the conditions for a more orderly and more extensive 
i m m i g r a t i o n " Y e t  the Zionist Executive, placed in the 
same dilemma, was neither in a hurry to spread the *389
3?. See note ■ 34 .above.
38. See.Appendix 5.
39. Dr. A Sonne, who had been sent from London to Palestine 
to examine the Z.C.'s activities on the spot, in a 
report to Political Secretary, C.Z.O., 24.8.20.,C.Z.A. Z4/1247.
4-0. Ibid,ibid.
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discouraging news iron Palestine to its offices i . Europe, 
nor was it in a position to admit its difficulties to 
the Foreign Office.
Samuel, doubtless well aware of the situation, also 
refrained from harming the Zionists' image at such an 
early stage. Convinced of the Zionists' ability to obtain 
the necessary funds for a constructive absorption of 
immigration and even to grant a development loan of
■id£2.5 million to the Government for the same purpose, he
did not act instantly to restrict immigration. In his
monthly reports to London ho emphasised the flourishing -
economic future and the increasing numbers of immigrants
h Pwith independent moans.
Immigration during the first six months of the new 
regime did not run strictly according to the immigration 
scheme as proposed by Samuel and approved by the Foreign 
Office. Large groups of immigrants, mostly young pioneers 
(Halutzin), gathered at the main ports and cities of Eastern 
Europe ready to leave for Palestine. On tlieir behalf, 
local Zionist Offices pressed the British Consuls for 
visas and the- Consuls requested instructions from London.
The Foreign Office, "extremely satisfied with the'way
¿17events wore shaping up in Palestine", instructed its
41 . Samuel to Curzon, 13.9.20., F.O. 4-06/4-4 file E1194-7/85/44.
42. Samuel to Curzon, 29.1 1 .20., F.O.371/5085 file E15029/ 
476/4-4; also 17.12.20., F.O.371/6382 file E440/144-/88; 
ibid, E2346/144/88.
43. O.A. Scott of the,Eastern Department, F.O. to Samuel 
Landman, General Secretary, C.Z.O., London, 3»8.20., 
C.Z.A. Z4/25004
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representatives in Europe to grant visas to immigrants
recomraended by the local branches of the Zionist Organisation. 
It would appear that no-one in Whitehall had paid serious 
attention to the fact that immigration under this category 
was limited numerically and that the British Consuls were 
not authorised to exceed the Immigration Schedule. In 
Bratislava, for instance, in a short space of time the 
British Consul franked 700 visas for immigrants recommended 
by the local Zionist Office. v
Samuel, aware of the danger of this procedure, cabled
to London: "it conflicts with policy approved by you of
limitation of immigration according to economic capacity of
the country to absorb immigrants and with arrangements with
the Zionist Organisation for agreed schedules of immigrants
and their responsible persons introduced by them", and urged
46that Consuls bo instructed accordingly. ' But Foreign
Office officials interpreted this as if Samuel was intending
to limit immigration only to immigrants recommended by the
Zionist Organisation p„nd would not agree to make any
47further changes.
. 44
44-. See.F.O. instructions to H.M. Consuls in Europe, 15.7.20., 
F.0.37^/5184 file E7189/4-76/4-4-.
45. Leonard Stein, Acting Political Secretary, C.Z.O., 
London, in notes on interview with Parkin of Passport 
Department, F.O., 15.10.20, C.Z.A. Z4-/963.
46. Samuel to F.O., tel. 195, 18.8.20., F.0.371/5184, 
file El 0630/476/44.
47. O.A. Scott, F.O., minutes dated 25.8.20., ibid; also 
F.O. to Samuel 28.8.20., ibid.
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'F : ATTEMPTS TO RESTRICT IMMIGRATION
After prolonged hesitations the Zionist .Executive 
decided to reveal its difficulties to the Foreign Office.
This delicate and rather unpleasant task fell to Leonard 
Stein, the young Acting Political Secretary of the Zionist 
Executive.
At an interview with R.Ï. Parkin of the Passport Control 
Department at the end of October, Stein revealed the 
financial difficulties of the Zionist Organisation in , 
absorbing immigrâtion and asked for the immigration schedule 
to be reduced from 16,500 as agreed,to 1 ,000. After indiretly 
accusing the British Consuls of exceeding their allocation, 
he urged that no further visas be granted to those
l-\- Qrecommended by the Zionist Offices until further notice.
From this interview and further contacts with the
Zionists, Foreign Office officials gathered that the
Zionist Organisation was holding the Passport Control
Officers and the Consuls responsible for lack of control,
thus ridding themselves of any responsibility for those 
zj.qimmigrants. This fooling became more concrete after the 
Zionists requested that the words: "employment and 
accommodation in Palestine for a period of ono year from 
the date of arrival" be deleted, from their own 'written 
obligation to take core of recommended immigrants on the
4-S. R.T. Parkin, minutes dated 22.10.20., F.0.371/5185. file E12987/A76A4.
^9. Parkin^ , minutes dated 26.10.20., ibid. Later on, he 
described these Zionist attempts to be "a typical 
example of a Dead Sea red herring", minutes, 9 . 1!2.20. 
F.O.371/5185, file E150 3/A76/A4
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grounds ’’that the words night be taken _ to imply some 
obligation by the Zionist Organisation towards the 
individual” A few days later, the Zionists declared 
unequivocally'that "no financial responsibility can be 
accepted by the Zionist Organisation in respect of 
immigrants who arc not vouched for by the authorised 
Zionist Representatives.”
Parallel to the Zionist's diplomatic attempts to 
restrict immigration by utilizing the Foreign Office 
machinery, the Central Zionist Office in London evolved a 
rigid and complex system of control in order to centralize 
supervision over its Offices and regulate immigration«
The new system included: allotment of1a limited number of 
Immigration Certificates to every Zionist Office and 
official recommendation forms to be supplied only by the 
Central Office, Specimens of both forms were sent through 
the Foreign Office to all British Consuls and Passport - 
Control Officons,with the intention of avoiding forgeries 
and irregularities, either of individuals or of tho Zionist 
Offices, When this machinery was finally sot up at the 
end of 1920 and the Central Office issued the first A00 
"authorised" certificates to its branches, over 5?000 
"recommended” immigrants had already entered Palestine.^ 
During the following months, the Central Office, in response
50. L, Stein to F.O. 18.10,20,, P.O.371/5185 file El 2987A 7 64-^4- o
51. Parkin’s notes on meeting with Stein, 22,10.20., ibid.
52. C.Z.O. to F„0., F.O.371/5185 file El 5909/476/AA.
53. Soe Appendix 5.
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to constant pressure iron its brunches, continued to allocate
further certificates. 'Ey May 1921, 1,900 additional
certificates had been issued by London, while over 3,000
"recommended" immigrants without authorised certificates
54entered Palestine.
Simultaneously with the reorganisation of the Zionist
immigration system, the Central Office launched a discreet
publicity campaign with the intention of cooling down
enthusiasm for immigration. In the first circular letter
to its branches dated October 1920, the Zionist Executive
chose to give details of instructions which the Foreign
Office had issued to Consuls in August. Nevertheless, it
was brought to the attention of the Zionist branches that.
single immigrants would find employment conditions in
Palestine nore suitable than heads of families, since
salaries for unskilled workers were lov; and for "intelligent
and professional workers there are no prospects of finding
55work in their p r o f e s s i o n . T h i s  was only a slight hint
of the new policy to come. However, it seems that the
Zionist Executive did not consider the circular to be up
to date and decided to postpone its distribution. The next
month's circular was sent out with an accompanying letter,
revealing the agreement with the Foreign Office to reduce
the certificates from 16,500 to .1,000 and that bachelors
56only would be accepted as immigrants. The December 54*6
54. See relevant correspondence in F.0.371/6382 files 
E1469 E1573/144/88.
55« "Instructions concerning immigration into Palestine", 
Circular No.1, London, 15.10.20., Z4/1237.
56. C.Z.O., circular to Palestine Offices, 19.11.20., ibid.
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circular letter, "not for publication", instructed the 
Zionist representatives "to draw the utmost attention of 
every immigrant to the present existing economic and 
sanitary conditions in Palestine, to the nature of labour, 
to the unsatisfactory housing conditions and wage 
situation ..." and thus to encourage immigration only of 
"young and courageous people, steeped in idealism, with a 
pioneering spirit and who are not afraid of hard physical 
work."'^ '7
In spite of Zionist and British attempts to restrict 
inmigration into Palestine by propaganda and reorganisation 
of the machinery of control, immigration into Palestine 
during the following months did not decline, but surprisingly
COincreased even more. This apparent paradox nay be 
explained by examining the prevailing conditions in eastern 
Europe and the motives of Jews to immigrate to Palestine 
in particular.
Major Morris, Director of the Department of Immigration 
and Travel, who visited the immigration centres in Europe 
in' summer 1921, net during his tour with local British 
Consuls, Zionist workers and personally examined hundreds 
of immigrants in an'attempt to find out tho reasons behind 
the British and Zionist failure to control immigration.
In his report to-Samuel, Morris mentions the following 
reasons for this situation: the United States of America
57» C.Z.O., circular to Palestine Offices, 17»42.20., ibid.
53« 4-,995 immigrants during the first five months of the
Civil Administration in comparison with 5»657 immigrants during the five following months, see Appendix 5«
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had closed its gates to mass immigration which seriously- 
affected Jewish immigration from eastern Europe. The 
American Joint Distribution Committee (Joint) suspended 
its relief work in these countries which worsened the already 
difficult condition of the Jews there, particularly of the 
refugees from Russia and the Ukraine, who were concentrated 
in Poland and Rumania, further on in the report, Morris 
describes the motives of the Zionist Offices to encourage 
immigration to Palestine by all means whether legal or 
otherwise, in order to keep their prestige and activities 
on a high level and "to push on the development of the 
National Home by pouring in a continuous stream of 
immigrants". Nevertheless, Morris ignored the responsibility 
for oversights in control of the British Consuls, who in 
his opinion were misled by the Zionists.
Leaving aside Morris's claims and accusations,it is 
still possible to conclude that the British and Zionist 
attempts to restrict immigration failed, because they did 
not conform with the original legal and administrative 
patterns which were set up with the intention of encouraging 
lar(ge scale immigration to Palestine. In order to bring 
about a radical change in the policy it was necessary to 
change these patterns and adapt them to a selective and 
more regulated system'of control which was desirable to 
both the British and tho‘Zionists.
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Chapter Two
THE TURNING POINT - TEMPORARY 
SUSPENSION OE IMMIGRATION
A; THE PALESTINE PHASE
The failure of the Zionist Organisation during the 
first year of Civil Administration to raise sufficient 
funds for the economic absorption of immigrants, most of 
whom were without independent means, finally brought 
about a radical change in immigration policy. The 
outlining of the revised policy lasted for the duration 
of Samuel's rule in Palestine and was a result of 
political, administrative, legal and economic considera­
tions which will be dealt with respectively in the 
following chapters. However, the turning point of the 
immigration policy - the temporary suspension of Jewish 
immigration - was a direct consequence of the political 
crisis in Palestine following the May Disturbances. This 
distinction requires that the two episodes be dealt with 
separately.
The Disturbances, which broke out in Jaffa on May 
Day 1921 and spread over the neighbouring areas during 
the following week, forced Samuel into a confrontation 
with violent Arab opposition which he had feared and
Atried to prevent during his first ten months in office.
In spite of a gradual increase in political tension, which 
followed the third Arab Palestinian Congress in December 
1920, the Administration was neither mentally nor
1. Caplan, The Yishuv. pp.133-138
37
physically prepared for the extent and intensity of the 
outbreaks. In addition to a demand to set up represent­
ative self-government in Palestine as in Iraq and Trans- 
Jordan, the Arab Congress passed anti-Zionist resolutions 
calling for the immediate abolition of: the Balfour 
Declaration policy; the recognition of the Zionist 
Organisation as an official body; the use of Hebrew as 
an.official language; the services of known Zionists in 
senior posts in the Administration and suspension of all 
Jewish immigration. The Congress elected an Executive 
whose duty was to see to the fulfillment of these 
demands.^
The short visit of the Colonial Secretary, Winston 
Churchill to Palestine in March 1921, gave the Arab 
Executive an exceptional opportunity to promote its 
political aims. But, for the Arabs, the meeting with 
Churchill was disappointing, if not downright insulting.
In the first place, he refused to see a delegation of the 
Executive which had come to Cairo and would only agree 
to see them in Jerusalem. When he finally received them, 
he told them frankly that the present form of Government 
would continue for many years, declaring that "our 
children's children will have passed away by the time 
that self-government} is completed". Concerning
the Arab demand to abolish the Balfour Declaration and to 
veto Jewish immigration, Churchill's reply was short and 
blunt: "It is not in my power to do so, nor if it were in 
my power would it be my wish".^ Churchill's reaction to 23
2. Poratli, The' Emergence, pp.88-89.
3. See Churchill's reply to the Arab Delegation, 28.3.21., 
C.0.733/2 file 21689.
the demands of the Arab delegation probably did little
Atowards easing the political tension in the country.
It is very likely that Arab extremists began to seek
another more convincing means of showing thoir objection
5to the Government's Zionist policy.
After the festival of Nebi Musa in April, an event
prone to trouble, had passed by peacefully, the May Day
6outbreak was totally unexpected. During the first few
days of the Disturbances Samuel remained composed,
apparently in the belief that the outburst was incidental
and confined to the Jaffa area/ This miglt explain his
refusal to declare martial law in Jaffa from the outset,
contrary to the opinion of his senior advisers who were 
8on the spot. When finally forced by the Army to declare
Qmartial lav/, he limited this to the Jaffa district only, 
and thus the violence later spread to other districts. At 
this stage, Samuel v/as endeavouring to avoid direct and 
violent clashes with the rioters, preferring more 45678
4. See report of Captain C.D. Brunton of General Staff 
Intelligence on effects of Churchill's visit on Arab 
spirits in Palestine. "Churchill',' wrote Brunton,
"upheld the Zionist cause and treated the Arab demands 
like those of a negligible opposition to be put off by 
a few political phrases and treated like bad children". 
13.5*21., C.O. 733/13 file 32993. Churchill, typically was quite unafraid to present this report to the Cabinet, 9.6.21., ibid.
5. Porath, The Emergence, p.104-.
6. "Report on Political Situation in Palestine, April 
1921", 9.5.21., C.O.733/3 file 24-596; see also Dr. David. Eder^of the Zionist Commission, Jerusalem, to the 
Zionist Executive in London, 28.4-.21., in Friesel, Weizmann, p.260,
7. Ruppin, following an interview with the H.C. on 
second day of outbreak, Ruppin, Memoirs, p.191.
8. Wyndham Deedes, the Chief Secretary, who went 
immediately to Jaffa and Colonel Sterling, the Jaffa 
District Governor. See Samuel's long and detailed 
report to Churchill on the May Disturbances, 15.5.21., 
(Samuel's Report) despatch 107, C.O.733/3 file 25835.
demonstrative action such as the presence of warships of 
the Mediterranean Fleet facing the coast of Palestine, 
and constant patrolling by aircraft as a demonstration
of strengthen order to prevent a renewal of the outbreaks»
The question of immigration was at the centre of
events right from the very beginning of the outbreaks.
The two demonstrations, one of a Jewish Socialist party
and the other of the Communists, which clashed on May
Day and indirectly caused the outbreak of the incidents,
were composed of young Jewish pioneers, mostly new 
i iimmigrants. The first Arab attack, which claimed the
largest number of Jewish victims, was directed not
unintentionally at the Immigrants House in Jaffa, "as an
12emblem of Jewish immigration". Arab boatmen at the port 
of Jaffa, who took an active part in the disturbances, 
made clear their opposition to further disembarkation of 
immigrants;  ^ Arab leaders, while officially disapproving 
of the attacks and expi’cssing "sorrow", "regret" and
-14"sympathy" to the relatives of victims, utilized them 
for their own political purposes. Musa Kazim el Husaini, 
President of the Arab Executive, sent letters to a long 
list of personages and institutions in Great Britain and 
Europe, describing the spread of Bolshevism propagated
9* Ibid, ibid.
10. Ibid, ibid.
11. Dinur, Hahagana, Vol.B, Part I, p.?9.
12. Abcarius, Palestine, P.73; Dinur, Hahagana, pp.80-81.
13. Ibid, p.112.
14-. See minutes of the 8th meeting of the Advisory 
Council, 3.5.21., C.0.733/3 file 2A59A.
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by Jewish immigrants, as an inevitable consequence of the
15Balfour Declaration policy. ^
The focusing of Arab agitation on the question of 
Jewish immigration and Jewish Communists led Samuel to 
deal first and foremost with these two topics. Action 
against the Communists, a small outcast group, with no 
roots in Palestine and entirely lacking in public support, 
was speedy and efficient. On the first day of the 
incidents, Samuel issued appropriate instructions to 
prepare for the arrest and deportation of the Communist 
ringleaders, which began on 9 March, as well as searches 
for the Communists who had gone underground in the 
meantime.^
Settling the immigration question was a far more
delicate and complicated matter. Despite heavy Arab
pressure in favour of suspending immigration immediately,
Samuel would not give in. On the fourth day of the
rioting, he still assured the Zionists that immigration
17would not be stopped. ' On the same day, when a slight 
lull gave the impression that the incidents were at an 
end, 150 Jewish immigrants were brought ashore at Jaffa
yy ounder the protection of the Army and taken to Tel-Aviv.
15. Musa Kazim cl' Husaini to the Speaker of the House of Commons with copies to H.M. King George V, His 
Holiness the Pope, the Speaker of the House of Lords, 
and the Foreign Secretaries of Groat Britain, Prance 
Italy, Spain and the United States of America, 3.9.21., 
C.0.733/16 file 23918; also Omar Betar, President of 
the Moslem Christian Committee, Jaffa, to H.M. King George V, 12.5.21., C.0.733/16 file 24124.
16. Samuel's Report. 15-5.21., C.0.733/3 file 25835.
17. Eder's interview with Samuel, 4.5.21., C.Z.A. J1/138.
18. Dinur, Hahagana, p.83.
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In addition, a further 30-odd immigrants were allowed to
19enter Palestino clandestinely via Egypt. These facts 
contradict the generally accepted version that immigration 
was automatically suspended with the outbreak of the 
incidents.
Furthermore, during the first five days, Samuel
attempted to find various alternative means of entry for
the immigrants, without aggravating the Arabs and giving
20them a further pretext for continuing the disturbances.
One possibility was to let the immigrants off at Haifa,
the other available port in Palestine. Although the
situation in Haifa was still quiet, the Haifa District
Governor stated that he could not take repsonsibility for
21public order if Jewish immigrants were to land there.
Another alternative was to disembark the immigrants 
in Egypt and wait for the storm to subside before bringing 
them into Palestino. On 4 May, Samuel applied urgently 
to Allenby, tho British High Commissioner in Egypt, asking 
for temporary accommodation at Port Said or Alexandria for
D Oabout 300 Jewish immigrants expected that week. Allenby 
refused, ovplaining that the political situation in Egypt 
at that timo did not allow this and suggested sending 
them back to their port of embarkation.2  ^ Samuel did not 
despair and reapplied to Allenby on the following day,
19. "Administration Report, June 1921", 4.7.21.,
C.O. 733/4 filo 34950.
20. Samuel's Report, 15.5.21., P.R.O., C.O.733/3 
filo 25835.
21. V.L.E. interview with Civil Secretary, 7»5.21.,C.Z.A. J1/138.
22. Lord Allenby to F.O., 4.5.21., Tol. 279 "very urgent", 
F.O. 371/6382 file E5243/144/88.
42
this time asking only that the parties be allowed to land
at Port Said and sent on immediately by train via Kantara
0/1to Palestine. This possibility also came to nothing.
In the meantime, from the fifth day of the outbreaks, 
the situation in the country was becoming worse. "The 
facts of the Jaffa riots", stated the official report of 
the Committee of Inquiry into the disturbances, "were 
greatly exaggerated and there were stories of Moslem men, 
women and children having been murdered by the Jews".
2 5Those rumours put the Arabs in a high state of excitement.
In districts north and south of Jaffa, Arab raids were
launched on Jewish colonies and without the immediate and
effective intervention of the Army,the whole country might
26have been dragged into a civil war. It would seem that
these 'developments, accompanied by grim reports from the
27District Governors, changed Samuel1s opinion of the 
character and extent of the disturbances. He then came 
to the conclusion that the Arab movement was " a deep 
national movement", and the outbreaks "a war of the Arab 
nation against the Hebrew nation" and not "just the 
propaganda of a small band", as the Zionists endeavoured to 
describe them.^
23. Allenby, addressed to Jerusalem, repeated to P.O.,
4.5.21., P.0. 371/6382 file E5249/144/88.
24. H.C. for Palestine to Allenby, Cairo. 5.5.21., I.S.A. 
11/3/3.
25. Cmd. 1540, p.5.
26. Ibid.,ibid.
27. Samuel's report, 15.5.21., C.0.735/3 file 25835.
28. See Sokolov/1 s report to a joint session of the T.L.E., 
and Z.C., regarding his interview with the H.C.,8.5.21., C.Z.A., J/139.
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It was presumably at this stage that Samuel decided 
to suspend .immigration, including the clandestine 
infiltration of immigrants under Government auspices. The
5.5. "Sicilia", which arrived at Jaffa on 5 May with
26 Jewish immigrants on board, and the S.S. "Georgovia" on 
7 May, received permission to disembark all thSir 
passengers, with the exception of Jewish immigrants. The
5.5. "Dalmatia" with 165 immigrants on board, which arrived
• 29the following day, was instructed to proceed to Port Said.
However, the unofficial stoppage of immigration did 
not completely satisfy the Arabs, who pressed for an
30official proclamation on the suspension of immigration.
On 6 May, huge crowds of Arabs had gathered in Ramie at a
festival for Nebi Salih, threatening to attack Jewish
51settlements in the neighbourhood. The High Commissioner
instructed the District Governor by telephone to announce
there, that there would be no more immigration for the 
52time being.^ Although this declaration came from a figure 
of secondary importance, and there was no assurance that it 
had actually come from the High Commissioner, it caused 
a general furore among the Jews in Palestine.^ Rumours
29. Memo oflmm. Dept., 8.5.21., I.S.A. 11/3; also
"Situation in Palestine" enclosed in Samuel's despatch 
to C.O., 8.5.21., C.0.733/3 file 24660.
30. Minutes of meeting with the H.C., 5.5.21 , J1/138. C o Z . A .
31. ■ Medzini, Esser Shanim. p.180.
32. Dr. D. Eder in V.L.E. meeting with Sokolow, 8.5.21.. C.Z.A. J1/139.
33. Medzini, Esser Shanim. p.180.
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spread that the intention had been not only to suspend
immigration, but not to renew it and to return all Jewish
immigrants thus far in Palestine to their countries of
origin.^ At any rate, if it was Samuel's intention to
try out the effect of this statement on the Arabs, he was
to see an opposite effect than the one hoped for. Part of
the Arab crowd, encouraged by the Government's concessions
35to their demands, attacked Jewish settlements m  the area.
Samuel's decision to make a public announcement on 
suspension of immigration brought to a head the tension 
between himself and the Zionists. In frequent meetings 
with Samuel and other senior officials, Zionist represent­
atives used diverse and sometimes conflicting arguments 
in a supreme effort to prevent an official change in 
immigration policy. From the humanitarian point of view 
they emphasised the suffering of the immigrants, among them 
women and children who, having reached the shores of
Palestine after months in transit, wore to be subjected to
36further hardships. Morally, they considered this 
suspension to be a crude denial of British promises and a 
hard blow to the principles of the mandate, likely to bring 
about a loss of confidence in the British on the part of 
the Jewish people all over the world.^
34. Minutes of V.L.E. meeting with Sokolow, 8.5.21.,
C.Z.A. J1/139; see also V.L.E. petition to the II.C.,10.5.21., in Attias, Sefer ha-Toudot, pp.56-57.
35. Dinur, Hahagana, pp.90-91.
36. Attias, Sefer ha-Teudot, pp.56-57.
37. Y. Bcn-Zvi,^member of V.L.E., in his letter to the 
H.C. regarding his resignation from the Palestine Advisory Council, 11.5.21., Attias, p.60.
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From a political point of view, the Jewish leaders 
maintained that "there is no question about freedom of 
immigration.• It is a basic (jcwishj[ right, which even 
the Turks had not been able to infringe". "Change of 
immigration policy", as far as they were concerned, "will 
be the downfall of Zionism" or a "mortal blow to the 38
Zionists, which would cause despair throughout the Yishuv".
Of all their arguments, perhaps the most interesting 
were those which attempted to guide Samuel through the 
mysteries of oriental politics and help him to extricate 
himself from the complications arising out of his "weak 
policy". Yet the Zionists themselves had difficulty in 
grasping the situation clearly and unequivocally. On one 
occasion, they claimed that the outbursts were "the 
propaganda, of a small band"f on another, they were at pains 
to convince Samuel that the riots had not been spontaneous
¿l_0but planned in advance by Arab leaders. The Zionists,
having always maintained that the Arabs did not hate the
Jews, were now undecided as to how they should interpret
the riots: were they to bo seen as proof of deep-seated 
41animosity?
38. Y. Then, member of V.L.E. in an interview with the 
Chief Secretary, 7.5.21., C.Z.A. J1/139; Sokolow in joint session of V.L.E. and Z.C., 8.5.21., ibid;
Y. Een-Zvi in his letter of resignation, see note . 37 above.
39..See note 28 above.
40. Y. Ben-Zvi in V.L.E. interview with the H.C., 5.5.21C.Z.A. J1/139. ^
41. See minutes of V.L.E. and Z.C., joint session,9.5.21., ibid. *
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Despite the Zionists' difficulty in arriving at an
accurate analysis of the events, throughout all their
contacts with the Government they were consistent in their
demands for firmer action on the part of the Administration
and the Army and for more severe punishment of the rioters,
explaining that this would be the only means of a speedy
end to the x’ioting. According to the Zionists, concessions
on immigration policy would not pacify the Arabs but would,
on the contrary, be interpreted as "a justification for
their deeds and a proof of weakness of the Government...
42and will increase their appetite for more". The
conclusion towards which they were attempting to direct
the British, was that "the victory of the Arabs will
arouse in them the desire for still more and they will
soon arise not only against the Jews, but also against the
43British rule, which they desire to rid themselves of".
As a reaction to Samuel's intentions to appease the
Arabs on immigration policy, a consistent change in the
tone and vigour of the Zionist demands became apparent.
At first, they encouraged Samuel not to give in to Arab
44pressure to suspend immigration. Once aware of his 
difficulties, they suggested disembarking the immigrants in 
Egypt and bringing them into Palestine secretly and even 
offered to help organise this operation.  ^ However, when 
it became apparent that this was not realistic because of
42. Y. Thon, see note 40 above.
43. Ibid, ibid.
44. Dr. D. Eder in interview with the H.C., 4.5.21., C.Z.A. J1/138.
45. Minutes of V.L.E. meeting with the II.C., see note 40 above.
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Allenby's refusal to let the immigrants land in Egypt,
they insisted that they be allowed to land openly at
Jaffa, with the protection of the Army "to prove the
46authority of the Government".
When it became obvious that Samuel was about to
declare an official suspension of immigration, a. proposal
was made at one of the Zionist meetings in favour of
anticipating Samuel and declaring that the Jews had
decided to stop immigration "in view of the abnormal 
¿insituation". ' This suggestion was finally rejected, 
apparently so that the Arabs should not interpret it as 
a sign of weakness on the Jewish side.
The high state of frustration and despair which had
overcome the Jewish leadership in Palestine during those
emotional days, may be well illustrated by the two following
examples. On the eighth day of the outbreaks, after an
additional interview with Samuel had ended in failui?«.,
Nahum Sokolow, the moderate Chairman of the Zionist
Executive, suggested opening a "large criminal case which
would become a national spectacle, on the lines of the
4RDamascus blood-libel trial or the Bayliss trial ..." '
The following day, Dr. Eder, the Political Secretary 
of the Zionist Commission, wrote to Joseph Cowen, member 
of the Zionist Executive in London: "If the High
46. D. Yellin, member of V.L.E. in joint meeting with Z.C., see note 38 above.
47. Minutes of V.L.E. - Z.C. meeting, 9.5.21., C.Z.A. 
J1/139.
48. V.L.E. meeting with Sokolow, 8.5.21., ibid.
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Commissioner's reply re: immigration is negative, it 'is
the intention of the Zionist Commission and Jewish bodies
to resign. I have another policy in my mind, to ask the
British Government to resign, to give up the mandate in
Palestine, since they cannot carry out minimum thereof.
Not to ask any country to mandate but to leave us Jews to
have it out ourselves with the Arabs. I reckon we have
"10,000 men capable of bearing arms in the country ...
If we have to lose Palestine, I would rather we went down
fighting than were gradually extinguished. However,
perhaps all this is unnecessary, we may get a firm answer
49from Herbert Samuel".
The Zionists did not receive a "firm answer" from 
Samuel. A threat to bring about a collective resignation 
of the leading Jewish bodies in Palestine: the Jewish 
National Committee, the Zionist Commission and the Rabbinate 
was counteracted by Samuel's own threat to resign.^0
Meanwhile, Samuel concluded his deliberations and 
began outlining a new policy aimed at pacifying the Arabs 
and channelling their political initiative towards 
constructive lines within a new constitutional framework.^ 
In the meantime, to prevent a renewal of the outbreaks he 
applied urgently to the Colonial Office for permission to 
announce that he would make a statement at the King's 
Birthday Assembly on 3 June, upon "certain important
49.
50.
51.
Dr. Eder to J. Cowen, private
See note 47 above.
Samuel to Churchill, 8.5.21., 
C.0.733/3 file 24660.
9.p.c-1., C.Z.Ao Z4/16151 
despatch 82, confidential
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constitutional and administrative measures which the
Government is about to adopt with a view to establishing
harmony amongst the people", in the hope that this
announcement "will induce all sections to adopt a waiting
a t t i t u d e " . However, before approval from London had
arrived, he was informed by the Military Governor in Jaffa, .
that the situation was changing for the worse and at any
53moment disturbances might break out again. Samuel did
not delay, but cancelled the original announcement and
hastened that same night to instruct all District Governors
to publicize a fresh announcement confirming the suspension
of immigration,which had actually been in effect for ten 
54days.'
L : THE LONDON PHASE
The first news of the riots in Jaffa did not reach
the Colonial Office until the following day and then, by
means of a telephone call from a newsagency.^ An official
version from Jerusalem did not arrive until the da7/ after.
Samuel's report, although giving the large number of
victims of the first two days (40 dead and i70 wounded),
pointed out that "it was not found necessary to proclaim 
56martial law",v which gave the impression that he was in
52. Samuel to Churchill, 12.5.21., tel. 151, F.0.371/6382file E5685/144/88. , { '  ^ ’
53. Samuel to Churchill, 13.5.21., tel. 155, C.0.733/8file 23739. ’
54. II.C. to Jaffa District Governor, 13.5.21., On the
a11 °th0r Governors Kero Given instructions
55. ^e-minutis^Middio Enst Dept., 0.0., 2.5.21., C.O. 735
56. Samuel to Churchill, 2.5.21., ibid.
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full command of the situation. Churchill's feaction was
that Samuel should take strong action and "bring to
58justice persons guilty of murderous violence".
The correspondence between Samuel and Lohd Allenby
during the first week of the disturbances concerning the
disembarkation of Jewish immigrants in Egypt, was brought
to the attention of the Colonial and the Foreign Offices.
The Foreign Office decided not to take action as long as
59the Colonial Office did not request it. It seems that 
lack of support on the part of the Colonial Office for 
Samuel's demands, left intact Allenby's refusal to allow 
immigrants to land in Egypt.
During that critical week, when the Jewish leadership 
in Palestine was struggling against suspension of 
immigration, there had been no parallel initiative on the 
part of the Zionist Executive in London. It was only after 
the first round of contacts in Jerusalem had ended dismally 
for the Zionists,that the Zionist Executive was stirred 
into action. Yet, unaware of Samuel's intention to suspend 
immigration, they were unable to act accordingly. Instead, 
following reports in the British press which gave the 
impression that "the whole matter was the work of the 
Jewish Bolsheviks", the Zionist Executive devoted its 
efforts towards warding off these attacks. To this end,
57
57.
58.
59.
60.
See minutes of Middle East Dept., C.O
Churchill to Samuel, 5.5.21., ibid.
J. Murray of Eastern Department, E.O. 
P.0.371/6382 file E5249/144/88.
See minutes of Z.E. meeting, A.5.21.,
•» 5.5.21., ibid.
, minutes, 4.5.21. 
C.Z.A. Z4/302/4A.
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Samuel Landman and Joseph Cowen, members of the Zionist
Executive, met Churchill in an attempt to dispel any
rumours of connection between the Communist demonstration
and the subsequent riots. The Zionists asked Churchill to
explain these facts in a public statement, emphasising
that "the number of Jewish communists in Palestine was
insignificant". Churchill agreed and promised to "bear
61in mind" the matter of the statement.
It was at this meeting that the Zionist Executive
first learned of Samuel's intention to suspend immigration.
However, it seems that the Executive was misled by the
Colonial Office, who gave them to understand that the
Zionist Commission had agreed to the suspension of 
6?immigration. Accordingly, the Zionist Executive cabled
to Jerusalem, expressing their strong opposition to
the suspension, stating that "if the Government wishes to
stop immigration, they must do it upon their own
responsibility and that it should be quite understood by
"65them that they are doing it against our wishes. v
This situation raises some important questions: how 
could the Zionist Executive in London not have known about 
the suspension of immigration a whole week after it had 
been enforced, nor of Samuel's intention to approve this
61. See minutes of interview with Churchill, 9.5.21., ibid.
62. It seems that Churchill did not draw a very distinct 
picture to the Zionists of Samuel's steps regarding 
Jewish immigration. See Z.E. letter asking for more 
information on suspension of immigration, S. Landman to Secretary of State, C.O., 10.5.21., C.Z.A. L3/31 .
63. J. Cowen, Z.E. London, to Dr. Eder, Z.C. Jerusalem,11.5.21., C.Z.A. S6/269 .
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policy officially in the form of a declaration? Why did 
the Zionist Commission not demand the immediate intervention 
of the Zionist Executive at the Colonial Office to avoid 
such a declaration?
Eirst, one should remember that until 5 May, despite 
strong Arab opposition, immigration was not suspended and 
Jewish leaders were assured by Samuel that he had no 
intention of doing so. After immigration had 
nevertheless been suspended unofficially, they still 
hoped that Samuel would refrain from making an official
fiQdeclaration. Second, the Jewish leaders in Palestine 
wished to emphasise the national character of their 
campaign against the suspension of immigration. The Jewish 
National Council (Hava'ad Haleumi), which played a major 
role here, was a sovereign body of the Yishuv and was not 
reliant in any way upon the Zionist Executive in London. 
Third, Nahum Sokolow, Chairman of the Zionist Executive 
and second most important personality after Wcizmann in 
the leadership of the Movement, was in Palestine at that 
time and conducted all negotiations with the Administration 
personally. Weizmann, whose presence either in London or 
in Palestine was vital, was then in the United States of 
America. There were no other prominent Zionist leaders in 
London at that time,.
, Once Jewish leaders in Palestine realised that they 
would be unable to change Samuel’s decision on their own,
64-. See Sokolow's report on interviews with Samuel and Deedes, V.L.E. meeting with Z.C., 8.5.21.. C Z A J1/139. ,A*
65. See telegram signed by Sokolow, Ruppin, Eder to 7 v  
London, despatched 10.5.21., received 13.5 21 r  7 ° Z4/302/4-A.  ^ ^
they cabled to London, reporting in detail on their 
negotiations with the Administration and asked for the 
support of tho Executive in order to renew immigration 
and avoid official suspension. This telegram, despatched 
on 10 May, did not roach London until three days later, 
which gives tho impression that it was held back by the 
Administration.^ The report from Jerusalem stimulated 
the Zionist Executive to reopen intensive contacts both 
with the Colonial Office and with the Foreign Office for 
a dual purpose: to issue a pro-Zionist statement and to 
prevent repatriation of immigrants who had been refused 
entry to Palestine.
Once Churchill had agreed in principle to make the - 
statement, the Zionists were asked to prepare a draft
t
and present it to the Colonial Office for approval and 
publication. Tho Zionist Executive requested that the 
suspension of immigration into Palestine should be 
defined as a "purely temporary measure" and that "the
establishment of a Jewish National Home in that country/
has not been and will not be shaken by tho resort to
violence of certain elements.among the population of
Palestine'.'^ The statement was intended both for external
and internal needs. Externally, to incline public opinion
in Britain more towards the Zionists and to counteract the
"distorted" information which had appeared in the press;
internally, to calm the uproar among the Zionist world and
.6 7restore confidence in its leadership.
66. Seo draft Statement, 17-5-21., C.O. 733/16 file 2A338
67. See copy cable sent to Zionist! Federations n  qC.Z.A., L3/31 . ’ °  *
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The second objective, to prevent repatriation of 
immigrants to Europe, was far more complicated. Following 
the official suspension of immigration, Samuel still 
continued in his attempts to obtain Allenby's permission 
to accommodate immigrants in Egypt temporarily.®® However, 
the intensification of hostility towards the British in 
Egypt and the local demonstrations against landing Jewish
immigrants there, apparently made it inexpedient for
69Allenby to accodc to Samuel's request.
Simultaneously with Samuel's efforts, the Zionists
in London wore exerting pressure on the Colonial Office
and the Foreign Office in a last minute attempt to revoke
Allenby's decision to return the 158 Jewish immigrants -
aboard the S.S. "Dalmatia" to Constantinople. Officials
of the Colonial Office who were not convinced of the "weight
of Allenby's reasons" for not keeping these immigrants in
Egypt, supported the Zionist demand and also applied to
the Foreign Office. At the same time, they did not
entirely discard the possibility of exerting pressure on
Samuel to allow these immigrants already en route to land
in Palestine or at least to arrange for them to enter by
70train via Kantara. However, all the efforts of the
68. Allenby to F.O. - 'received yesterday ft 3 s 93 <Jerusalem, Tel.327" - 14.5.21. F O 3 7 ’’ f om file E5590/144/88. ’ ' ->?1/630t
.0. 14.5.21., F.O. 371/69. Allenby to Samuel repeated to F,6382 file E5591/144-/88. Samuel received confirmation on Allenby's difficulties from his own man, see 
C. Lambert, Palestine Immigration Officer in Kantara to Director of Immigration Department on riots in 
Alexandria, to which he was witness, 24.5.21., I.S.A. 
11/3. Nevertheless, contrary to general belief, (see* Hahagana, p.112), tt seems that Allenby allowed a 
limited number of immigrants to land in Egypt until 
10th May, see Palestine Administration Report for8.8.21., C.O. 753/5 file 42315, July,
55.
Zionist Executive proved fruitless. Colonial Office 
officials failed to persuade their colleagues at the 
Foreign Office to intervene and change Allenby's decision.
Once the Zionists realised that their attempts to
gain permission for the immigrants to land in Egypt had
failed, they focused their efforts on obtaining the
protection of British Consuls for immigrants who were to
71be returned to their ports of exit. Here the Zionists
achieved more positive results. The Foreign Office sent
instructions to its representatives in Europe to give
their "best assistance" to the local Zionist Offices
concerning these immigrants, but to avoid providing any 
72financial help. However, these instructions could not 
prevent the increasing chaos amongst thousands of 
immigrants already on route. The blame must,at least in 
part, be attributed to the British Administration for not 
sending appropriate instr-ctions in time. A whole week 
had passed between the suspension of immigration and 
Samuel's application to the Colonial Office requesting the 
Foreign Office to instruct Consuls to stop granting visas. 
This telegram was delayed at the Colonial Office for five 
days before being passed on to the Foreign Office, which
70. S. Landman to Major Young of C.O., 16.5.21., Young's 
minutes, 18.5.21., C.0.735/16 file 24-067; S. Landman to Forbes-Adam of F.O. 16.5.21., P.0.371/6382file E5670/14-4-/88. J. Murry of F.O., minutes 17.5.21. F.O. 371/6382 file E5608/144/88.
71. J. Murry's minutes, 19.5.21., F.O.371/6382 file E5608 
/144/88.
72. See the instructions, 21.5*21., ibid.
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did not send out the necessary instructions until four 
73days later.'^
During this time, over 3,000 immigrants had arrived
iit ports and main cities in Eastern Europe, most of them
74furnished with British visas for Palestine.' Because of 
this situation, Samuel urgently sent two Immigration 
Officers to Europe to control and regulate immigration on 
the spot.
D: MORRIS? S MISSION - THE CONTINENT PHASE
On 9 June, Major Morris, Director of the Palestine 
Immigration Department, and his assistant, Nathan Mindcl, 
left for Europe. They had been instructed to investigate 
each immigrant and check carefully the reliability of his 
papers and his suitability for immigration from an 
economic and political point of view. They were to pay 
particular attention to preventing the infiltration of 
Bolsheviks or any other extremist elements, with full 
authority to refuse those who did not satisfy them. ^
However, the main objective of this mission was to 
regulate immigration so that immigrants would arrive in 
Palestine in small groups of no more than 100 people and 
would come in-through throe points of entry: Jaffa, Haifa
73- H.C. for Palestine to Secretary of State for Colonio11.5.21., tel.148; G. Grindel of C.O. to P.O., 17.5. F.O. to H.M.'s Representatives 21.5.21», all in 
P.0.371/6382 file E5685/144/88.
74. See memo of Immigration Department, 14.6.21., I.S.4. 
11/3/3.
75« See "Instructions regarding immigrants awaiting admission to Palestine", 8.6.21., ibid. w '
CO C\J
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and Kantara,at reasonable intervals of time. For this
purpose the Immigration Officers had to classify the
immigrants according to their date of arrival, ports of
exit, the extent of their mobility and economic viability.
First priority was given to single men, then to families
and lastly to women and children on their own. This method
was not so much humanitarian as practical, so as to
facilitate their disembarkation and speedy dispersal in
Palestine. To this end,the Administration enlisted the
help of the Zionist Commission to organise the secret
and speedy transfer of immigrants,in groups of 50 persons,
76directly to Jewish colonies.'
At Constantinople and Trieste, the situation was at 
its worst,as the immigrants had been there the longest 
and those who had been refused permission to disembark in 
Palestine and Egypt had been returned to these two ports. 
For this reason the Immigration Officers were sent there 
first: Mindel to Trieste and Morris to Constantinople. 
Samuel instructed them to request the assistance of the 
local Zionist Organisation and British Consuls upon their 
arrival and asked the Foreign Office for the co-operation
of its representative wherever the Officers intended to 
77visit.
At Constantinople, Morris found about 500 immigrants.
In accordance with given instructions, he interviewed only 
those holding British visas and rejected the rest - about 
350 persons - on the spot. Of those holding British visas, 
he refused about half, who had obtained visas on the grounds
76. ibid, ibid.
77« H.C. for Palestine to C.O., tel.212, 8.6.21., I.S.A., 
11/5/3, clso in C.Z.A., S6/269 .
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that they were 'feelf-supporting", but who had not really 
fulfilled the required conditions of having either enough
OOmoney or definite employment.' The rest, most of them 
immigrants who had obtained guarantees from the Zionist 
Organisation before obtaining their British visa, were 
issued with fresh visas and divided into two groups which
were given permission to leave for Palestine at an interval
79of two weeks.'
At Constantinople, Morris was able to follow at first 
hand the activities of the Zionist Offices in Eastern 
Europe. In his view, these were influenced by the dual 
and sometimes conflicting functions of the Organisation: 
on the one hand to promote immigration to Palestine and 
on the other to select the immigrants. At this time of 
crisis, such a contradiction stood out more than ever, 
since, following the suspension, the Zionists felt 
their prestige shaken with the likely consequence that 
immigration and subscriptions for Palestine would drop 
significantly.®®
At Vienna, the number of immigrants was much higher 
and pressure exerted on Morris thus stronger. Here, the 
Zionists did not concern themselves only with problems of 
prestige and distrust, but with more concrete difficulties 
such as the financial burden of housing and maintaining
78. Morris to H.C. for Palestine, (21.7.2ll. I.S.A. 11/5/3 
Morris's final and official report (Morris's Report) p.2, 13.8.21., C.0.733/6 file 4-7584-.
79. Morris to Passport Control Officer in Constantinople23.6.21., I.S.A. 11/3/3.
>
*
80. Morris to H.C. for Palestine, /21.7.21.7,I.S.A., 11/3/3.
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about 900 immigrants and a worsening of relations with
O x 1the Austrian authorities. Austria, the main transit 
country for emigration from eastern Europe, threatened to 
close its gates to further Jewish immigration unless the 
Zionists could carry out their undertaking that immigrants 
would remain no longer than three weeks. This threat 
materialised after Morris had rejected a third of the
immigrants he had examined and Poland had objected to
S2their repatriation. 1
From Vienna, Morris continued to Budapest and Warsaw
and from there via Berlin to Trieste. Out of 3,^00
immigrants en route, 1,550 immigrants in possession of
British visas were interviewed by him and Mindol. About
two thirds - 1,058 - were permitted to proceed to Palestine
85and 542 were refused.  ^ Morris's hope that a delay would 
cause most of the 2,000 rejected immigrants to return to 
their own countries, did not materialise. The refusal 
of the Governments of Poland and Rumania to repatriate 
the immigrants left then no other choice but to wait at 
the ports of exit, until the normalization of immigration 
policy in September allowed.them to proceed to Palestine.
81. Robert Strieker and Dr. Martin Roscnbluth of the Zionist Office in Vienna to Major Morris 26.6.21.,I.S.A. 11/3/5. ■
82. S..L. Schmid from the Austrian'F.O., to Mr. Keeling of the British Embassy in Vienna, 5.7.21., I.S.A.11/3.
83. See memo of the Palestine Immigration Department,27.8.21., I.S.A. 11/3/3.
84. See note 78 above.
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The attitude of prospective Polish immigrants was
completely different. Out of 2,000 in possession of
British visas only 300 came to be interviewed, which
confirmed Morris's assumption that the disturbances in
Palestine and suspension of immigration had. an entirely
different effect on Jews still in their homes, than on
8Sthose already en route.  ^ This brought Morris to his 
main conclusions: first, that only efficient machinery 
of control on the spot would select and regulate 
immigration in accordance with the economic conditions 
in Palestine and second, that this control should be 
transferred from the Zionist Organisation to officers 
directly subordinate to the Immigration Department in
t "i 86Jerusalem.
85. Ibid, ibid.
86. See the Conclusions of Morris's Report, pp.22-23
18.8.21., C.0.733/6 file 47584. ’
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Chapter Three
REVIEW OF IMMIGRATION POLICY:
THE ROAD TO THE WHITE PAPER
A: OUTLINING OF NEW SCHEMES OF CONTROL
During the first week of May a new immigration policy
-1was beginning to talco shape in Jerusalem. The lesson of 
the Disturbances' obliged Samuel to take a groat deal more 
notice in the future of two principles which,in his view, 
had not boon considered strictly enough until then: "Hirst, 
that the enterprises in which the men are to be engaged 
should bo ready before the arrival of the immigrants; and 
second, that stricter control is kept over the selection of 
immigrants, individually, with a view to ensure the
2exclusion of those who are politically undesirable'.' In 
fact, these two methods were intended to achieve the same 
goal, namely to prevent the creation of a discontented 
nucleus, which was having difficulty in establishing 
itself in Palestine and liable to form a troublesome 
element.
In accordance with Samuel's instructions, the 
Department of Immigration and Travel under the supervision 
of Major Morris began working on a new scheme of control.
By the end of May the first draft was ready. According to 
the new scheme, the Palestine Administration was to be 
assigned almost full and exclusive control over immigration
1 .
2 .
Albert M. Hyanson, Department of Immigration and Travel Jerusalem, to Samuel Landman, General Secretary of ’
the Zionist Organisation, London, in a semi-official letter, 8.5.21., I.S.A. 11/2/1 .
Samuel to C.O., Despatch 82 confidential, 
0.0.733/3 file 24660. 8.5.21.
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at its sources. For this purpose, it was suggested that
several Palestine Inmigration Officers he appointed at the
principal immigration centres in Europe. These Officers
v/ould carry out all the functions previously exercised by
the British consuls and the local brances of the Zionist -
3Organisation regarding immigration.
The advantages of the new system, as indicated by
Morris himself, were as follows: first, it would enable
all examinations and investigations concerning the
applicant to be ma.de near his domicile, which would give
better insight into his political background, the
reliability of his papers and the state of his health
before he left for Palestine. Second, Palestine
Immigration Officers well acquainted with the conditions
there,would be in a better position than British consuls
to fit the potential immigrants into the country's economic
requirements. And third, "the inhabitants of Palestine .
be satisfied that immigration is properly controlled and
that numbers arc only allowed to come in as the development
q .of the country demands'.'
The main political significance of the new method 
was the obvious ousting of the Zionist Organisation from 
its dominant position in the control of labour immigration. 
Its role in the now scheme was rather indistinctive, and 
generally defined as to "co-operate with the Administration 
in the selection of immigrants'.' However, anticipating 
strong Zionist objection to the proposed scheme, Morris 34
3. "Memorándum on Immigration into Palestino", Department of Immigration and Travcl, 30.5.2-1., I.S.A. 11/3.
4. Ibid, ibid.
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suggested that the Immigration Officers "should be in
sympathy with the Zionist cause" and that it should be
made clear to the Zionist Organisation that they would
benefit by having many expenses saved to them and the 
5immigrants.
The Zionist Commission was not associated with, nor 
informed of, the new scheme. In spite of its frequent 
meetings with Samuel during May, it was unable to extract 
any information on the future policy except a general 
promise that immigration would soon be resumed, but with 
"stricter control according to the Economic Absorptive 
Capacity of Palestine". Samuel's forthright criticism 
of the Zionists' failure to absorb immigration did little 
towards easing their anxiety, nevertheless, a general 
tranquility in the country towards the end of May, and 
an improvement in the atmosphere between them and Samuel, 
aroused in them hopes that the new policy, to be made 
public on 3rd June, would not impair their position too 
drastically.^ This cautious optimism disappeared after 
Samuel had finished reading his statement. "Judas" and 
"traitor" were words which came to their lips. The 
sharpness of the Zionist reaction to Samuel's speech was 
due as much to the general apologetic and conciliatory *7
. Ibid, ibid.
. Edcr to Z.E. , reporting on his interview with the High Commissioner on 31.5.21., "confidential", 4.6 21 C.Z.A. Z4/16151• ’’
7. Ibid, ibid. This long letter, which was written at 
various intervals during the week before and after' 
Samuel's speech gives an interesting observation of some oi the Zionists' "expectations" and "disappointments"
tone of the speech as to the "dangerous" interpretation he 
had, in their opinion, given to the Balfour Declaration. 8 9
Anxious to case Arab fears of the "unhappy 
misunderstanding" o f the Declaration, Samuel gave his 
assurance that the British Government had "never consented 
and never will consent ... to their country, their holy- 
places and their lands being taken from them and given 
to strangers", and "will never agree to a Jewish 
Government being set up to rule over the Moslem and 
Christian majority". The real sense of the Balfour 
Declaration, stated the High Commissioner, was that "the 
Jews, a people that are scattered throughout the world, but 
whose hearts are always turned to Palestine, should be 
enabled to found here Jin Palestine]/ their home, and some 
among them within the limits that are fixed by the numbers 
and interests of the present population, should cone to 
Palestine in order to help develop the country by their
resources and efforts to the advantage of all the 
9inhabitants".
The omission of the term "national" i r o n  "Horae for 
the Jewish people" and making the right of Jewish 
immigration subordinate to the "interests of the present 
population" were interpreted by the Zionists as an attempt 
to obscure the political weight of the Declaration and to
8. Ibid, ibid; Ruppin, Memoirs, p.191.
9. See Samuel's speech of 3rd June enclosed in
139 to C.O., 6.6.21., c.0.733/3 file 30263. P
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diminish British support of the Zionist c a u s e . T h e  
concrete implications of this new approach far future 
immigration policy were, as Samuel himself announced in 
his speech: first that immigration should be 'tetrictly 
proportioned” to the employment available in the country; 
second, that the enforcement of immigration policy would 
remain exclusively in the hands of the British authorities 
in Palestine and abroad; and finally that nothing "in the 
nature of a mass immigration” would be permitted.
In his Statement, Samuel not only presented tho 
general principles of the new policy, but entered into 
details of the method which w o u l d ensure adherence to 
these principles. His scheme, which disregarded Morris' 
proposals, was based on the principle of classifying 
immigrants into various categories according to their 
professional make-up and their potential contribution 
to the economy of the country.
The idea of dividing immigrants into categories was 
not new, but rathor an elaboration of the former method 
outlined by Samuel himself and in force until May 1921 
According to the old scheme, immigrants wore divided into 
two main categories "A" - Zionists, persons coming under 
the auspices of the Z i o n i s t  Organisation and - persons 
other than Zionists. The latter category included these 
who were self-supporting and people able to obtain 
employment in Palestine, persons of religious occupation 
with sufficient moans of maintenance and families of
For a comprehensive discussion of this sec Caplan, . 
The Yishuv, pp.174-184; also Friesel, V o i z m a n i^ s  First Piters, "'ppT262-265i Attics, Sofer Ha-Toudoc, pp.fcffi. I-Mlh. The Emergence, pp.lZ57=TO5:
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those at present resident in Palestine. These groups 
formed the basis of Samuel's new scheme for seven separate 
and better-defined categories in the following order:
"A" - Travellers. Persons who do not intend to remain in Palestine for a period exceeding 
three months.
"B" - Persons of independent means who intend to 
J' take up permanent residence in Palestine.
"C" - Members of professions who intend to fellow their calling.
"D" - Wives, children and other persons wholly dependent on residents of Palestine.
"E" - Persons who have 0. definite prospect of employment with specified employers oi­
ent erprises.
up" _ persons of religious occupations, including
the class of Jews who have come to Palestine' in recent years from religious motives and who can show that they have means of maintenance hero.
12. "g"' - Returning residents.
11
The most prominent change in the new system was 
the abolition of the former category "A” - those who 
had come with the sanction of the Zionist Organisation, 
which consisted of over CO# of immigration prior to 
the suspension. 15 According to the new proposals, labour 
immigration including those under the sanction of the 
Zionist Organisation, would bo .able to enter Palestine 
within category "E", but only if they followed "a 
particular specified trade and have a definite prospect 
of employment with specified employers or enterprises".
In this way, Samuel abolished the pool of labour schedules
11. See "Instruction to Consuls regarding Granting of Visas" Appendix 2.
12. Samuel to Churchill, Despatch 227, 16.7.21.,
C.0.733A  file 37660.
13. 9191 immigrants with Zionist Commission guarantee, out of total of 10.,632 immigrants,, Appendix 3.
6?.
which had given the Zionists exclusive priority in 
selecting and regulating immigration, according to their 
own discretion.
The second significant change in Samuel’s scheme was 
the enlargement of powers of control of the Department of 
Immigration and Travel in Jerusalem, at the expense of 
both the British Consuls and the Zionist Offices. Under 
the new scheme, it was necessary to refer to Jerusalem
applicants without independent nccuis cl^Soified in 
the following categories: "C" - members of professions,
”D” - persons dependent on residents of Palestine and 
"E” - persons who had specific employment in Palestine. 
British Consuls were also requested to apply to Jerusalem 
in all irregular and doubtful cases before accepting or
n • -h ^rejecting the applicant.
On these points there was no real difference between 
Samuel's and Morris's schemes. Both intended to limit as 
far as possible dependence upon the Zionists and the 
British Consuls and to transfer the control over 
immigration from their hands to the Immigration Department 
in Jerusalem. It would soon prime, facie, that the only 
difference between the two systems was the question 
whether control over immigration should bo carried out 
by permanent or current instructions from the Immigration- 
Department, or by Immigration Officers subordinate to the 
Department but situated in Europe. However, this 
difference, in spite of its technical appearance, reveals 14
14. See note 12 above.
an essential difference in attitude between Samuel and 
Morris to the entire question of immigration.
Morris, as head of the Immigration Department - a 
small and unimportant part of the Palestine Administration 
was undoubtedly in favour of expanding its scope and 
activities. Doing.an administrative rather than a 
political personality, Morris was less sensitive than 
Samuel to the political implications of the immigration 
question. His proposal to place Immigration Officers 
in Europe was intended to improve control over immigration 
without necessarily limiting its extent. His scheme made 
it possible to come to a quick and correct decision on 
each case on the spot, allowing a smooth stream of 
immigration into Palestine.
Samuel on the other hand, was more sensitive to the 
political effect of immigration, and the May Disturbances 
only served to increase his sensitivity. To prevent 
failure in control as had happened in tho past, he 
insisted on the necessity of concentrating control over 
immigration in Jerusalem in the hope of achieving the 
strictest possible control. The division of immigrants 
into seven categories and frequent references to Jerusalem 
regarding a groat number of the cases, made the method 
complicated and inflexible. Although aware of those 
deficiencies, Samuel did not scorn to be particulorlv 
worried.about the result of his policy, which was liable 
to reduce immigration significantly, as it suited his 
general "gradualist" policy for the building up 0f tho
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Jewish National Hone. .For this reason, Morris's proposal 
to set up a wide and expensive network of control in 
Europe became superfluous.
Shortly after ho had finished outlining his scheme, 
Morris left on his Mission to the Continent. It seens 
that at this stage his scheme had not reached the ears 
of either the Colonial Office or the Zionists. On the 
other hand, Samuel's scheme, as publicly announced in his 
Statement o f  3 r d  J u n e and approved post factum by 
Churchill, ^ w a s already in force by the end of May.* 16
.13: . ZIONIST CAMPAIGN IN LONDON: EFFORTS 10 TUHN Ik Ou
THE CLOCK
Z i o n i s t  p a r t i c i p a t i o n  during the f i r s t  s t a g e s  o f  
outlining the new immigration policy was, as wc have seen, 
quite insignificant. This was a direct result of two 
main factors: the tension between Samuel and the Zionist 
Commission following the May Disturbances and the -■•¡•»dest 
role delegated to the Zionist Organisation in the new
scheme. \
The Colonial Office, however, showed a different 
attitude to the future role of the Zionists in controlling 
immigration and a greater readiness to co-operate with • 
then in elaborating a new policy. This attitude was 'due 
to good relations maintained with the Zionist Executive
15« Churchill to Samuel, tel.122, 2*6.21
C.0.733/3 file 26711. *’
16. Samuel to Churchill, tel.177, 21- S 21 t o ,7 '•./»‘- l o ,  r .o . ii .  <1/3.
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during and after the flay Disturbances, as well as to a 
certain disagreement with Samuel's behaviour during the 
Disturbances. ' British goodwill was expressed not only- 
in the frequent meetings between officials of the Colonial 
Office and members of the Zionist Executive during May 
and June, but also by British efforts regarding the
A p
deportation of immigrants to Europe. °
O n e  m a y  d e d u c e with certainty that the efforts of 
the Colonial Office were intended to bring the "tragic 
results" of the suspension of immigration’to as speedy an 
end as possible and to come to a satisfactory agreement 
with the Zionists over the immigration question.
Nevertheless, the impression remains that at thjs stage ' 
t h e  Colonial Office was more anxious to reach an 
agreement oveir this question than the Zionists, T h i s  
phenomenon might be explained by increasing sensitività 
at the Colonial Office to public opinion and anti-Zionist 
criticism in Parliament of policy in Palestine. The 
Government was accused of placing a heavy and unnecessary 
financial burden on the "British tax-payer" in order to 
keep up its Z i o n i s t  policy, which appeared to be contrary 
to the wishes of the majority of the population of 
Palestine and whose moral value and contribution to the 
British interest were n o w called into question.^ 178
17. See notes of interview of J. Cowen and S. Landmen -r 
Z.E. with Churchill, 9.5.21., "confidential" C 7 ZV302/4A; "Notes of conversation at the C o l o n i c i ’ r y - r  ■
14.5.21., "confidential", ibid; Richard Lichtbe?m 1C° » member of /-,E. to Wcizmann, 24.5.21, C 7 /Weizmann t o  Schmarya Levin, member of Zionist- r.
15.7.21., W.i.j MoinoJtehagan, Middle Ef£t ÍiÍr?í®CUtlV0pp.101-102. ------- -zaires,
18. See Chapter 2,pp.57-56
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The anti-Zionist lobby in Parliament became stronger, 
particularly in the \Aouse of Lord3, and was supported 
by newspaper "tycoons" such as Lord Northcliffe and Lord 
Beaverbrook.c
As in Jerusalem in May and now in London, it was clear
to all parties concerned that imraigratinn policy was t h e
root o f the Palestine problem. As in tlio past, it was
once more obvious, that to obtain a solution to the
political entanglement it was vital to settle the question
of immigration. The search for such a solution was
accelerated by the news of the impending arrival of
21the Palestine Arab Delegation to London. It seems that
Churchill wished to reach an agreement with the Zionists
over the question of immigration before the arrival of
the Delegation. An agreement such as this would have
freed the Colonial Office from simultaneous negotiations
with the Zionists and the Delegation. Palling this,
Churchill suggested, it would be best for the two sides
to meet and come to a "working agreement" on this question.
To this end, Churchill exerted much pressure on Woizmann* 22 23
and also on the Arab Delegation, soon after their arrival
2 *in London at the beginning of August,
19
20 
21
S e e  "Notes of Conversation at the Colonial Office"
14.5.21., "confidential", C.Z.A, Z4/302/4A, ’
V/eizmann, Trial, p.3^9; Porath, Emergence, p.37, pp.m'
See "Moslem-Christian Delegation to Europe" a kJohn Shuckburgh, head of Middle East Dept.,’at thr r ' n
23.7.21., C.o: 733/13 file 37329; "Palestine” memo °’ ’ submitted to the Cabinet by See. ox State for
11.8.21., CAB. 24/12?. 011103
22. Soe"Notes of conversation held at Mr. Balfour* h -no,
on 22.7.21.; Meinertzhagen,Middle East, pp.103-106-G°** * minutes of Z.E. meeting 3.8.21. C.Z„A'„ Z^/gn^/XLA ’
23. See note 24 below. ’ c~
However, the Zionists were neither too enthusiastic
at that moment over the idea of meeting the Arab
Delegation nor over-anxious to arrive at an immediate
solution to the immigration question. What they considered
a more pressing priority was to halt what seemed to them
"a dangerous process of deterioration" in the attitudes
of the Administration and public opinion in Britain towards
2Athe realisation of the National Home. ‘
The only personality among the Zionist leaders 
competent enough to halt this process was Weizmann. It 
will be remembered that Weizmann had spent the critical 
period of May-June in the United States on a publicity and 
fund-raising campaign in connection with the opening of 
activities of the Keren Hayesod (Jewish Foundation Bund) 
in A m e r i c a . T h e  crisis which had overcome the American 
Zionist Movement at that time prevented his immediate 
return to London, in spite of urgent pleas from his 
colleagues to the effect that the "whole political work
of the last five years" depended upon his urgent presence
. T , 26 m  London.
Ueizrnann returned to London at the beginning of July 
and began intensive contacts with top British political 
figures, as well as Colonial Office officials, bringing 
up the entire question of Palestine. Ilis efforts wore 
directed towards - strengthening the traditional Zionist 
argument.of the "identity of interest" between Great
.Weizmann to his wife Vera, 1A.8.21., W.A.; during conversat­ion at Balfour's house (see note 22 above), Weizmann 
considered the Arabs as "political blackmailers" and said that he could only talk to them when he knew the position of the British Government.
Britain and Zionism, an argument which seemed to have been 
weakened by the aftermath of the May Disturbances. In 
this, he was helped by personal impressions of his recent 
visit to the United States. In his talks,he accentuated 
the strengthening and expansion of the Zionist idea among 
American Jewry and the current trend of anti-British 
feeling in American public opinion and Administration
27circles, which could lead to war between the two countries,;
The conclusion to be drawn from those two developments, was
clear - firm British support of the Zionist cause in
Palestine would greatly improve Britain's image in the
United States. Balfour was apparently impressed by
Weizmann's arguments and suggested a meeting at his home
with the Prime Minister and the Colonial Secretary at .which
V/cizmann would be given the opportunity to voice his
28claims before a "sympatnetic circle".
The meeting, held on 22nd July, fulfilled those 
vpoetations. Weizmann was the main spokesman and his 
points received the full support of Lloyd George and 
Balfour, while Churchill, attempting to justify Samuel's 
policy in Palestine, placed himself in the minority.
Weizmann began with his impressions of the United States 
and passed on to an analysis of the serious effects of 
Samuel's speech of 3rd June 6n the Zionist cause. In his 
opinion, the speech was contradictory to the Balfour
25. Weizmann, Trial, pp.333-34-2; Priosel, Weizmann. 
pp.236-256.
26. Z.E. London, to Weizmann, Now York, 14-,5.21., C.Z.A.. 
L3/31 ; Eder to Weizmann, 6.5.21., ibid, Z4/305/9«, *5
27„ Weizmann to Balfour, 6.7.21., W.A.; Meinertzhagen .Middle East, pp.100-101. •’
28, Priesel, Weizmann, pp.263- 254.
Declaration, proposing an immigration policy which would
a b s o l u t e l y  prevent the creation of a Jewish majority in
Palestine. Balfour and Lloyd George agreed with this,
stating that "by the Declaration they M  always meant
29an eventual Jewish State".
Weizmann chose to give his arguments the form of a 
general protest, without suggesting concrete solutions 
to the various problems he had brought up, among them 
tho question of immigration. But Churchill saw this latter 
point as a vital issue and pressed Ucizmann to state 
"what would satisfy him in the way of immigration?".
Weizmann was careful to mention neither numbers nor the
method which in his opinion was suitable and avoided both
those points by saying that, firstly, British support must
be ensured for the economic development of Palestine, to
make possible the smooth absorption of Jewish immigrants.
Finally, it was agreed by all sides that they should strive
towards finding practical solutions to the various
50questions raised at the meeting.
Following this concession, Woizmann later met 
Churchill and discussed with him all the "burning problems" 
in Palestine, such as approval of the Mandate; change of
29.
50.
"Note of conversation", see note 22 above.
For Weizmann's impression of that conversation see 
Weizmann to Achad Ha'am, the well-known Zionist thinker30.7,21., W.A.; Weizmann to Wyndham Deedes, Chief Secretary of Palestine, 31«7.£-1», ibid; Weizrnann to Shuckburgh "private and personal , 16.11,21., C.Z.A. 
Z4-/16055; for impression at Colonial Office see "minutes of covering letter" by Shuckburgh to his memo "Political Situation m  Palestine", 7.11.21.,
C.0.753/15 file 57572.
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anti-Zionist officials in the Palestine Administration;
the setting up of a Jewish police force; punishment of
Arab rioters connected with the May Disturbances; approval
of Gutenberg's electricity concessions for the development
of industry and agriculture; and lastly, the question of
immigration. On this matter Churchill undoubtedly shocked
Weizmann,by suggesting that complete control of Jewish
immigration into Palestine bo transferred to the Zionist
Organisation« Weizmann rejected this proposal as ’’not
practical, so long as the Government of Palestine had the
power to expel persons"« It seems that in reality, it was
V/eizmann's scepticism about the ability of the Zionist
Organisation to control .immigration efficiently which
prevented him from accepting the proposal« Instead, he
suggested that the control should remain in the hands of
the British authorities, but that co—operation with the
Zionist Organisation should be strengthened. Finally,
Weizmann asked that "immigration must be restricted for
„31the time being.
Weizmann's objection to taking full control over 
immigration and his demand to restrict it temporarily 
represented the official policy of the Zionist Executive. 
This policy was presented in a confidential circular to 
the members of the Action Committee (the enlarged Zionist 
Executive) and to the Presidents of the Zionist Federations
51. This meeting was mainly based on topics of the r/ n memo submitted to Churchill on 21.7«21«, one dav°’°Uf the meeting at Balfour’s house, seo memo in r r/ n?!0/!0
file 38128; see also Weizmann ' s report of fh° ™ 'g- ^  with the Secretary of State in minutes of 7 ncctlng 
meeting on 3.8.21., C.Z.A. Z4/302/AA. * ■
in August 1921, shortly before the 12th Zionist Congress. 
Referring to the suspension of immigration and Samuel's 
speech of 3rd June, the Executive explained, the principles 
of its policy: "The Executive has protested and will 
protest against these or any other restrictions placed upon 
Jewish immigrants on the part of the Government. At the 
sane time the economic soundness of tnese /oamuel's1 
conditions, however unpleasant, cannot be contested".
The leaders of the Federations were surely surprised to 
discover the Zionist Executive's opposition even to the 
immediate departure of those who had Peon stranded in 
Europe,as a result of the suspension of immigration: "Wo 
are well aware of the suffering, both moral and material, 
of the Halutzim, (Jewish pioneers) in Warsaw, in Vienna 
and in Trieste. Eut it would bo suicidal for us to 
transfer the unpleasant and degrading spectacle of our 
impotence in dealing with the Halutzim movement from 
Warsaw and Vienna to Jerusalem and Jaffa. The Executive 
must therefore, state that while strongly protesting against 
t h e  stoppage of immigration, it is compelled to emphasise 
that a sound influx of immigrants can only proceed apace 
with the growth of the financial resources of the Zionist 
Organisation and the Keren Hayesod .
In the meantime, the Colonial Office had received 
further details and explanations of Samuel’s scheme, which 
they believed if "generously construed", would satisfy the
76.
32 "The Jaffa Events” - circular letter to members
* 0f the Action C o m m i t t e e  a n d Presidents of Federations July 1921, J»A* 
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Zionists.^ Churchill had since met Weizmann and tried to 
obtain his personal agreement to the new schone, in order 
to enforce it as s o o n  a s possible. It seems that Woizmann 
agreed to t h e  scheme, his only objection being the
necessity for p r i o r  reference of each case recommended by 
the Z i o n i s t  Organisation to Jerusalem. This reservation 
was accepted by Churchill, who ashed Samuel to approve it.^
The extensive correspondence between the Colonial 
Office and the High Commissioner concerning this 
apparently trivial Zionist request shows up the differences 
in attitude-, or rather the Colonial Office’s misunderstanding 
of Samuel's new policy. Samuel saw in the proposed, 
amendment a serious threat to his entire- scheme, which 
intended to relievo the Zionist Offices in Europe of the;-’ 
privileged role in,selection and regulation of immigration, 
particularly labour immigration. Ho therefore insisted 
that final authority in all cases coming under labour
category ”E", must rest with the Pale;¡tine Administration.^
33. See Samuel's proposals in Despatch 227, 16.7,21. and minutes by Richard. Meinertntagon, then Military Adviser of Middle East Department, C.O., 3.8.21. both in C.O. 733/4 file 37850.
34. Churchill to Samuel, t e l g o  o n* _ „ „ file 57860s ill. this mooting WoisnaTO h b n i ? ' o 7 A ’ Colonial Offico an additional memo* to tllGthe new phases of Jewish actiriti« on
see also minutes by Major Xouna- oi' S f ^ 1?0 •Office resardino this mono, 1 7'.a h tilc Colonial 
C.O. 733A  file .41795;. ' borh in
35. Samuel to Churchill, tel.360 s Q pi « «file 44737. ' ’ p*^o£r1*’ C.O.733/6
36. Gerald L.M. Clauson of Middle ?oof nninutes, 6.9.21., ibid.' St ^P^tment, C.0
37 During those three years immigrated to Palestine, 
came..under the - guarantee see Appendices 6 and 7.
lea
but;of
3 than 30,000 Jews 
only- about half of them 
the Zionist Organisation,
However, the Colonial Office considered this to be 
an inefficient and impractical system "if the case of 
every one of the 100,000 immigrants whom it is hoped to 
introduce into Palestine in the course of the next throe 
years", would be r e f e r r e d  back.3 6  T h i s  estimate of 
immigration to come indicates more than anything else 
the significantly different concepts between the Zionist 
Organisation and the Colonial Office on the one hand 
and Samuel's gradualist policy on the other.^
The Zionist cause received support from an unexpected 
source with the arrival of Major Morris in London,at the 
beginning of September. Morris strengthened the Colonial 
Office's approach "for giving the Zionist Organisation 
the right to settle immigrants to whom they can gievrantee 
employment without the necessity for referring each 
individual case to the High Commissioner."^® in Morris's 
opinion it was "obvious that immigration is the foundation 
on which the National Home must be built up, so it is to 
the interest of the Palestine Government that immigrants 
who are allowed to enter Palestine should be the best
possible immigrants that can be found ...„39
Samuel finally gave in to pressure from London on
this issue and agreed that the Colonial Office should
continue contacts with the Zionists and arrive at a working
1-0agreement concerning the new scheme. Nevertheless,
33. See note 36 above.
39. G.L.M.Clauson, minutes, 7-10.21., C.0.733/6 
file 4 9 714.
4-0. Samuel to Churchill, tel.381, 21.9.21.; see Clouson'^ minutes on Samuel's reply 23.9.21., both in C 0 7aa/g file 4 7 4 4 3; Samuel to Churchill 4. 10.21., tel*aog 9/
4.10.21., C.O. 733/6 file 49714. "
79
negotiations were postponed until the return of Weizmann 
and Sokolow to London, as Colonial Office officials had 
"a very little confidence in the other members of the 
Executive to taro the broad and sensible view which this
ZJ.-1matter requires".
Meanwhile, sharp criticism in Morris's Report, which
had now reached London, of the failure of the Zionists to
control immigration satisfactorily, caused the Colonial
Office to re-examine its stand on the intended role of
the Zionists on control of immigration. British
flexibility and understanding of the Zionists' demands gave
way to disappointment and impatience when the Zionists would
not "come and put all their cards on the table",• Pending
talks with the Zionists it was decided to re-examine the
whole question on the basis of the Morris Report and
q 2prepare points for discussion.
The Colonial Office's re-examination did not change 
its basic concept regarding the Zionists' role in control 
of immigration. However, this now depended upon whether 
the Zionists would succeed in persuading their British 
colleagues that past oversights would not be repeated. The 
Colonial Office therefore requested to know hdV the 
Zionist Organisation would ensure that the selected 
immigrants would be politically and socially suitable as 
settlers, and technically and physically qualified for
zl-1. Clauson's minutes, 7»10»21., ibid. 
^P.Shuckburgh to Clauson, minutes, 12.10.21., ibid
4.8their destined jobs in Palestine. If satisfactory 
answers could be given to those questions it was proposed 
to give t h e  Zionist Organisation a trial period; but i f  
t h e  mistakes of the past would recur it would be necessary 
"to take control out of their hands" and appoint British
4-/-1Immigration Officers to do that job".
The Morris Report, which caused the Colonial Office 
to re-examine its attitude to the immigration question, 
also stimulated the Zionist Executive into action. 
Information about the existence of the Report and about 
the severe criticism levelled against the Zionist 
Organisation,worried the Zionist Executive in London. The 
Executive requested its people in Jerusalem to send them 
the Report urgently, but Morris continually postponed 
sending the Report to the Zionist Commission and finally 
left for London without letting them have it. Jerusalem 
suggested instead that the Executive should forward its 
comments to the Colonial Office in some unofficial 
manner,"to rectify the bad impression which may have been
/iccreated by the Report". ' However, t h e  Zionists m
Jerusalem apparently succeeded in obtaining a copy of the
46Report and sent it urgently to London. So that‘.while 
Colonial Office officials were outlining their policy on 
the basis of the Report's findings and having personal *IS
o n a "Memorandum on Jewish immigration into Palestine”,
IS 10 21 ibid: also in I.S.A. 11/6, prepared by 
01*uson and S.M. Campbell; see Shuckburgh in minutes to ' Bir Tames E. 'Mastcrton-Smith, Permanent Under-Secretary 
S  State for the Colonies, 20.10.21., C.O.733/6 file47914 
44. Clauson in minutes, 7.10.21., ibid, ag nr M Eliash of Z.C. Jerusalem, ro Leonard Stein, Political Secretary of Zionist Organisation, London,
18.9«21> C.Z.A. S6/296 .
46. Stein to Eliash, 6.10.21., ibid.
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consultations with Major Morris, officials of the Zionist
Executive in the offices at Great "Russell Street,were 
preparing their own comments on the Report. It seems 
that the Executive was firm in its opinion that there 
was no point in entering into concrete discussions on 
the question of immigration,before being given an 
opportunity to present their own interpretation on the 
subjects with which Morris had dealt in his Report.
The apologetic and controversial nature cf the 
Zionists' comments on the Morris Report certainly made it 
more difficult to obtain a clear picture of their opinion 
regarding future control of immigration. But in actual 
fact their observations were not intended to give such 
a picture ,but rather to contradict Morris's findings. Yet 
it is not difficult to deduce from the Zionists' memorandu 
that they were attempting to renew the previous system 
of control. In thc-ir defence, the Zionists pointed out 
that the old method had been in use for only a very short 
period and that some time was required to enable their 
Offices to adapt themselves to the Regulations; that the
cautious policy of the Executive had itself reduced the 
number of Zionist guaranteed immigrants from 16,500 familio 
to 2,300 persons; and that the Consuls had full 
responsibility for "nori-guaranteed" immigrants, a fact
which Morris had completely disregarded in his Report,
4-7 "Comment on the Report of Major Morris «. C.Z.A., S6/272 . The "comments" were mos written by L. Stein, see note 45 above.
t " 29.10.21 probably
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Nevertheless, the Executive did admit that there
had been shortcomings in the Zionist Control,which were
caused by the financial dependence of the Palestine
Offices on the local Zionist Federations. The natural
tendency of the Federations to promote the Zionist cause
among their people by sensational propaganda in favour
of immigration to Palestine,militated against control on
the part of the Executive over the Palestine Offices.
In order to rectify this situation, the Executive decided
that they should take over the budget and with it the
direct supervision of the Palestine Offices,"in order to
bring their activities more into line with the actual
48requirements of Palestine".
In the meantime, John Shuckburgh, head of the Middle
East Department, had confidentially sent Weizmann the
Colonial Office memo, which was based on the findings of
the Morris Report and invited him to fix a meeting as soon
as possible, to deal with several questions in order to
formulate revised instructions to be sent to the British
C o n s u l s . Weiznann replied at once, but avoided mention
50of a date for the requested meeting. It appears that 
the Colonial Office's memo not only did not advance 
negotiations with the Zionists but on the contrary, held 
them back a further three weeks, in which time the Executive 
was able to prepare a new memo in reply i>o that of tho 
Colonial Office. It ,seems that this time Weizmann had 
personally taken part in the memorandum's preparation,which
48. Ibid, ibid.
49. Shuckburgh to Weizmann, ■/l.yli»2i., C.0.755/0 file 497^4
50. Weizmann to Shuckburgh, 2.i1»21., ioid.
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was a review iron the Zionists * 'point of view of immigrâtior 
policy since the setting-up of the Civil /..dwinistration in 
PalestineIts main purpose was to strengthen the 
confidence of the fritish Government in the ability of 
the Zionist Organisation to maintain efficient and 
responsible control over labour immigration to Palestine 
and to demand more that this aurhoriry shouic
not be taken away from then, With the assurance not to 
exceed the agreed number ana to prevent, tno entry of 
"undesirable" eler'nts into Palestine, rhe Zionists
f the old scheme of k n 1 s “•J - 1 •.
grant; , ¡1 Their modelat : 7 f igur
i rod J:'or 1the two coming; yoa r,3of labour immigrants require 
(25,000); and their undertaking that one third of this 
number would consist ot skilled t.aoou;,' il- ustra i.e the
.5-1
Zionists' wisi1 i tc S^ti h iv tneh  tritisi
Regarding, nor'-guarantood- immigrants, the Zionists
agreed with daouei'a ixoooeaia that they ahoulfl he dealt
with on their recite without any general iiiait of mmbera-
Nevertheless, the d-eeatice insisted eh auittina; the
condition that o^n...Suercnteed': xoalyrante coning under
„ , urrT.'s should have a definite prospect ofCategory 'up' (.!e*ocnr. j , u u w j
, • 4_v, -p-i-.(i] r nyolovcrs or enterprisesemployment wxth st..uc.n.ini. epiu,
1 -v . r-.r a-iuio-i at ’ "unworkable in practice" anddescribing thxs cuun.-on a,,
•, ^  orU'Tdfipri laws enforced elsewhere unparallehoct in .Lrir.oiwi.ai
, t ir- attached letter to memo 31. V/oizmann to onuw.-H~t._- , signature appears on memo
■dated ¿2V; - w  oration into fales'cino-' which is
o lA-nn rnf includes ¡p uppenaxC-w, - ■ ../at/go60 pages long ,.uiu x.u- 
file 58538.
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Generally, Palestine immigration laws should not be
c ostricter than those of any other countries.
It seems that the Executive's tactics achieved even
more positive results than anticipated, causing internal
dissension and c o n f u s i o n  among the Zionists themselves.
At the conference on the question of immigration which
finally took plo.ee on 25th N o v e m b e r , V/oizraann succeeded
in dispelling the doubts of the Colonial Office officials
and gaining their full confidence in the ability of the
Zionists to control immigration "even more admirably than
any other Government". As with the whole Palestine question
Weizinann endeavoured to accentuate the British and Zionist
identity of interests now apparent in the common wish to
prevent the entry of politically undesirable elements. To
this end,ho offered the help of the Zionist Organisation in
recommending and selecting of the "non-■guaranteed"
.55immigrants as well as for tne "guaranteed.'
The only opposition to this offer surprisingly came 
from the Zionist side. Xiconaro. otein, the Political 
Secretary, rejected the- idea that all Jewish immigrants 
would be obliged to obtain a reference from the Zionist 
Organisation, "a system which would rule out all possibilitie 
of immigration to a Jew who was dioj.ij.vod oy the local 
Zionist Organisation". But the nriuish accepted v/eiznionn1 s 
offer, stating that "however uni out unto idiis night be, it
52. See "proposals" of the memo pp.20"23 > ibid.
53. Ibid, ibid.
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was desirable to protect the Palestine Government as 
much as is possible ... from the introduction of 
undesirable immigrants."-^
A similar episode occurred during the proceedings 
when Weizmann suggested (and officials of the Colonial 
Office agreed with him) that Immigration Officers should 
be "travelling inspectors",whose duties would chiefly be 
to check immigrants against records supplied by the 
Zionist Organisation. Stein, on the other hand, was in 
favour of Morris's recommendation to appoint Immigration 
Officers in certain European centres,who would combine 
all functions of the British Consuls and the local 
Zionist Offices. Although there was "no definite 
crystallisation of opinion" as G.M. Clausen remarked in 
his minutes, "generally, the Conference agreed with 
Dr. Weizmann".
Weizmann undoubtedly played a major part in 
obtaining the agreement of. the Colonial Office to the 
Zionists' proposals . His success was due to his ability 
to pinpoint the main fear of the British Administration - 
the danger of infiltration to Palestine by politically 
undesirable elements who could cause <—gitation and unrest 
and to offer the Zionists' help on this matter.
54. See notes of'the conference, C.0.733/16 file 58556, also in I.S.A. 11/6; see minutes of Z.E. meeting24.11.21., C . Z . A . ,  Z4/502./6.
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Acceptance of the Zionists’ offer inevitably 
necessitated the expansion of their authority to 
recommend and select all Jewish immigrants to Palestine, 
in fact, more than the Zionists were actually ready to 
take upon themselves. Stein apparently succeeded in 
persuading Veizmann to revoke his offer that recommendation 
for Jewish "non-guaranteed" immigrants should be dealt 
with by the Colonial Office. Writing to the Colonial 
Office, Weizmann explained that this "privilege" would 
impose a corresponding obligation upon the Zionist 
Organisation, which would have to "morally assume full 
responsibility for all Jewish immigrants" and would 
expose the Organisation to "constant criticism" and 
"complaints of favouritism and of discrimination on 
personal or political grounds". Instead, he suggested 
leaving complete control over "non-guaranteed" immigrants 
in the hands of British Consuls and the Palestine 
Administration.^ This shows the Executive's intention 
of concentrating particularly on labour immigration for 
the time being, disregarding middle class and "unorganised" 
immigration. But in spite of the Zionists' unpretentious 
stand, the Colonial Office was still of the opinion that 
Zionist recommendation for all Jewish immigration to 
Palestine was vital, to ensure sufficient control.
In retrospect, however, there was no reason to 
over-estimate the Zionist achievement. Indeed, the 
provisional agreement with the Colonial Office ensured 
co-operation with the Zionists in controlling immigration,
55. Weizmann to Shuckburgh, 7*12.21., C.0.733/16 
file 38533.
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"but it also endorsed. Samuel's entire scheme. Its rigid 
and bureaucratic nature enabled the Administration to 
intervene frequently, particularly in regard to the 
"non-guaranteed" immigrants. This, the Zionists' 
undertaking to include "skilled labour" in the schedules 
of "guaranteed" immigrants, and the necessity to ro-approve 
the schedule every three months, became the main causes 
of friction between the Palestine Zionist Executive and 
the Palestine Administration in the coming years.
C; TOWARDS A "WORKING AGREEMENT"
Samuel's Statement of 3rd June officially ended the 
preliminary formation of the revised policy in Palestine 
The second stage began with Churchill's Statement in the 
House of Commons on 14th June. The political centre of 
gravity shifted from Jersualen to London for the whole
of the coming year.
Describing most sympathetically the Zionists' 
achievements in Palestine, the Colonial Secretary firmly 
insisted on Britain's responsibility towards fulfilling 
the Balfour Declaration. Churchill assured Parliament 
t h a t  J e w i s h  immigration into Palestine had hitherto been 
"very carefully x^ atched and controlled" and saw 'ho 
reason why with care and progress there, there should 
hot be a steady flow of J e w i s h  immigration ... accompanied 
at every stage by a general increase in the wealth of the 
whole-of the existing population ..." But, unlike Samuel 
ho was not afraid to pinpoint the conflicting Arab and 
J e w i s h  demands focused on that question. Acceptance of
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Arab demands for representative institutions, stated the
Secretary of State, "would certainly veto all further
Jewish .immigration" and this could not happen "without
definitely accepting the position that the word of
Britain no longer* counts in the East ..." Therefore, if
these institutions were to be conceded, "some definite
arrangements" would have to be made to safeguard Jewish
56rights to come to Palestine. . On these lines, the
Colonial Office intended to conduct its talks with the
Arab Delegation whcch was expected in London at the
57beginning of August.
The Delegation was not encouraged by the British
to come to London, nor was it recognised as a
representative body of the Palestinian Arab population.
However, opinion in Jerusalem and London was that, since
the Delegation had already come to London, advantage
should be taken of its presence to roach an agreement over
58the political questxons of Palestine. It their first 
meeting, Churchill had insisted that the Delegation should 
meet Weizmann, if not officially, then privately, and 
together to try and cone to "some form of working 
agreement" over the immigration question. Churchill
56. See text of Churchill's speech in the House of Commons on British policy in the Middle East, 14.6.21., 
C.O. 733/7 file 57955.57. "Moslem-Christian Delegation to Europe", Shuckburgh's
memo, 23.7.21., C.0.733/13 file 37529. ' ■58. Ibid, ibid; interview of members of the Delegation with Samuel, 23.6.21., C.0.733/4 file 33632 ; notes of interview of representatives of Zionist Executive with Major Young 23.8.21., W.A.; Young's minutes to 
Churchill, 22.8.21., C.0.733/14 file 42762; Shuckburgh's minutes, 29.9.21., C.O. 733/6 file 48808«,
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suggested that the agreement could be based on a prior 
fixed number of immigrants to be allowed to cone to 
Palestine "year by year f o r  the next five years". In 
this way, it would bo possible to ease Arab fears of 
being "floated by alien immigrants" and at the same tine
ensure that a certain number of Jews would be allowed to 
come to Palestine in order to develop their National 
Homo.
In contrast with the pragmatic approach of the 
British,the Arab Delegation cono to London furnished 
with far-reaching national demands,. These were not 
new, and included the abolition of the idea of a Jewish 
National Home; creation of a "National Government" in 
Palestine, responsible to an elected Parliament; and the 
stoppage of Jewish immigration, until the time when such 
a Government would be formed. 59 60 The Delegation rejected 
the idea of meeting Dr. Neiznann or any other Zionist 
personality at the outset, stating that they did not 
recognise the Zionist Organisation and that their 
instructions were to negotiate with the British Government 
and rot with the Zionists. mo lite '-in. -u. gument to bo 
with the Government" explained Musa Lazim Pasha, the 
President of the Delegation, "because it has the power
59. .Report of conversation between Churchill and the 
Arab Delegation, 12.8.21., C.0.733/178 _ file 1-1293; notes of conversation of Major Young with the 
Delegation,' 11.8.21., C.0.733/14 file 4 0 ? 13.
60. See "A brief Statement of the Demands ..." of the 
Arab Delegation submitted to the Secretary of State 
the Colonics, 12.8.21«, C.0./3b/1l ule I-2635» for
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that can give or take away iron us". At this meeting, 
and at the following one ten days later, Churchill 
repeated his appeal for a more compromising and flexible 
attitude from the Delegation towards a practical 
agreement on the political questions. Speaking to then 
"plainly and in blunt terms" he termed their demands 
for a National Government and the abolition of the 
Balfour Declaration as non-disoussnblc and tried to 
convince them that their only political outlet would be 
to co-operate with the Government by.reaching an 
agreement which, even "if it did not give them controlgy|
it would give them influence.”
The effectiveness of this "influence" had to depend 
upon the extent of power granted to the Palestine 
population through the proposed representative 
institutions. After two fruitless meetings with the
Secretary of State, the Delegation was informed of the 
proposed schemes for these institutions. Major Young 
submitted to them four alternative schemes for a 
Legislative Assembly. These alternatives were based on 
various combinations of two different prototypes: either
an "advisory assembly on an entirely elective basis with 
no legislative power" or a "legislative assembly with a 
permanent majority of officials ex'1 nominated members,,to 
ensure the due carrying out of tnc policy of Bis Majesty's
61. Note 59 above; notes 
Delegation, 22.8.2 1.,
of conversation with the
C„0.733/14 file 42762.
Government". The last condition was mainly directed at 
the power to control Jewish immigration.
The Delegation rejected all British proposals, 
stating that none of the proposed bodies gave "truly 
representative character" and "power to control over the 
Executive" to "the hands cf the people".^ Instead they _ 
submitted their own constitutional plan which, recommended 
the granting of executive powers to a "representative 
Government, giving the inhabitants control over their 
domestic affairs, but acting with the advice of the 
helping power". The control of immigration,regarded as 
a 'domestic affair", was left "in the hands of the 'people 
of Palestine". The immigration policy, emphasised the
Delegation, "should be regulated not in the interests of
£¿1the Zionists, but of the Palestinians"
The rejection of the British proposals put the talks
with the Delegation at a deadlock. The Colonial Office .
gave the drabs to understand that in its opinion the
65continuation of negotiations was pointless. Colonial 
Office officials believed that the uncompromising attitude 
of the drabs was derived from their feeling of being 6234*
62
62. Notes of Conversation ... 23.8.21., C.O.733/14. On 
the same day Major Young also not representatives'of 
the Z.E. o.nd reported to then on his meeting with the 
Delegation, see note 58; see also "Notes of Conference of Legal Advisors ... Constitution of Palestine", 
12-13.8.21., C.0.733/14 file 42532.
63. The Palestine drab Delegation to Churchill, 1.9-21., 
C.O. 733/16 file 44017.
64. The Palestine drab Delegation to Churchill, 24.10.21., 
C.O. 733/16 file 53080.
6 5 . Shuckburgh at a meeting with the Delegation, C.O. 735/15 file 46936; Shuckburgh's minutes 
C.O.733/6 file 48808.
15.9.21.. • 29.9.21„
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"discredited in Palestine", and that "if any one of then 
weakens, the remainder1 will attach to him all ignominy 
when they return to Palestine". This mutual suspicion 
among the members of the Delegation, their inability to 
express themselves in English and their being "very slow 
of understanding" made the Delegation, in the opinion of 
the British, "a hopeless body to deal with".
The conclusion of the Colonial Office on the situation
was,"that the time has cone to leave off arguing and
announce plainly and authoritatively what the Government
proposes to do." Being "orientals", presumed Shuckburgh,
the Arabs "will understand an order and if once they
!' brealise that we :the British) mean business, may be
expected to acquiesce". Accordingly, ho suggested, the
Secretary of State should invite the Arab Delegation and
representatives of the Zionist Organisation to a joint
conference at the Colonial Office, for the purpose of
making a statement on future policy m  Palestine. 1 This
would cither set the negotiations on more concrete lines
or end them absolutely. Shuckburgh invited the Arab
Delegation to a joint meeting with the Secretary of State
and the Zionists, thus giving the Delegation to understand
that the mooting was a direct result of their uncompromising 
68stand. Apparently, the Colonial Office changed its ■
69mind and cancelled the proposed meeting. . There is no 6*89
66. "Political Situation in Palestine" a memo by Shuckburgh
7.11.21., C.0.733/15 file 57572; Comments by Eric Mills, 
Middle East Department, C.O., 30.11.21., C.O. 537/855«
67 .»Shuckburgh' s memo.; 7.1^«21», ibid.
68. Shuckburgh to the Delegation, 12.11.21., C.O. 733/16 
file 53080.
69. Weiznann to Wyndham Decdes, 13.12.21., C.O. 537/854-
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evidence however, of any pressure coning iron the
Delegation to bring about this cancellation, but it
doubtless served the drabs' cause well by preventing
70the immediate termination 01 negotiations»
If seems, however, that the Colonial Office's rigid
stance forced the Delegation into accepting the idea of
meeting representatives of the Zionist Organisation, as
the lesser of two evils . Over a Itnchoon with the
.Secretary of State on 25tli November, the Delegation
agreed to meet Weizr.-ann for 'ban informal exchange of viewa
apparently believing that this was a condition to a
71favourable agreement with the Government. At any 
rate, this was the reason which they latex1 on gave for 
accepting Gl'archill ’s request» Whatever the later 
explanations were to be, the Delegation was undoubtedly 
anxious to renew talks with the British, as they hoped
to bring about a radical change in British policy in
7 aPa.-estme'c“
/. rcnaii. made by Musa Kazin at the aforementioned.
luncheon about "no objection to Jewish immigration itself.
so long as it did not outrun the capacity of the country
n gto absorb if, and the successful conference that same
rphday with the Zionists on immigration\ might have aroused 
some* British hope of arriving at a working agreement' on 
this question» But the Arab-Zionist meeting which finally
70» Arab Delegation in a meeting with Shuckburgh, 15o9.21» 
sec note 65 above.
71o "The twenty-first despatch", 16.12.21», Porath, 
Emergence, p»52.
72. The Delegation to Churchill, 2A.10.21», C.O.755/16 
file 55080«
took place on 29th November could not have been further 
from fulfilling these hopes.
Endeavouring to bridge the gap between the two
parties, Shuckburgh, the chairman, assumed a general
acceptance of several propositions of "a non-ccntrovcrsial
nature" as an indication that there wore "common grounds"
75for reaching an agreement.  ^ But by his introduction of 
topics such as "the real fear with which the Arabs 
regarded the idea of Jewish immigration" and "the 
contingency of Jewish political ascendency in Palestine", 
the discussion turned into a controversial and impractical 
argument.
This gave the two parties the opportunity of making 
political statements which shewed their irreconcilable 
stands. Dr. Weiznann, making a "conciliatory speech", 
appealed for co-operation between the "two nations", in 
the upbuilding of Palestine and invited the Delegation 
to enter into immediate concrete discussions. Musa 
Kazira Pasha, on the other hand, rejected any "discussion" 
or "understanding" with people whom he considered as 
aggressors"; at any rate, if ouch a discussion had to be 
based on Arab acceptance of the Balfour Declaration. 
Discussing the various interpretations of the Declaration 
Musa Nazim made it a condition that a now official 
interpretation of the Declaration should bo made if the 
Delegation was to participate in further negotiations. 7345
73. Shuckburgh in the Arab-Zionists meeting, 29.11.21., W.A
74. See pp .84-85 above,
75. Dor this meeting I used tv/o notes: a long and detailed 
one by the Zionists, see note 73 above,and a brief one 
by E. Mills of the Colonial Office, C.0.537/855»
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To prevent the complete failure of the Conference, 
Shuckburgh agreed to prepare a new "formuld1 for the 
Declaration.
Tho failure of the mooting illustrated the slim 
chances of bringing the two parties to a "working 
agreement" without making a significant change in the 
entire Palestine policy. ' By re-interpreting the 
Ealfour Declaration tho Colonial Office did not intend 
to make such a change but merely a new verbal "basis of 
negotiations" between the two parties. Shuckburgh, who 
took it upon himself to draw up a new formula, was quite 
sceptical about the effectivemess of his own proposal.
But in his opinion there was no need for hurry to reach 
the next stage, and even perhaps some advantage in
77allowing the parties "to kick their heels a little". '
V/eizmann, on the other hand, could not remain 
indifferent to this latest move of the Colonial Office 
and expressed his fears that the proposed re-interpretation 
"would at once weaken very seriously the bargaining power 
of the Zionist Organisation", and furthermore, "it could 
only have the effect of greatly impairing any prospects 
there may be of a working agreement on issues of 
practical importance".^
The Zionist fears of a new re-interpretation of the 
Balfour Declaration - their principal recognised 76*8
76. A memo by Shuckburgh, sec note 66 above; E. Mills' 
minutes, 30.11.21., C.0.537/855
77- Shuckburgh's minutes, 2.12.21., ibid.
78. Weizmann to the Under Secretary of State, C.O.,
1.12.21., C.O. 733/16 file 59977«
96.
legitimate foothold in Palestine - were natural and 
sincere, but their desire to reach a "working agreement" 
with the Arabs on the immigration question deserves 
further consideration. Obviously, the Zionists were 
interested in reaching an agreement with the Arabs,in 
order to remove all possible obstacles in the way of their 
activities in Palestine. How far they were really 
ready to go towards the Arab demands is quite impossible 
to judge, even after their joint meeting, since their 
readiness to compromise was not brought to the test by 
the Arabs.
The results nevertheless remained more concrete and
meaningful from the Zionists point of view. Their
success in obtaining the confidence of the Colonial
Office over control of immigration as agreed at their
78ajoint meeting a few days previously,made the proposed 
agreement with the Arab Delegation if not unnecessary, 
then of secondary importance. Although there is no 
reason to conclude that the British-Zionist Conference on 
immigration directly damaged the prospects of an Arab- 
Zionist agreement, nevertheless, the success of the first 
and the failure of the latter had a very significant 
effect on future immigration policy.
Returning to our topic, one might say that the 
failure of the Arab-Zionist meeting placed the British- 
Arab negotiations in a new deadlock. Shuckburgh kept his 
promise, although after a long delay, and sent the 
Delegation a new formula for the Balfour Declaration.
78a. See pp. 84-85 above.
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The re-interpretation was, as expected, rejected by the
Arabs, who protested against the formula's recognition
of "historic and religious associations that connected
the Jewish people with Palestine". Opposing this
connection, the Delegation could not find any reason for
"special facilities" for Jewish immigration into
Palestine. The Delegation also rejected the principle
of Economic Absorptive Capacity of the country as unjust
and irrelevant, stating that "even supposing that
Palestine is economically unaffected by Jewish immigrants
there can be no doubt as to the political harm that their
79presence must threaten Arab interests". A week later,
the Delegation .re—applied to the Colonial Office
requesting that "it is only right and fair" that while
they were negotiating with the Government, Jewish
80immigration to Palestine should be stopped.
The re-focusing of Arab demands on the immigration 
question spurred the Colonial Cffice on once more to 
finding an "urgent solution" to the question. In spite 
of the Colonial Office decision to suspend all further 
contacts with the Delegation, following a suspicion that 
they had communicated to tho "Morning Post" the draft 
constitution of .Palestinc-in defiance of the Secretary 
of State's injunction that it was to be treated 
confidentially8- the Colonial Office officials took urgent 
steps t o  find such a s o l u t i o n . T h e i r  p r o p o s a l  suggested 79801
79. The Delegation to Churchill, A.2.22., C.0.753/36 
file 6869.
80. Ibid, 11.2.22., ibid.
81. Sec all corrospondenco and minutes on this affair in 
C.O. 7 3 3 / 3 6  filo 6575.
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setting up an Immigration Board, quite irrespective of the
Palestine constitution and without considering Jev/ish
82or Arab demands. It was further recommended that the 
proposed body should be "representative of Palestinians 
of all classes" and would advise the High Commissioner 
on immigration questions "from the point of view of the 
inhabitants of Palestine". At the same time, the 
Palestine Zionist Executive would advise the High 
Commissioner from its particular point of view. In the 
event of an irreconcilable difference of opinion the 
pornts at rssue would be referred to London for decision. ^
It seems that Colonial Office officials were ■'
inclined to believe that by isolating and solving
separately the question of immigration, they night succeed
in advancing the negotiations with the Arab Delegation on
the question of the proposed constitution of Palestine.
The fact that Dr. Edor of the Palestine Zionist Executive,
at the time in London, "was not altogether unfavourable"
to that proposal, encouraged them to act without any
further delay. Without waiting for Samuel's approval,
the Colonial Office tackled the immigration question
"promptly" and sent their proposals to the Arab 
85Delegation. y In this way they reversed their ban on 
further communications v/ith the Arabs, and started a new 
round of talks.
82. Major Young's minutes to Shuckburgh, 15.2.22., and
16.2.22., C.0.735/36 file 6896; Shuckburgh's minutes
to Sir J. Masterton-Snith, Under Secretary, C.0.,20.2.22 
ibid.83. Churchill to Samuel, 21.2.22.,ibid; to the Arab 
Delegation, 1.3.22., Cmd 1700 pp„7-2.
84. Shuckburgh's minutes, 20.2.22., see note 82 above.
85. Samuel's reply reachd. the C.O. on 25.2.22., but 
mysteriously came to the knowledge of the Middle East 
Department on 9.3.22., see Samuel to Churchill,
tel. 65, 24.2.22., C.O.753/19 file 11392.
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It socms that the Delegation did not give serious
consideration to the new British proposals, objecting
that the Zionist Organisation should also have "a point of
view" and that "the capacity of the proposed board will
be in effect consultative". They insisted on their old
conception that "the best safeguard is the creation of
a National G o v e r n m e n t which will consider the question
of immigration in so far as it is compatible with the
86interests and capacity of the country".
Meanwhile, Samuel's reply to the proposals of the 
Colonial Office had reached London. Samuel had succeeded 
in anticipating the Arab reaction much better, stating 
that the transfer of control of immigration from the 
proposed elected body to "nominees of the Government" 
would be attributed to "Zionist motives". In spite of 
that, he suggested that a "standing committee" from the 
proposed Legislative Council be appointed to consist of 
half the total number of elected representatives, but its 
functions would be "critical and advisory".8^ Samuel's 
revision compelled the.Colonial Office to appeal once 
more to the Delegation with a more acceptable version of 
the proposed board. But all this was in vain. The 
Colonial Office again came to the conclusion that there 
was no prospect whatsoever of moving the Delegation from 
its obstinate stand and that sooner or later the British 
would have to give the "last word". Nevertheless, it 
was decided in London to consider the request of the 86
86. Arab Delegation to Churchill, 16.3»22., C.0.733/36 
file 12752; also in Cnd, 1700, p.13°
. See note 85 above.87
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Palestine Administration and to "keep the Delegation in
play", at any rate until after Easter in order to avoid
88any risks of disturbances in Palestine.
With the failure of this last attempt on April 22nd,
the Colonial Office returned to its old plan of
November 1921 to make a statement regarding policy in
Palestine, which would inevitably end the present
negotiations with the Arab Delegation. The intention
of the Colonial Office was to collect together Samuel's
speech of 3rd Juno, Churchill's statement of 14-th June
and selected correspondence of the Colonial Office with
the Arab Delegation and the Zionist Executive during the
previous year, in the form of a White paper on British
policy in Palestine. For this reason, Samuel was asked
to bring forward his proposed visit to London and with
the cc-cpcration of the Middle East Department of the
80Colonial Office, to draft a new statement of policy.'-
The Statement, a new official interpretation of the
Balfour Declaration, rigorously set aside any "exaggerated
interpretation" of the Declaration, affirming that His
Majesty's Government had never had the intention of making
Palestine "as Jewish as England is English" or that
"Palestine as a whole should be converted into a Jewish
National Home" , while the idea was, in fact, that "such
90a Home should be founded in Palestine". By reengnjp^^ 
the connection between the Jewish people and Palestine
88. Shuckburgh's minutes, 5*4-.22., C.0.733/36 file 12752.
89. Shuckburgh's minutes, 20.6.22., C.0.733/36 file 29270.
90. Cnd. 1700 pp.17f., (emphasis mine, M.M.)
101
as "ancient historic connections" the Statement determined 
the presence of the Jews in Palestine to be "as of right 
and not on sufferance".
Turning to the immigration policy, the Statement 
declared that "it is necessary that the Jewish Community 
in Palestine should be able to increase its numbers by. 
immigration". But this immigration should not be so 
great in volume "as to exceed whatever may be the economic 
capacity of the country at the time to absorb new 
arrivals". This gave official approval to the leading 
principle of the new immigration policy, better known as 
the principle of Economic Absorptive Capacity.
In this "new" principle, there was,in fact, nothing-
new. Major General Bols, the Military Chief Administrator
in Palestine had already announced it in April 1920, when
he gave the first official interpretation of the Balfour 
91Declaration. Since then Samuel and Churchill had
repeated this x^rinciple, although in different verbal
92versions on various occasions.
The Zionist Organisation accepted this principle 
by accepting the White Paper as a whole, and expressed 
its confidence that both His Majesty's Government and the 
Administration of Palestine would be guided by this
91. Meinertzhagcn, Middle East, pp.69-70; Medzini,
Ess or Shanim, p’. 111.
92. Por example see Churchill to an Arab delegation in 
Jerusalem, 28.3.21., C.O. 733/2 file 21698; in his 
speech in the House of Commons, 14.6.21., see note
36 above; in a memo to the Cabinet 11.8.21., CAB.24/127; 
Samuel in his Statement of 3ud June, see note 9-above; 
in conversation with Eder, see note 6 above.
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principle and would not deviate from it» In other words,
they trusted that political pressure, disturbances or
any other factors would not influence immigration policy,
95as had happened in the past. Although the Zionists
did not regard the White Paper as a great triumph,, lout
rather as a "necessary condition" for the confirmation
of the Mandate by the League of Nations, this principle-
was not in contradiction with their policy. V/eizmann
and other members of the Executive believed that if this
policy were carried out "honestly and conscientiously" it
would still afford the Zionists a framework for building
up a Jewish majority in Palestine and for the eventual
emergence of a "Jewish State". Yet, "absorptive capacity"
had still to be created and this remained the major
94-task of the Zionist Organisation.
The Arab Delegation, which had already explained 
the irrelevance of the economic factor as an exclusive 
indicator for immigration policy, claimed in its reply 
that hitherto even this principle had not been adhered 
to, the proof being the "turning out" of Arabs from 
their jobs and the prevailing grave unemployment in 
Palestine. But pointing out the political and social 
effects of "immigration of a foreign element" on tho . 
"native population" of the country, the Delegation 
repeated its demand for the creation of a "Representative 
National Government, which shall have complete control
93. V/eizmann to tho Colonial Office, 18.6.22., C.0.733/36/292 .
94-. V/eizmann, Trial, pp.360f.
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of migration". The Delegation rejected, the White 
Paper which did not satisfy this demand.
Despite the rejection of the White Paper by the 
Douse of Lords, Churchill succeeded in gaining a decisive 
majority on Government policy in Palestine in the House 
of CommonsThis and the ratification of the Palestine 
T‘undate by the League of Nations later in July brought 
to an end the political campaign for Palestine in London 
and shifted it back to its original centre.
93
<95 Delegation to Churchill, 17.6.22,, Cmd. 1700,' pp-Pl-ps,
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Chapter Four
THE NEW POLICY: ZIONIST AND ARAB REACTION
A: CO-OPERATION OR NON-COOPERATION : THE DILEMMA
OP THE P.LLESTINE ZIONIST EXECUTIVE
Shortly after the Civil Administration had been 
set up, the Zionist Executive in London decided to ~ ■ 
transfer its central Immigration, Colonisation and Trade
'Iand Industry Departments from London to Jerusalem, The 
transfer was apparently postponed because of the financial 
distress of the Zionist Organisation. However, the 
political crisis which followed the May Disturbances 
convinced the Zionists of the urgent necessity to 
strengthen their position in Palestine by prompt 
promotion of their economic and colonisation projects 
there. ' Accordingly, the Twelfth Zionist Congress passed 
a resolution in favour of splitting the Zionist Executive 
between London and Jerusalem and transferring the above- 
mentioned departments to Jerusalem, to be headed by the
gPalestine members of the Executive.
Although this resolution had already come into 
force in the autumn of 1921, the now Palestine Zionist 
Executive had, as we have seen, very little influence 
over negotiations on immigration then taking place in 
London. However, the renewal of immigi*ation and
1. Gee resolution of the Z.E., 10.8.20., C.Z.A., Z4/302/3A.
2. "The Jaffa Events" - "circular letter to members of the 
Action Committee and Presidents of Zionist Federations",1.7.20., W.A.; also Leonard Stein's report "The 
Situation in Palestine, August 1921", 17.9.21.,
C.O. 733/16 file 52260.
3. Zionist Organisation, "Report of the Twelfth Zionist 
Congress", London 1922.
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the siting of the Immigration Department in Jerusalem 
gradually increased the participation of the Palestine 
Executive in the legislation and execution process of 
immigration policy.
The fundamental dilemma of the Palestine Executive 
at that time ,was the conflict between maximising the 
growth of the Jewish National Home, despite political 
and economic difficulties on the one hand, and the extent 
of co-operation with an Administration which pursued a
¿j.policy of only gradual immigration, on the other. Composed 
of .representatives of various Jewish communities in the 
Diaspora which held quite different political and social 
views, the Executive frequently failed to come to a 
consensus and to produce an unequivocal solution to this 
dilemma. One nay distinguish two dissenting and 
uncrystallised approaches in the Executive; one, more 
collaborative, realistic and relatively "minimalist" and 
the second, more enthusiastic, antagonistic and relatively 
"maximalist". The lack of consolidation and the eventual 
balance of power between these two parties caused the 
Executive's policy to be generally compromising, pragmatic 
and sometimes even inconsistent, in order to satisfy all 
its members.
The "collaborative" group of the Executive consisted 
of Dr. David Eder, Director of the Political Department,
Dr. Arthur Ruppin, its economic expert and Director of the 
Colonisation Department and Dr. Siegfried van Vriesland, 
its Treasurer. The "opponents" were Menachem Ussishkin,
A. See minutes of P.Z.E. meeting, 15.12.21., C.Z.A. 
unclassified.
106 =
Chairman of the Executive and Director of the Keren 
Kayemet (Jewish National Eund) in Palestine; Professor 
Hermann Pick, Director of the Immigration Department 
and representative of the Mizrachi - the Zionist Orthodox 
Movement; and Joseph Sprinzak, Director of the Labour 
Department and representative of Hapoel Hatzair, the 
moderate Labour party. The dividing line between these 
two viewpoints could have been due to their origins; 
the first group were Jews from central and western 
Europe while the latter came mostly.from eastern Europe.
Samuel's decision in June 1921, to allow most of the
immigrants stranded in Europe because of the suspension,
to proceed to Palestine according to the new Regulations,
brought over 5,000 immigrants by the end of 1921.^ This
tide of immigration, at a time of advancing economic-
depression in the country, increased the unemployment
7rate, particularly among the newcomers. Many of these 
immigrants did not fulfill the requirements of the new 
Regulations and the Administration was faced with a 
rather difficult dilemma: should their visas be accepted 
without question, or should the Regulations be strictly 
enforced, with the result of deporting all irregular 
cases regardless of their genuine visas?^ The economic
5. The announcement of the new policy was made in i|he 
H.C.'s statement of 3**d June, see above, _pp« 65i£*
The new Regulations of August 1921 were issued a.
•Official Gazette No. 49, of August 15th 1 1 ■> see
App. 5.
6. 5039 immigrants; see App*-6.
7. Samuel to Churchill; 14.12.21., tel. 502, C.O-.733/& 
■file 62256*
8. Ibid, ibid.
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crisis, in addition to strong political agitation among
the Arabs, compelled. Samuel to adhere strictly to the
law.^ Nevertheless, to allow time for those already
en route, Samuel agreed to accept irregular cases up
until 15th January 1922. In the meantime, he applied
urgently to London, asking that British Consuls in
Europe be instructed accordingly and that the Zionist
Organisation should ensure the co-operation of its
Offices in Europe with the Consuls in securing that"no
further cases of irregularity in issuing visas should
„10occur."
Samuel's appeal to the Executive for full 
co-operation with the Administration in this task ,caused 
a serious division of opinion within the Palestine 
Executive. The question facing the Palestine Zionist 
Executive was whether to recognise the new policy in 
principle or to oppose it and avoid any collaboration in 
restricting immigration. Dr. Eder attacked the "double- 
faced" policy of the Executive for turning a blind eye 
to the forgeries and irrcgularitxes carried out by the 
Zionist offices and individuals ,and warned that sooner 
or later these would be discovered and cause disputes 
with the Government "which may destroy the entire work 
of the Executive". He insisted on adopting Government 
policy and acting according to the now populations. 
Furthermore, he recommended a temporary suspension of . 
immigration until an improvement in the financial 9*
9. "Political Situation in Palestine", Samuel to Churchill,
9.3.22., confidential despatch, C.O. 733/19 filo 13502.
10.Samuel to Churchill, 14-,12.21., sco note 7 above
108
situation 'of the Organisation would come. Dr, Ruppin,
supporting Eder's views, expressed his fear of possible
strikes and demonstrations by Jewish unemployed which
could cause a "very unpleasant political situation",
Sprinzak, on the other hand, objected vigorously to any
concession over stoppage of immigration and suggested
bluntly "not to interfere with the irregular work of
the Palestine O f f i c e s , b e c a u s e  the Regulations themselves
obliged these Offices to work illegally. Yet,the Offices
11might bo told to carry on their work more secretly".
Characteristically, the resolution adopted by the 
Executive included all divisions of' opinion and suggested 
indirectly, a reduction in its own control over the 
activities of the Palestine Offices. Strictly speaking, 
to as.k the Palestine Offices to act according to the 
Regulations and to make clear to t h e m  t h e  present grave 
situation in Palestine, but nevertheless, to let them 
come to their " o w n conclusions" about the extent of 
co-operation with the British Consuls regarding control 
on immigration.
Samuel's insistence on acting strictly according
to the Regulations and o n deporting the first irregular
cases after the deadline prevented the Executive from
avoiding this question. The dilemma now before the
Executive consisted of two principal questions:
a) Whether to agree or to oppose in principle any
deportation of Jews from Palestine, on the grounds 
of "technical irregularities"; 1
11. See note d above
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b) whether or not to participate in the final
examination of these cases prior to their 
12deportation.-
In the absence of Dr. Eder from Palestine, Dr, Ruppin
and Harry Sacher, the legal adviser of the Executive,
repeatedly urged the Executive not to ’’circumvent the
law" but to go along with it until such time as the
present policy was revoked altogether. At the same
time, they suggested asking for the presence of some
Zionist observers at those examinations. Sprinzak
again expressed doubts as to whether permanent co-operation
of the Executive in this matter would not be interpreted
as recognition of the new Regulations. In his view, a
state would be reached when visas issued by British
Consuls would be recognised as "legal and final" and their
holders should not be expelled. At the same time, he
found a possible advantage in deportation of some
immigrants, which might turn public opinion against
the present policy and bring about a drastic change.
Ussishkin, although sharing Sprinzak's views, did not
agroo about the political outcome of any deportations.
In his opinion, t h e j  would first and foremost affect the
prestige of the Executive itself and were liable to
create a bad impression among Diaspora Jews, hampering
fund-raising efforts for Palestine. Accordingly, he
opposed any demonstrations, but suggested informal
contacts in order to reduce deportations. This approach
was eventually adopted by the Executive which avoided a
19principal.resolution on the question. 123
12. Minutes of P.Z.E. meeting,
13. Ibid, ibid.
19.2.22., C.Z.A
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The question of deportation soon lost its acute 
priority with Samuel's decision, in March 1922^  to 
suspend all immigration temporarily "except in very 
special cases". The reasons given for that unofficial 
suspension wore the general increase of unemployment in
the country, and the Executive's unreadiness to submit
li­the precise number of unemployed immigrants. This
drastic measure on the part of the Government compelled
the Palestine Executive to reconsider its policy in all
its aspects. As on many previous occasions, Dr. Eder
again repeated his appeal for full co-oporation with tho
Government and even recommended accepting the unofficial
stoppage in order to prevent an official one, which would
inevitably have increased the present tension with the
Administration. But the majority of tho Executive
strongly objected to this, pointing out the harmful
effects of such a policy.
In order to find a "golden path" between political
necessity and economic reality, the Executive oonceived
an original idea of creating a L \bour Pool to consist
of an agreed number of unemployed immigrants. The Pool,
agreed and approved by the Government, was designed to
regulate labour immigration more flexibly, irrespective
of the oscillating demands for labour and the professional
qualifications of the immigrants. It was also suggested
that the Pool be maintained by the Zionist Organisation
and dispersed among Jewish colonies,to avoid Arab
15agitation and subsequent political friction. *
14-« Eder in P.Z.E. meeting, 28.3*22., C.Z.A.
15* Pick, ibid.
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This rather unorthodox proposal found considerable 
understanding and support from Morris. The Labour Pool 
could easily co-ordinate with Morris's fundamental 
conception of increasing immigration without worsening 
the negative/effects of unemployment. Furthermore,
Morris revealed to Dr. Eder his personal disagreement with 
the present immigration scheme and promised that Zionist 
responsibility for labour immigration would be increased. 
In practical terms, Morris tentatively agreed on a Pool 
of 2,500 people on condition that the Executive would 
remove its objection to the appointment of Immigration 
Officers abroad
The fact that Morris himself had various reservations 
about the now policy and was offering the Executive a 
"deal", strengthened Eder's case for more co-operation 
with the Government. Eder even took upon himself to 
recommend these appointments to his colleagues. Pressing 
for more "understanding" and "collaboration" with the / 
Administration, Dr. Eder stated that the Executive had 
to admit that "neither it nor the Zionist Organisation's 
Palestine Offices had the ability to select suitable 
immigrants for Palestine." Accordingly, ho suggested 
leaving entire control over immigration in the hands of 
the Government. Dr. Ruppin supported Eder's views, 
cautiously explaining that by transferring control to these 
inspectors the Zionist Organisation could rid itself of 
such accusations as that of introducing Bolsheviks to 
Palestine and thus there would be no justification for any 16
16. Eder in P.Z.E. meeting, 10.A.22., also in 11.A.22.
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further deportation of undesirable or irregular
immigrants. Nevertheless, he demanded that the primary
selection of immigrants and their adjustment to the
economic needs of the country, should remain in the
17hands of the Zionist Palestine Offices.
However, Eder and Ruppin failed to convinco their
colleaguos. Expressing their fears that the proposed
Officers would encroach on the functions of the
Palestine Offices, the "opponents" placed three
conditions on their agreement: first, that the Officers
must be Jewish or at least "Christians close to our
opinion"; second, that their control be limited only
to examine the total fixed number and political
desirability of the immigrants, leaving the actual
selection to the Palestine Offices; and lastly that the
Zionist Organisation should have the right to control
the Officers' work » These conditions and in particular
the last one,were justified in the light of Morris's
proposal that the Zionist Organisation should finance
*18the maintenance of the proposed establishment.
As will be seen in the next chapter, the question 
of the Immigration Officers was not in any way dependent 
upon Zionist consent,but rather upon more substantial 
factors. The severe conditions which the Executive 
laid down for these appointments were unrealistic and 
unacceptable to the Administration. Acting.under 178
17. See the general debate on this question in P.Z.E. 
minutes of meetings on 10.A.22.; 11.A.22.; 10.5.22.; 
C. Z. A •
18. Eder in P.Z.E. meeting of 10.5»22., C.Z.A.
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enormous political pressure from both Labour circles 
in Palestine and the Palestine Offices in the Diaspora, 
the Executive was compelled to protest against any 
restriction on immigration; nevertheless, realising its 
financial distress, and its complete dependence upon the 
Government, it could not afford to reject the policy 
absolutely and avoid co-operation with the Government. 
Hence the pragmatic attempts to heal the breaches between 
the economic, reality and political necessities. In these 
circumstances the question of co-operation with the 
Government was an academic if not a hypothetical one.
13: ARAB REJECTION OP THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROPOSALS
Following approval of the White Paper by the House 
of Commons, the Arab Delegation in London was ordered by 
the Executive of the Arab Palestine Congress to reject the 
White Paper officially and to return to Palestine "at 
oncc".^ Opinion at the Colonial Office was that the 
Delegation would return to Palestine "with failure 
thrown in their faces and will assuredly not allow the 
matter to rest there". Colonel Richard Mcinertzhagen, 
then Military Adviser to the Middle East Department of 
the Colonial Office, predicted Arab "passive resistance" 
which could later on turn into "an agressive attitude *
19« Sec telegrams from Omar Bitar, President, Executive, Palestine Arab Congress to the Sec. of State fox' the 
Colonies, 0.7.22»; also petitions from Moslem-Christian 
and Nadi Arabi Associations and from "representatives 
of all Palestine districts" of the same date, all in 
C.O. 733/36 file 33005. Also Musa Kazim el Husseini, President of the Arab Delegation, to Churchill, 
10.7-22., C.O. 733/36 file 33276.
114-.
towards Zionism and the British Administration"•
These .fears caused the Secretary of State to send an
urgent message to Samuel expressing his "full and
unhesitating support for preservation of order as jfthe
High Commissioned may consider necessary in event of 
21disturbances".
; However, despite urgent calls from Palestine, the
'■Delegation preferred to prolong its stay in London.
At first, they expected to have a further opportunity
to meet the Secretary of State; after his refusal to 
22see them they were apparently hoping that a delay in
23'their arrival might calm the excitement in Palestine.
These speculations eventually prevented the Delegation -
from arriving in time for t h e  opening of the Fifth
Arab Congress, due to take place late in July. The
Delegation was rushed to the Congress immediately upon
its arrived and the Government was thus prevented from
meeting them and advising them to adopt a more moderate
24-line in their reports to the Congress.
The principal issue at the Fifth Arab Congress was 
the question of non-coopcration in the elections for the 
Legislative Council. On this matter the Congress 2013
20. See.memorandum of R. Meinertzhagen, C.O., 6.7-22., and minutes of Major Young, 8.7»22„, 12.7.22., ibid.
21. Churchill to Samuel, tel.213, 14-.?.22., ibid.
22. See Young's minutes, note 20 above.
23. Wyndham Deedcs, Chief Secretary, Palestine, toJ. Shuckburgh, C.O., "personal and confidential",
13.9.22., C.0.733/38 file 4-8206.
24-, Ibid, ibid.
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unanimously adopted a resolution calling for a ban on the
election. Tho argument for the resolution was derived
from both ideological and practical reasons. Participation
in the elections might be interpreted as "tantamount to
acceptance" of the White Paper and the Mandate. On the
other hand, the limited power delegated to the proposed
body far from satisfied the principal Arab demand for a
representative National Government. The Congress further
recommended various practical methods of propaganda to
25be carried out, which later proved very effective.
At the same time, the Administration, having reason 
to believe in the existence of moderate elements among 
the Arab leadership and the Delegation itself, launched a 
comprehensive propaganda campaign in favour of vast 
Arab participation in the election. The main argument 
in this campaign, was the substantial Arab opportunity of 
influencing future immigration policy through the proposed
or*Immigration Committee.^ Tho proposed terms of tho
Committee,as presented to tho Arab Delegation by the
07Secretary of State in fpril 1922,'"' and later on 
published in tho Palestine Order in Council issued in 
August 1922, recommended that:-
"(i) The High Commissioner shall confer upon all 
matters relating to the regulating of immigration 
with a Committee consisting of not loss than one half of the unofficial members of the
25. On the Congress's debates, resolutions and recommendat­
ions, see Porath, Emergence, pp„90, 120-121.
26. On tho Government's campaign see file 2/24-2/1.
27. Churchill to the Pal. Arab Delegation, 11.A.22.,Cmd. 1700, 1922.
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Legislative Council, and provision shall he made 
by Order in Council for investing the said 
Committee with all such powers and authorities 
and otherwise for the constitution and conduct 
of the business of the said Committee, as may be necessary to carry..this Article: into effect.
."(ii) In the event of any difference of opinion 
. between the High Commissioner and the said 
Committee- upon any such matter as aforesaid 
the High Commissioner shall make a full report 
on the subject to the Secretary of State, whose 
decision thoreon shall be final." 28
Despite the Arabs' outright rejection, first by
the Delegation and later on by the Congress, of the
Legislative Council, the Government presented the
Immigration Committee as the most worthwhile consideration
for the Arabs to participate in the elections. Wyndham
Deedes, the Chief Secretary, who- took a personal hand
in conducting the official "persuasion" campaign, was at
pains to persuade Arab local and national leaders of the
obvious advantages to Arab interests of the Committee.
At the same tine, he emphasised that taking part in thé
elections would not necessarily moan Arab acceptance of
29the Balfour Declaration.
Meanwhile, the Administration was preparing for the 
elections. As a preliminary stage the Government intended 
to hold a population census in October 1922. This decision 
placed the Arab Executive in a rather difficult dilemma. 
Although results of the census would have shown an 
overwhelming Arab majority, their participation might be 
interpreted as a departure from their decision to boycott
28. Article.8A ox the Order* Cmd. 1889, 1923
29. Sec Porath, Emergence, pp.122-123.
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the elections » After lengthy deliberations the Arab
Executive issued a notice informing the public that the
30census was of "public benefit". Nevertheless, the
Government, having some reason to believe that there
might bo opposition to the census, issued a warning that
refusal to register or cause others to refuse to register
was illegal and punishable. It seems that this warning
and a further Government decision to prosecute individuals
and the Arab Executive as a body, had they continued
their agitation, convinced the Executive to co-operate
31with the Administration.
However, the Government's success in carrying the
census into effect could not ensure a similar result
regarding the elections The essential .difference between
the two was obvious. The census was compulsory, while
participation in the elections was left to personal
decision. Moreover, the avoidance of compulsory measures
to force participatioxi was interpreted by the Arabs as
32official consent to the boycott. In any case, the 
Government's liberal policy was hardly able to compete 
with the vigorous campaign conducted by the Arab Executive.
30. See "Appeal to the Noble Nation" by the Executive 
Committee of the Fifth Palestinian-Arab Congress, 
15*10.22., enclosed in H.C.'s "Report on the Political 
Situation ...", -October 1922., "secret" C.O. 733/27 
file 57552.
31. Doedes to Shuchburgh, 20.10.22., C.O. 733/38 file 53952 also Public Notice issued by the Pal. Govt, (undated) 
and "Proclamation to the Noble Nation" bjr the Arab 
Executive (undated), both in the H.C.'s report, ibid.
32. Porath, Emergence, p„123.
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Under these circumstances, the elections were bound to
fail^ Only 18$ of the Moslems and 5-5$ of the Christian
Arabs, as compared with 50$ of the Jewish voters, used
54their right to vote.
Those anticipated, but neve: theless very remarkable
results did not convince the High Commissioner that
Arab non-cooperation was absolute and genuine. Samuel
tended to believe that political apathy in general,
lack of confidence in the candidates and a feeling that
the "Legislative Council would not bring any better
protection to the Arab interests" played a decisive role
55in their political behaviour*  ^ This conclusion persuaded
him to recommend the reconstitution of a now Advisory
Council consisting of nominated representatives, identical
with tho composition of the Legislative Council, namely,
8 Moslems, 2 Jews and 2 Christian members. Accordingly,
Samuel suggested an amendment of the Palestine Order in
57Council 1922, which would consider the new body.'
33« Soc Samuel's "anticipations" a month before the
election took place,in his despatch to the Duke of Devonshire, Churchill's successor at the C.O., tel. 32,
27.1.23., C.O. 733/4-1 file 5099.
34. Samuel to Devonshire, tel. 78? 10.3.23.? C.O. 733/43 
file 12857; also tol. 123, 11-4.23., in paper 18303, ibid; and his official Report, 11.5.23, in Cmd. 1889, 
1923.
35« Samuel's Report, 11.5.23.? ibid.
36. Soc "text of announcement" published by the High 
Commissioner on 29th May, brought in his despatch to 
the Secretary of State, 1.6.23., Cnd. 1889.
37. See "The Palestine (Amendment) Order in Council, 1923", 
ibid.
119
The idea of consulting the population on questions
regarding immigration was not abandoned in this
proposal. On the contrary, the High Commissioner
considered the entire constitution of tho proposed council
to be the fulfillment of his policy in favour of
consulting the people of Falestii.c "on a matter so
closely affecting their interests Nevertheless, tho
proposed powers of the new Council in regal'd to
immigration policy were not defined in the new Order, nor
in the High Commissioner's Statement of 29th May, in which
he presented the proposed Council. These were left open
for further negotiations with Arab and Zionist leaders
then in progress, under the leadership of Gilbert Clayton,
59the newly appointed Chief Secretary.
With these negotiations still taking place in
Palestine a new Arab Delegation, which had been elected
at the Juno 1925 Sixth Arab Congress, loft for London.
Immediately after its arrival, the Delegation demanded
an opportunity to lay tho .Arab cause before a special
Cabinet Committee which was then discussing future
AOBritish policy in Palestine..
The principal reccramondation of the Committee was the 
immediate constitution of an Arab Agency in Palestine 
which would occupy 'a position "exactly analogous to that 
accorded to the Jewish Agency under the terms of tho 
Mandate". It was suggested that the Arab Agency should
58. Samuel to Devonshire, confidential despatch, 20.4.25.,
I.S.A. 11/1/1/1.
59. G. Clayton, Acting H.C. to Sec. of State, tel.276,
C.O. 755/4-8 file 58851; Porath, Emergence, p.4-0
4-0. Tho Palestine Arab Delegation to the Chairman, Cabinet 
Committee (Pal), 22.8.25., C.O.755/58 file 574-05
120
bo a recognised body fox' the purpose of advice and
co-operation with the Administration in such natters
"as nay affect the interests of the non-Jewish population".
As far as control over immigration was concerned it would
have the right to be consulted as to the moans of ensuring
that the "rights and position" of the non-Jewish sections
of the population would not be prejudiced by Jewish
immigration. In practical terms it was proposed that
the Arab Agency, in conjunction with the Jewish Agency,
would take the place of the Immigration Committee for
the function indicated in Article 84 of the Palestine
41Order in Council. However, this arrangement,was 
considered by the Secretary of State to bo a provisional 
settlement only, subject to review whenever a fully
42representative Legislative Council would be set up.
The Arab Delegation was neither invited to put
43its case before the Committee, nor informed of its
44recommendations. The opinion of tho Palestine 
Government and Colonial Office was that consultations 
with the Delegation, at that stage would inevitably have 
hampered the Chief Secretary’s effort to set up the
42. See Pal. Committee, The Future of Palestine, Report,
27.7.23., Cab 23/46;“Devonshire to Clayton, tcl.247,
3.8.23., C.0.733/48 file 38851o
42. The Secretary of State to the II.C., 4.10.23., C.0.753/58 
file 42044, published as well in Cnd. 1989, 1923.
43. This was decided even before its arrival in London. Shuckburgh noted: "I understand that it would be quite 
contrary to general practice that the Cabinet Committee 
should invite witnesses and hear evidnece", and added, 
"if the Committee hears the Delegation the Zionists will 
unquestionably demand to be heard as well..." minutes
on 16.7.23«, C.0.733/54 file 35998; see also his 
minutes on 24.7.23., C.O. 733/54 file 37431.
44. Devonshire to Clayton "personal and secret" tel 247,
3.8.23., C.O. 733/48 file 38851.
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/j-5Advisory Council. Nevertheless, the damage head been 
done. Reports reaching Palestine that the Delegation's 
activities in London were producing "good results" and 
that "success is imminent" caused the Arab candidates 
to retrain from taking their seats in the Council. They 
apparently feared that if they were to do so, they would 
have been 'feolcly responsible" for any failure of the 
Delegation. In these circumstances, Clayton was unable 
to fill the vacancies on the Council and its constitution 
was postponed. "
The formation of an Arab Agency had no better
chances. Throe months after its approval by the Cabinet,
the Report of the Cabinet Committee was presented to
Arab representatives by the high Commissioner and was
unanimously rejected. Musa ICazirn Pasha, President of
the Arab Delegation, stated on behalf of those present
that the Arabs, "having never recognised the status of
the Jewish Agency, have no desire for the establishment
4 - 7of an Arab agency on the same basis".
With that Statement, the proposal to set up an Arab 
Agency,with the entire idea for closer association of the 
Arab community with the Administration., in natters which 
might affect their interests,was brought to an end. The
4-5» Samuel to Devonshire, tel. 347, 21.9.23«, I.S.A., 2/171 Devonshire to Samuel, tel 287, 22.9.23«., ibid.
4-6. Acting Ii.C. to Sec. of State, tel.276, 3.8.23«,
C.O. 733A8 file 38854.
4-7. H.C. to Sec. of State, 11.10.23; sec also detailed 
report enclosed in H.C.'s despatch 104-1, 12.10.23'.,
C.O. 733/50 file 54395? both published in Cmd. 4989, 
4923.
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.failure of the three successive British attempts to
establish a Legislative Council, to reconstruct the
Advisory Council and to set up an_Arab Agency brought
the Secretary of State to the inevitable conclusion that
further efforts on sinilar lines would be 'Useless" and
that there was no other alternative than "to continue
to administer the country in conformity with their
undertakings even though they have to forgo the assistance.
zj_8that they had hoped to obtain from Arab community".
There is no doubt that if the Arabs had accepted
the British proposals and co-operated in setting up the
proposed constitutional institutions, they would have
succeeded to a certain extent in influencing immigration
policy. However, the extent of such influence and how
matters would have been had they given their co-operation
remain hypothetical questions to which only speculative
4-9answers can be given. It nay therefore bo preferable 
to examine the real influence of their non-cooperation.
first, one should note the fact that, parallel to 
the Government's attempts to set up the proposed 
institutions, two separate activities were taking place, 
both of which had a stronger connection with immigration 
policy: the re-organisation of the Immigration Department,
and the legislative and diplomatic activities surrounding 
the immigration scheme and Immigration Ordinance, both of 
which wc' shall deal with in ,tin.;:iiext-chapters.
48. Sec. of State to H.C., tel. 331* 9.11.23., C.0.733/50 
file 515537 published also in Cmd. 1989.
49. See for example Porath, Emergence, pp.126-128.
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Activity surrounding the formation of the Legislative
Council was conducted between August 1922, with the
publication .of the Palestine Order in Council, and March
1923, when the final results of the elections for the
Council were received» During this period, the intention
to expand the functions of the Immigration Department, or
at least preserve its present state,was dominant. This
aim had two main causes, administrative and political.
Samuel was aware that the establishment of an Immigration
Committee would give the Department a great deal of work
in preparing rules to govern the Committee and its
activities, necessitating the continued existence of
50the Department. Second, the proposed formation of the
Committee which the Zionists regarded with "gravest
disfavour", was unlikely to be accompanied by a second
blow to the Zionist cause, namely the abolition of the
Department. A strong Immigration Department, which the
Zionists considered of "national value" and a "symbol",
could provide some counterbalance to the Immigration 
52Committee. In this manner, the proposal to constitute 
the Immigration Committee gave reason fox' the continued 
existence of the Department, at least as far as Samuel 
was concerned.
This proposal.had a very similar impact on 
negotiations over the now Immigration Scheme taking place 
in Palestine and London at that time. The readiness of
50. H.C. to Sec. of State, Despatch 24-5, 18.4.22.,
C.O. 733/21 file 20456.
31. See notes by Leonard Stein on interview with Major 
Young, "confidential", 27.2.23., C.Z.A. S6/275.
52. Dr. Weiznann at mooting with H.C. and Palestine senior officials, 5.12.22., I.S.A. 11/6.
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the Colonial Office to meet Zionist demands with regard 
to the new scheme of control was strengthened in the light 
of the impending formation of the Immigration Committee.
On this issue, the Colonial Office accepted the Zionist 
view "that the argumentative position of the Palestine 
Government vis-a-vis the Immigration Committee will be_ 
considerably strengthened if the Committee, when it 
meets, finds a well considered scheme already in 
operation". Therefore, it is not merely coincidental 
that in the very week of the elections in Palestine, the 
Colonial Office despatched to Jerusalem the final draft 
of the Immigration Scheme which went "far to satisfy" 
the Zionist Organisation.
However, the failure of the elections brought about 
a turning point in the British attitude towards Zionist 
domanda. Samuel insisted that the reconstructed Advisory 
Council as a "representative body of the population of 
Palestine", should bo consulted on questions regarding 
immigration. Later on,he removed his previous objection 
to abolishing the Department of Immigration and Travel, 
also suggesting that Morris, who was favoured by the 
Zionists,be dismissed and that Hyamson be appointed 
Chief Controller.^ Moreover, in July 1923, the Colonial 
Office was considering a now sememe for limiting the 
entire Jewish immigration.^ This new course and the
53» Stein to Kisch, "personal", 16.1.23., C.Z.A. Z4/16085.
54. Kisch to Secretary, Zionist Organisation, London, 
11.3.23«, C.Z.A. Z4/16085»
55. Samuel to Devonshire "confidential", 20.4.23., I.S.A.11 / 1/ 1 1 .
56. See Chapter 5» PP> 141-143.
57. Shuckburgh's memorandum, 24.7»23«, C.O. 733/59- 
file 379-31.
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appointment of the Cabinet Committee to consider future 
policy in Palestine,brought tension with the Zionists 
to an unprecedented head. Weiznann called at the Colonial 
Office at the end of July and in an extraordinarily 
stormy appearance criticised the appointment of the 
Cabinet Committee, the "concessions" to the Arab 
Delegation and the intention to limit immigration
t t 5 8numerically.
The rejection of the proposal to set up an Arab 
Agency by Arab representatives in November 1925 only 
contributed to the independence of the Government from 
both Zionist ana Arab appeals. The outcome of this 
policy was expressed accordingly in the new Immigration 
Ordinance and Regulations which will be dealt with in the 
next chapter. All in all, it seems quite obvious that 
Arab policy had a negative impact on Zionist demands and 
immigration policy as a whole. If it had been expected 
that Arab non-cooperation would improve British-Zionist 
relations, reality showed the exact opposite. According 
to the British policy.of "equilibrium" in Palestine, this 
outcome was inevitable.
Thus far we have seen the impact of Arab policy on 
various questions regarding Jewish immigration. The 
influence of these matters over the Arab stand, however, . 
was negligible. Nevertheless, the actual volume of
58. Compare Weizmann and Shuckburgh's versions of the
sane meeting: Weizmann's in C.Z.A. Z4/16060, "secret"; 
Shuckburgh's in note to the Secretary of State, 26.7.25., 
C.O. •755/54- file 57451. See also Weizmann to Duke 
of Devonshire (following that meeting) 26.7.25., C.Z.A. Z4/16060.
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immigration during the period concerned did have a
considerable effect on the Arab stand regarding British
Constitutional proposals» One may assume that had
negotiations over these proposals taken place during
1924-1925, when Jewish immigration reached an unexpected
peak, their outcome night have been different. There
is no doubt that the economic distress of the Zionist
Organisation, the high rate of unemployment, the ebb in
immigration and comparative increase in emigration from
Palestine during those years, all contributed to a
hardening of the Arab stand. Under these circumstances
it might have scorned to the Arabs that there was very
little to lose by not co-oporating with the Administration.
This assumption is strengthened in the light of the
Arabs' readiness during 1924-1926 to renew negotiations
for sotting up representative institutions and an
Immigration Committee, in which Jewish representation
would be even stronger than in the original British
proposal, i.e. five members of whom•two would be Jews,
59two Arabs and a British official as Chairman.
59. Kisch to Stein, 7o11.24., C.Z.A. Z4/1445 IX
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Chapter Five
REORGANISATION OF THE DEPARTMENT OF IMMIGRATION AND 
TRAVEL; ATTEMPTS TO ADJUST ITS MACHINERY TO THE NEW
SCHEME OF CONTROL
A: THE TENDENCY TOWARDS EXTENSION
The revision of immigration policy caused Samuel 
to extend the functions of the Immigration Department and 
to adjust it to the new scheme of control. As early as 
November 1921, he set up a new Sub-Department of Labour 
as a section of the Department of Immigration and Travel. 
Its duties were to collect information on the labour 
market and to estimate the future demands of manpower 
in the various economic spheres. This estimate could 
help regulate immigration according to the categories of
'Iimmigrants upon which the new scheme was based. However,
the Sub-Department;' s task was not restricted to Jewish
immigrants only, but included the whole population of
Palestine. Samuel saw this as o. vital correction of
injustice to Arab labour, whose employment problems had
2so far received no consideration from the Government.
Albert M. Hyamson, a former official of the Central 
Zionist Office in London and, from January 1921, the 
Assistant Director of the Department of Immigration and 
Travel, was appointed Controller of Labour. Samuel
1. See"Mceting held in the presence of Ilis Excellency 
the High Commissioner to discuss the foundation of a 
Labour Department", 16.11.21., I.S.A. 2/14-5; also a 
note of E. Keith-Roach, First Assistant, Chief Secretary 
to the II.C., 28.11.21., I.S.A. 2/218; Samuel to 
Churchill in a report on Civil Service, 5«42.21., 
despatch 4-96, C.O. 753/8 file 6394-5«
2. Samuel to Churchill, 26.12.21., Despatch 59-6, C.O.733/8 
file 134-1.
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belfved that the fact that Hyamson was a Jew and a past 
active Zionist would not prevent him from conducting 
this delicate job fairly and genuinely. In this way, 
another pxobl the increasing personal rivalry in the 
Department between Hyamson and Morris, had been partly, 
solved. Hyamson, who had acted as Director of the 
Department during Morris's mission to Europe in the 
summer of 1921, had apparently taken advantage of his 
Chief's absence and persuaded the Chief Secretary to split 
up the Immigration Department, himself becoming head of 
the new Sub-Department.
A larger and more complicated extension of the
Department's functions wras anticipated with the proposed
appointment of Immigration Officers in the main centres
of immigration in Europe. Samuel's first objection to
this proposal, originally recommended by Morris, ^  was due
to his assumtion that the new policy would inevitably
reduce immigration and would not justify the existence
of this expensive network in Europe.^ Nevertheless, the
7inefficient control exposed by British Consuls' and the
0Colonial Office's suprport of Morris's proposals, caused 
the Palestine Administration to drop its previous objection 
and agree to the appointment of three Inspectors and not
3. Samuel to Churchill, 5.12.21., see note 1 above.
A. E. Keith-Roach, then official in the Middle East Dept., 
C.O., minutes, 21.6.24., 0.0.733/68 file 26356.
5. See Morris's proposals in "Homo, on Immigration into 
Palestine”, 30.5.21., I.S.A. 11/3.
6. Samuel to Churchill, 4.10.21., tel. 405, C.O. 733/6 
file 49714; sec Chapter 3, P. 68-69.
7. Samuel to Churchill, 14.12.21., tel. 502, C.O. 733/8,. 
file 62256; Vvyndham Deedes, Acting H.C. to Churchill,
10.3.21., confidential despatch, C.O. 733/19 file 13505.
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only one as the Colonial Office had recommended. Samuel 
placed two necessary conditions upon these appointments; 
first, that the Inspectors should be accorded the status 
of Vice Consul, and second, that their expenses be met 
by revenues accruing from tees for visas, endorsements 
and the like.
The Foreign Office's first reaction to these 
appointments was rather disappointing. Lord Curzon, the 
Foreign Secretary, felt that the execution of the scheme 
"would not only create an undesirable precedent to break 
the universal procedure and to establish new rules for 
Palestine only, but that it might also give rise in 
practice to difficult questions with Foreign Governments". 
Nevertheless, he consorted to the appointments, on 
condition that the Inspectors should not have the power 
to issue visas and take fees themselves, but only to
11recommend applicants to the British Consul for a visa.
The rejection of Lemuel's conditions by the Foreign
Office, which could have called the whole new immigration
scheme into question, compelled Jerusalem to spur the
Colonial Office on towards reaching a more satisfactory 
12arrangement. Writing to London, the Palestine Government *9102
9
3. G.L.M. Clauson, I'iiddle East Department, C.O., minutes,
7.10.21., C.0.799/6 file 4-4-737.
9. Wyndham Deedes to Churchill, 30.12.21., tel.521, C.O. 
733/8 file 245.
10. Samuel to Churchill, 20.1.22«, Despatch 23, C.O. 733/18 
file 4-591.
11. F.O. to C.O., 25.1.22., "Immediate", F.O. 372/1916 
file T188/14-7/L83; C.O. to H.C. , 27.1.22., tel.29, ibid.
12. H.C. to C.O., 11.2.22., tel. 50, ibid.
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re-emphasised the inefficiency of the British Consuls in
controlling immigration, which had been the indirect cause
of unemployment in the country, and insisted on the early
appointment of Immigration officers in order to "secure
adequate control over Consuls and Zionist representatives
abroad". Furthermore, the proposed Inspectors were
considered "essential to the satisfactory conduct of the
new immigration scheme for selecting immigrants most
15suited to the economic needs of the country". The
Colonial Office, although for different reasons, did not
need much encouragement on this issue. In its opinion,
Immigration Officers abroad would definitely 'be vital in
preventing any infiltration of "undesirable elements" and
in supervising the work of the Zionist Offices in order
to put a stop to unfair discrimination against non-Zionist 
14-applicants.
The different reasons given to justify these 
appointments might illustrate the different approaches 
of London and Jerusalem to the Zionist role in the new 
scheme. While Samuel still insisted on granting sole 
authority of control to the Immigration officers (by 
relieving the Palestine Zionist Offices of their previous 
privileges), the Colonial Office, (according to its 
agreement with the Zionists at the Immigration Conference 
of November 1921),' was inclined to support the 13*
13. Wyndhan Deedes to Churchill, 11.3-22,, confidential 
despatch, C.O. 733/21, file 24-592.
14-. John Shuckburgh, minutes, 2.2.22., C.O. 733/18 file 4-741.
15» See Chapter 3 above, pp.84— 86.
13'!.
restoration of the old Certificate system, by reconnending 
that the Palestine Offices exercise considerable discretion
✓| rover selection and regulation of immigrants.
However, without a solution to the problem of
financing the proposed establishment, the scheme could
not go far. Opinion at the Foreign Office was that the
Palestine Immigration Officers should be allowed to
collect additional fees as well as His Majesty's Consuls
and thus enable the Palestine Government to make up some
17of the £5,000 required for the scheme. Morris, on the 
other hand, suggested that the Zionist Organisation itself 
should bear the expenses of the Officers who were intended 
to control its cv/n work. ° This proposal, although not.
1 C)entirely rejected by the Zionists, - had a very slim 
chance of being accepted by the Palestine Government 
because of its contradictory nature.
The solution to this financial deadlock eventually
came from a quite unexpected direction. The increasing
disagreement between Egypt and Palestine regarding the
traffic of Jewish immigrants through Egypt, compelled the-
Foreign Office to intervene and to request consultations
20with the Colonial Office. 1678920
16. Sgg Chapter 6 below, pp.147-148.
17. Eric G. Forbes-Adan, Treaty Department, F.O., minutes23.2.22., F.O. 372/1916 file T2127/147/388.
18. Dr. David.M. Edor, Director of Political Department, 
P.Z.E., minutes of 56th Meeting of the Executive,10.4.22., C.Z.A., unclassified.
19. See Chapter 4 above, p. 111-112.
20. Forbes-Adan, minutes, 25.2.22., see note 17 above.’ For the entire question of transit through Egypt, see F.O. 
372/1916 file T2389/147/388.
1 3 2 .
This development gave the Colonial Office a fresh
opportunity to bring up the question of Immigration
Officers before the Foreign Office. At an inter-
Departmental Conference at the Foreign Office on April
5th, 1922, the entire question of control over immigration
was considered. The Colonial Office based its arguments
on recent reports from Palestine accusing the Consuls of
oversights in control over immigration. They succeeded in
convincing the Foreign Office to remove its objection to
Samuel's condition that the proposed Officers would be
self-supporting, their revenues being fees paid for visas,
endorsements etc. The Foreign Office then applied to
the Treasury, requesting that the Government "should make
no claim for any fees paid by the prospective immigrants",
using the argument that the establishment of such
officers "would be of considerable assistance to His
Majesty's Consuls and would no doubt relieve then of a
21large part of their work".
2?Following the Treasury's approval, Foreign Office
officials found "the way now clear" for installing the
proposed Officers at Warsaw, Vienna and particularly at
Trieste, where they were interested in maintaining "a
proper organisation, in view of the immigrant traffic in
23transit to Egypt".  ^ Nevertheless, the Colonial Office, 
which had at the sane time issued its "Declaration of 213
21. F.O. to the Treasury, 8.5*22., F.O. 372/1916 file T5156 
/147/388.
22. Treasury to F.O., 17.6.22., F.O. 372/1917 file T7217/ 11-7/388.
23. Forbes Adam, minutes, 20.6.22., ibid; see also his 
minutes of 24.8.22., F.O. 372/1918 file T9892/147/388.
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British Policy in Palestine" (Crude 1700), held the view 
'that it would be unwise for any new procedure to be 
adopted until such tine as the Legislative Council has
cone into being and the Immigration Committee ¡of this
'j 24body ! had been consulted upon the whole question".
However, Samuel, anxious to see the early establishment
of the scheme, emphasised that the appointment of the
Immigration Officers "does not imply any radical change"
in the present method of control and would co-ordinate
with the future policy. Furthermore, in his view, it
would be regarded locally "as indicative of fulfillment"
of the undertaking given in his own Statement of 3rd June
1921,"that the Immigration Department would be entirely
responsible for the supervision of immigration". The
High Commissioner then submitted a detailed estimate of
the cost of the proposed establishment of three inspectors
which now amounted to £6,661 per annum, while revenues
expected from visa fees of 10,000 immigrants and 2,000
26regular travellers at £1 each, amounted to £12,000.
Following the approval of the White Paper by 
Parliament, the Colonial Office initiated a second 
inter-Departnental Conference with the Foreign Office, to 
discuss the immigration question in all its aspects. Among 
other decisions, the Conference passed a resolution on the 
immediate appointment of four Immigration Officers at 2456
24. Churchill to Samuel, 6.7.22., confidential despatch,' 
C.O. 733/36 file 29635.
25. Samuel to Churcnill, 22.7.22., confidential despatch, 
C.O. 733/23 file 37766.
26. Enclosed in Samuel's confidential despatch, 22.7.22., ibid.
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Warsaw, Vienna, Constantinople and Trieste, "in order
that they familiarise themsSlves with the present condition
of immigration during the period required for the
completion of the machinery for putting the new scheme 
27into force". '
Despite this resolution,Foreign Office officials 
expressed serious doubts regarding Samuel's estimate of 
the cost of the new machinery, since the regular visa fee 
was eight shillings and not £1 and since travellers were 
to pay their fees to the British Consuls and not to the 
Immigration Officer. The Foreign Office cane to the 
inevitable conclusion that.Samuel's proposals were 
over-optimistic and contrary to Treasury instructions. 
Therefore, the estimated revenue of the Immigration 
Department was unlikely to be realised, unless immigration 
were to increase considerably.^
B: THE TENDENCY TOWARDS REDUCTION
Tho principle that immigrants and visitors to
Palestine should maintain the entire establishment of
the Department of Immigration and Travel by paying various
fees (for visa, landing, immigration, etc.) was a
fundamental one and had existed since the very formation
20of the Department. ■ This principle, although of an 
economic nature, also held important political significance,
27. See minutes of the inter-Departmental Conference held
at the C.O., 14.8.22., F.O. 372/1918 file T9643/147/386.
28. Forbes-Adam, minutes, 24.8.22., F.O. 372/1918 file 
T9892/147/388; F.O. to C.O., 6.9-22., ibid.
29. See Chapter 1 above, p,24 Notes 26-27.
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as it could be shown to the public that Jewish immigration 
was not a burden on the Palestinian taxpayer.
Following the May Disturbances and increasing
criticism in Great Britain and Palestine of the Government's
so-called "pro-Zionist" policy, the Palestine Administration
had to send a notice to the press, pointing out that "none
of the cost of the Department of Immigration and Travel
is being paid by the taxpayers of Palestine" and that the
Department showed a surplus which has been carried o^or
30to the credit of the General Revenue. Nevertheless,
it seemed very likely that Samuel's'intention to extend
the functions of the Department in order to restrict
control on immigration,could have increased its expenses.
However, this restriction and the decision to abolish
fees for passports as from January 1922,could only reduce
the Department's revenue and turn its profit into a heavy 
31deficit. At the sane time, pressure from the Secretariat
to reduce the Department's staff met with strong objections 
32from Morris.
These contradictory approaches within the Palestine 
Administration brought about the intervention of the 
Colonial Office, which recommended nothing less than the 
complete abolition of the Department by delegating its 
existing functions to other Deijartments in the following . 
order: the issuing of passports and the entire control of 
immigration policy to the Secretariat; actual control of
30. "Cost of Control of Immigration" enclosed in Keith- 
Roach's note to the H.C., 28.11.21., I.S.A. 2/218.
31. Keith-Roach to the H.C., 28.11.21., ibid.
$2. Ibid, ibid.
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entry into the country to the Director General of Police
and Prisons; and the Sub-Department of Labour as a whole
33to-the Department of Industry and Commerce.
Samuel was totally opposed to these proposals, mainly
for administrative reasons. The recent restrictions on
immigration, explained the High Commissioner, "give rise
to a great deal of controversy" and "provide extremely
difficult problems to be solved", which required much
attention, more than the Secretariat could devote.
Moreover, the establishment of the proposed Board of
Immigration and the legislative work on immigration would
necessitate the continued existence of the Department.
The High Commissioner went on to explain that if this -
work were to be undertaken by the Secretariat, it would
require practically the same staff as was at present
employed by the Department and no economy would bo achieved.
But to avoid a hasty decision, ho suggested postponing the
whole matter until he had discussed it with the Colonial
34-Office during his impending visit to London.
As the general question of re-organising the entire 
Palestine Administration was discussed at Samuel's meetings 
at the Colonial Office, it was decided to leave the fate 
of the Immigration Department, among other issues, in the
35hands of an Economy,Committee to be set up in Jerusalem.
The Committee, consisting of three members including 
Ilyamson and an official of the Secretariat, gave
33. Churchill to Samuel, 9.3.22., confidential despatch,
I.S.A. 2/219.
34-. Samuel to Chur-chill, 19.4.22., confidential despatch, 
ibid.
35. Samuel to Churchill,27.7.22., despatch 534-, C.0.733/23 
file 39366.
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considerable support to the Colonial Office proposals, in 
opposition to the stands taken by Samuel and Morris.
Among its constructive proposals ,the Committee recommended 
first to transfer part of the present duties of the 
Department, such as travel facilities, admission of 
immigrants and registration of British subjects to the 
Director General of Police and Prisons and second, to 
adopt the Secretariat's proposal of reducing the 
Department's staff by closing the Jaffa Immigration Office, 
scaling down the Haifa Office and having the Jerusalem 
Office exclusively for granting visas. In addition to 
this,it was suggested that the appointment of the 
Immigration Officers abroad be postponed ,since the 
anticipated revenue from visa fees would not have 
justified their existence. If the above recommendations 
wore carried into effect, the Committee promised a
considerable saving of £6,175, one third of the Department's.
36total budget.
As expected, the Committee's proposals brought 
immediate criticism from the Immigration Department.
Morris attacked the Committee's basic estimate of revenue 
for the coning year which was based on the present low 
rate of immigration. He foresaw that this would soon 
change for the better as a result of the recent approval 
of the Mandate, the approaching economic prosperity and 
the most probable increase of inmigration from Russia, which 
would follow the stationing of British Consuls in Moscow
36. See minutes of the Economy Committee of the meetings 
hold on 21.10.22., and 8.11.22., enclosed in Samuel's 
despatch to the Duke of Devonshire, Colonial Secretary,
5.1.23., despatch 17, C.O. 733/4-1 file 262.
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and Odessa» The expected increase in immigration would
accordingly augment the Department's revenue from
immigration fees. Referring to the proposed transfer of
certain functions to the Police, Morris objected to this
on political grounds, stating that "from the point of
view of the tender susceptibilities of the Palestine
public, there are grave objections to the Police and
37Prison stations being used for this purpose". r
As Director of the Department, Morris was naturally 
interested in raising its standard and extending its 
functions. Since these aims depended mainly on the 
financial state of the Department there were two possible 
ways of increasing its revenue; one, by raising fees for 
various services and the other by increasing the number 
of immigrants and travellers. The first possibility met 
with strong and persistent objections from the Zionist 
Organisation as well as from foreign Governments such as 
Prance and Italy, which considered themselves defenders 
of the interests of Christian pilgrims to the Holy Land.^ 
The second possibility was even more complicated, as it 
contradicted the entire spirit of the new immigration 
policy. Morris, who personally admired the "creative, 
energetic and initiative" nature of the Jewish people and 
believed that Jewish immigration was a "promising element",
37. Morris to the Treasurer, Palestine Government, 11.10.22. to the Chief Secretary, 20.11.22., and 16.12.22., 
enclosed in Samuel’s despatch of 5.1.23., ibid.
38. See copies of letters from Italian and French Consuls 
General in Jerusalem to II.C,, enclosed in Samuel-’s 
despatch 594 of 10.3.22., F.O. 372/1948 file T10239/ 
14-7/388; also C.O., to H.C., 28.9.22., despatch 1126,P.0. 372/1918 file T11387/14-7/388.
139
which might prosper and enrich Palestine, inclined to
the second choice, namely in favour of facilitating
Jewish immigration. Having personal objections to the
new policy, Morris was undoubtedly not the ideal person
to execute it efficiently. His constant disagreements
with the new policy eventually led to his dismissal one
year later. However, at this stage, Samuel preferred
not to interfere and sent the Committee's reports with
Morris's observations, without submitting any personal
comments. This non-committal attitude was not entir^y
welcomed by the Colonial Office which expected the High
Commissioner to add his own views on the issue and if
possible, to recommend concrete proposals for reducing
JOthe Department.
Subsequent to the failure of the Palestine 
Legislative Council elections in February 1923, which 
prevented the constitution of the LDTiigr^ .tion Committee,
Samuel was obliged to return to this unpleasant question, 
but now deprived of his previous argument, which was 
based on the necessity of the Department as an "auxiliary 
body" to the Immigration Committee. He was then 
compelled to reveal the real reason for his objection, 
namely the firm Zionist pressure against any weakening 
of the Immigration Department, which they considered "as 
the material expression or symbol of the upbuilding of the
/• 'iJewish National Home", Writing to London, Samuel expressed
39. See Morris's Eepoo; on his tour to immigration centres in Europe, 18.8.21., 733/6 file d758d.
HO. Sbuckburgh, minuter 31.1.23«, C.O. 733/d1 file 2626.
d1. V/eizmann, during meeting with the H.C. in Jerusalem,
5.12.22., C.Z.A. '-/161^6.
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serious doubts as to whether the recommendations of the
Committee would really lead to any economies and
emphasised the political undesirability of any
4-2association of the Police with immigration»
Although Colonial Office reservations about the
Committee's findings stemmed mainly from economic and
administrative reasons, the Duke of Devonshire,
Churchill's successor at the Colonial Office, was ready
to accept Samuel's point of view. Nevertheless, the
Secretary of State insisted, that those parts of the
Committee's proposals which did not contradict Samuel's
anxiety about Zionist criticism,should be carried out in
order to of'fect some saving in the Department. Accordingly,
he recommended that all functions concerned with travel be
transferred to the Department of Public Security and other
trivial duties not directly concerned with Immigration
to the Secretariat and the Police. The new re-organised
Department would then deal exclusively with matters
regarding immigration which might permit a substantial
4-4-reduction in its budget.
Samuel rejected these proposals again, this time 
for economic as well as political reasons. Firstly, he 
was opposed to maintaining two separate authorities, each 
dealing with certain classes of incomers to Palestine, 
which in his opinion would inevitably lead "to confusion 
and more expenses". Secondly, the proposed formation of
4-2. Samuel to Devonshire, 13.4-.23., despatch 333, C.0.733/ 
4-4- file 20325.
4-3. See note 4 0 above.
4-4-, Devonshire to Samuel, 16.5.23., despatch 554-, G.O. 733/ 44 file 20325.
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the Department exclusively for immigrants might harm its
"common inage" and emphasise its "completely Jewish
aspect", which was undesirable from all points of view.
Samuel instead suggested an amalgamation of the Sub-
Department of Labour with Immigration and Travel and -
placing control of the combined Department directly in
the hands of the Secretariat. It night thus be possible .
to settle all the controversial questions concerned with
the Department. The combined Department would become
a section of the Secretariat and the question of its
profitability would then lose its political significance;
second, a probable saving of £2,000 (the sum required by
the Colonial Office) could then be effected and direct
control over the policy and machinery of immigration
45would be strengthened.
The question of supervision over the SSction could 
be even better effected by Samuel's further suggestion 
that Morris be dismissed from his post and Hymnscn 
appdried as Chief of the proposed Pernios Section. Ilyanson, 
who had proved himself so far to be a very energetic, 
meticulous and obedient official, and more important, able 
to keep the Zionists in strict chock , was certainly a 
more suitable person to implement the restrictions on 
immigration.^6 The official reason given for this 
reshuffle was that additional efforts were to be made in 
reducing the Department's expenses. Since Morris appeared
45. Samuel to Devonshire, 1.6.23., confidential despatch 
C.O. 733/45 file 21427.
46. E. Keith-Eonch, minutes, see note 4 above.
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in the list of staff as a temporary officer, whereas
Hyamson was listed as permanent, it was considered "clearly
47fair" that Morris should go and Hyamson remain.
At the same time,Samuel did not try to conceal his
own fears about probable opposition to his proposals, from
both Arab as well as Jewish circles. The Zionists, stated
the High Commissioner, might regard the abolition of the
Department with "apprehensive dismay", while the Arabs
could consider the appointment of a Jew as Chief of the
Section as further evidence "that control over immigi^iion
48is entirely in Jewish hands".
Samuel's visit to London in summer 192$ provided a
suitable opportunity for wide-ranging discussion on the
future of the Immigration Department and the fate of
Hyamson and Morris. Colonial Office officials' were firm
in their opinion that any attempt to place a Jew in charge
of immigration was bound to be interpreted "as a mere
manoeuvre to get rid of a Christian in favour of a Jew and
to place the Department under Zionist domination".
Therefore, it was agreed to, adopt Samuel's proposals
concerning the reorganisation of the Department and
removal of Morris from his post, but Hyamson would be ,
transferred .to a different position and the new Section
49placed under an officer who was neither Arab nor Jew. .
47. Shuckburgh, minutes, 21.7*2$., C.O. 7$3/47 file $4189.
48. See note 47 above; see also notes of "Discussions between Middle East Department and Sir H. Samuel", 
26.7.2$., C.0.• 7$$/$4 file $$$24; Shuckburgh to Clayton, Chief Secretary, (since March 192$) 26.7*2$., 
confidential despatch, C.O. 7$$/47 file $4189.
49. See note 47 above; also Sir J. Masterton-Smith, Under 
Secretary, C.O., minutes, 21.7.2$., C.O. 733/47 file 
$4189; "Extracts of Minutes of Discussion with
Sir H. Samuel", 10.7*2$., ibid.
Ironically, it was the Zionists and not the Arabs who
regarded unfavourably the idea of removing Morris and
50placing Hyamson m  charge of immigration.
Nevertheless, when the Permits Section eventually
came into being on 1st April ‘1924, Hyamson was the nan
51to be appointed as its chief. However, this event was
■followed by an unusual incident. Shortly after his
appointment, Hyamson addressed a memorandum to the Chief
Secretary in which he outlined the functions of the new
Section and pointed out that most of then "are directly
concerned with labour", while the "least important axe
not even remotely connected with immigration." Moreover,
he considered immigration itself to be "mainly a labour
natter" and insisted on changing the section's title
from "Permits" to " l a b o u r " A l t h o u g h  neither Samuel"^
. 54nor the Colonial Office considered Hyamson's proposals 
too seriously, his arguments do shed some light upon his 
personal concept of immigration ind hismnew task in 
particul ar o
The original motive for re-organising the Department 
of Immigration and Travel was to extend its functions,in 
order to adjust its machinery to the new scheme of control. 
But the economic depression, the grave unemployment and 
consequently the'ebb of immigration affected its revenue
50. F. Kisch to the Political Secretary,.Z.O. London, 
5-10.23., C.Z.A., Z4/16085.
51. Samuel-to Thomas, Colonial Secretary, 23.5.24.,
C.O. 733/68 file 26356.
52. A.M. Hyamson to Chief Secretary, 18.5-24., "confidential 
enclosed copy in Samuel's confidential despatch to 
Thomas, 2.5.24., C.0.735/68 file 22627.
53. Samuel to Thomas, 23.5.24., see note 51 above.
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and eventually caused its reduction and abolition as an
independent unit. However', its new status and its new
Chief suited presentppjicy and were designed t^ act
uore efficiently and strictly. Ironically, after the
new nachinery had just been set up and Hyanson had taken
over, Morris's predictions of an approaching economic
55prosperity, followed by a tide of immigration,  ^ began 
to come true. The new nachinery of control had now to 
face an entirely different reality from that for which 
it had originally been intended.
54-. E. Keith-Roach , minutes, see note 4 above.
55» Morris to the Treasurer and the Chief Secretary, see 
note 37 above.
Chapter Six
THE IMMIGRATION ORDINANCE, 1925
A: THE CAMPAIGN OVER THE IMMIGRATION SCHEME
The lessens of the May Disturbances strengthened 
the Zionists' original belief that the foundations of the 
Jewish National Home should be built upon selective 
and well-controlled immigration. Accordingly, the 
Zionist diplomatic campaign in London during the second 
half of 1921,was primarily concerned with regaining their 
exclusive control over selected immigration. A considerable 
achievement on this issue was reached at the Immigration 
Conference in November 1921, when the Colonial Office 
approved in principle a re-establishment of the "guaranteed 
system" under the auspices of the Zionist Organisation.
This consent obliged the Colonial Office to include the 
Zionist Executive in the outlining of new immigration 
policy with a special view to the control of labour 
immigration.^
Eollowing this agreement, the Colonial Office 
drafted its proposed scheme of control in accordance 
with main Zionist demands. The scheme recommended the 
creation of quarterly immigration quotas - Labour Schedules, 
agreed and approved by both the Palestine Administration 
and the Palestine Zionist Executive. Immigrants within
1. See Chapter 3, pp. 86-87.
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these quotas were classified into two categories: the
existing category "E" of skilled and unskilled labour,
selected and guaranteed by the Zionist Organisation, and
a new category "II" - members of professions and lir.ited
means of independence x’ecor.inended but not guaranteed^by
2the Organisation.
The Colonial Office submitted the proposed scheme to 
the Zionist Executive for observation prior to its being
-7
sent to the High Commissioner for his approval.^
Dr. Weizmann, although generally satisfied with the 
British proposals, asked for more flexibility in the 
definitions of the new categories and in the allocation 
of immigration certificates among the various Palestine 
Offices, in order to make the system "more workable in 
practice".^ The Colonial Office again went a considerable 
way towards accepting Weiznann's suggestions, made the 
relevant amendments and only then sent the scheme to 
J erusalem.
The Colonial Office proposals, which had made quite 
significant changes in Samuel's original scheme, undoubtedly 
placed the High Commissioner in a rather difficult 
position. Samuel was aware that these amendments would 
be seen in Palestine as a radical departure from the 
policy he had declared in his Statement of 3rd June, but 
since he had agreed that the new scheme should be drafted
2. See the first draft of the scheme enlcosed in Churchill's
confiden:ial despatch to Samuel, 14.12.21., C.O. 733/16, 
file 58536. " .
3. Shuckburgh to Weizrnann, 6.12.21., ibid.
4. Weizmann to Shuckburgh, 7-'l2„21., ibid.
5. Shuckburgh to Weizmann, 12.12.21., ibid., see note 
2 above.
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by the Colonial Office with the participation of the
Zionist Executive, he was unable to reject it absolutely.
Therefore, in order to reconcile any divergen^-s the
High Commissioner asked the Colonial Office to avoid
any formal changes in his original classification - such
as the addition of a new category "H", but nevertheless,
he agreed to the most essential proposal of creating a
Labour Schedule,which would include all immigrants
selected and guaranteed by the Zionist Organisation as
part of category "E" - labour. Moreover, in response to
local Zionist pressure, ho agreed to extend the Schedule
period from three to six months and to empower the
Palestine Zionist Executive to send the allocation of the
7Schedule directly to its offices in Europe. '
Samuel's agreement in principle with the Labour 
Schedule gave the Colonial Office the green light for 
formulating the new scheme in more detailed and concrete 
form. The scheme, an elaboration of the Zionists' demands 
within the limits of Samuel's policy,was based on five 
principles, or rather, five phases in the following order:
1. A bi-annual conference of Palestine Zionist Executive 
and Palestine Administration. Agreement reached on 
quotas of guaranteed and non-guarante^d immigrants, 
trades to which they should belong and allocation to 
various countries. 67
6. Samuel to Churchill, tel.405, 4.10.21., C.0.733/16 file ¿'-9714.
7. Wyndham Jeedes, Acting H.C., to Churchill, tel. 521.,30.12.21., C.O. 733/8 file 245; see draft of that' 
telegram in I.S.A.11/6.
/
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2. Immigration Inspectors, British Consuls and Palestine 
(Zionist) Offices he informed of this agreement.
3. Palestine Offices forward list of selected immigrants 
both guaranteed and non-guaranteed, to Immigration 
Inspectors.
4a Immigration Inspectors to make sure that these
candidates really are suitable from economic, health 
and political points of view.
5. Consuls will grant visas to all immigrants approved 
by the Inspectors,^
This scheme, apart from being designed with a view
to "constructive work in Palestine" and "necessary to the
economic conditions" of the country was, as far as the
Colonial Office was concerned, also essential "to enhance
the status" ... "and confer a large measure of
responsibility" upon the Zionist Organisation, whose
control over immigration "had so much declined as to be
practically negligible". Furthermore, responding to
Zionist pressu.ro, the Colonial Secretary could find 'ho
reason why" this scheme should not be enforced at once,
even before the establishment of the Immigration
Committee which might have dealt with the "existing
9regulations as they stand".
Meanwhile, taking the Colonial Office proposals into 
consideration, the Palestine Administration drafted its 
own scheme. Yet, influenced by the present high rate 
of unemployment and the inefficient control exerted 89
8. The scheme was drafted by Eric Mills, C.O., 2.2.22., 
C.O. 733/18 file 4741; see also Shuckburgh's minutes, of the sane date, ibid.
9. Churchill to Samuel, confidential despatch, 21.3.22., 
C.O. 733/36 file 11723. Regarding the proposals of 
setting up an Immigration Committee, see Chapter 4,pp. 115-116.
by British Consuls, the Palestine Administration proposed 
a stricter scheme which minimised the role of the 
Zionist Organisation. These proposals wore based on four 
main principles:
1. Determination of a quarterly Schedule by the 
Palestine Government according to figures presented 
by its competent Departments and "with the advice 
of the Palestine Zionist Executive".
2. Allocation of the Schedule in quotas and under 
"general industrial headings" to the centres of 
immigration.
3. Primary selection by the Zionist Organisation ana 
other "approved bodies".
4. Final selection by Palestine Immigration Officers
from amongst the Zionist candidates and "independent 10applicants"„
The most significant differences between the two 
schemes lay in the role delegated to the Zionist
Organisation, over control of selected immigrants. While
the Colonial Office suggested "an agreement" with the
Zionists on rationing and allocation of the Schedule, the
High Commissioner proposed that the Palestine Zionist
Executive "would be consulted". London had granted an
exclusive privilege of selection to the Zionist Organisation
whereas Jerusalem made it possible for "other approved
bodies" to select ano. recommend candidates, while final
selection was to remain in the hands of the Immigration
Inspectors. Nevertheless, as a result of the unofficial 10
10. Deedea to Chui'ch.'ll, confidential despatch, 10.3.22., 
C.O. 733/19 file 13305=
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agreement between Morris and the Palestine Zionist 
Executive the Palestine Administration recommended the 
formation of an "indefinite" Labour Pool consisting of 
unemployed immigrants.
The differences between the proposals of the Colonial
Office and the Palestine Administration corresponded to
a large extent with the different approaches of the two
parts of the Zionist Executive in London and Jerusalem,
as well as with their unequal ability to convince the
British to accept their demands. The principal motive
of the Zionist Executive in London v/as the complete
restoration of the- previous Certificate System which
enabled the Zionist Organisation "to exercise a measure of
12effective control corresponding to its responsibility".
The Palestine scheme was criticised by the Zionist 
Executive from a practical as well as a moral point of view. 
The Executive stated that the Palestine Government was 
unable to have at its disposal sufficient information 
which was required for allocating the immigration 
certificates among the various immigration centres, a 
matter which the local Zionist Offices "are far better 
qualified to deal with". Especially as the Schedule 
would be classified under "general industrial headings",
13a condition which needed the proper machinery for selection. 12
11. See Chapter A, pp. 111.
12. Leonard Stein, Political Secretary, C.Z.O., London,
to Under Secretary of State, C.O., 10.3.22., C.O. 733/^6 
file 11723.
13» Sec "Immigration to Palestine", memorandum by Z.E., 
London, 19.6.22., C.Z.A., S6/276; also in C.O. 733/36 
file 29683.
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By its counter-proposals the Zionist Executive was 
not'only working in the interests of immigrants, nor 
merely to increase immigration by any means, but rather 
towards a more substantial goal - the consoledr>' ion of its 
own position as an exclusively recognised body for selection 
and regulation of immigration into Palestine. Under 
Samuel's proposals all immigrants were to be on an equal 
footing, whether recommended by the Zionist Organisation, 
by any other "approved bodies" or not recommended at all.
In other words, no special status of any kind was accorded 
to the Zionist Organisation, "but on the other hand", the
i' ” iZionist Executive pointed out, "public opinion jwouldj
continue to hold the Zionist Organisation responsible for
all Jewish immigrants, whether arriving under its auspices
or not". This abnormal situation would render the
Organisation unable in any way to limit the nominations
of candidates by "irresponsible bodies" while it would
still remain under a "moral obligation" to provide for
them if they failed to make good. Although the Executive
did not ask that all immigrants without exception, should
require a recommendation from the Zionist Organisation, it
did insist on having "special status" of control over
selection of labour immigration. Otherwise, it predicted,
"the Organisations' prestige, its power of control and
its ability to organise immigration in a systematic manner
14will be seriously prejudiced". 14
14. Ibid, ibid
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The Zionist criticisms and counter proposals were 
carefully considered at the Colonial Office, and later 
transmitted to the Foreign Office and the Home Office to 
bo discussed together at an Inter-Departmental Conference 
on immigration,to take place in mid August 1922. The 
division of opinion among Foreign Office officials prior 
to that conference,illustrates the controversial nature of 
this question. Major Spencer, for example, supported the 
High Commissioner's scheme and opposed any concession to 
be made to the Zionist Organisation which would inevitably 
weaken the status of the Immigration Officers. In his 
opinion the Zionist fear that their position would be 
weakened was "true, necessary and desirable". Forbes Adam 
and Parkin, on the other hand,expressed sympathy with the 
Zionist demands. Forbes Adam held the view that since 
the Zionist Organisation held a recognised position in 
the Mandate itself and had "borne all the burden and 
criticism for its success or lack of success", it would 
be only fair to leave to them as much responsibility as 
possible in selecting and guaranteeing immigrants." Parkin, 
who found that the Zionist proposals "contain much wisdon 
from the practical point of view" shared Forbes Adam's
'I aobservations. However, these views eventually did not 
have any real bearing on the conference itself. Major 
Young of the Colonial Office leading the discussion, *
15» Sec minutes of Major Spencer, Eastern Department,
F.O., 3•&»22., Forbes Adam, 3.8.22., and R.T. Parkin
4.8.22., both of Treaty Department, F.O., F.0.372/1Q17 file T8965/14-7/388. '
explained how far his Office was prepared to go towards 
meeting the Zionist criticisms but preferred to leave 
the actual revision of the scheme to a separate meeting 
with Batterbee, the representative of the Hone Office, 
and himself
The results of that meetin0; could not have been too
palatable to the Zionists. Disregarding the political
implications of the question, the Young-Batterbee
Committee couched its proposals in purely administrative
terms. Accatlingly, it was suggested that the determination
and the allocation cf the Schedule be left in the han .^3
of the Palestine Government in the first place. Likewise,
it was recommended that final selection of immigrants
should rest in the hands of the Government working ,through
the Immigration Officers, who must be given "very wide
powers to reject the nominees of the Organisation". In
this manner, Zionist fears that they would be held
responsible and criticised if undesirables enter Palestine,
17would be"unfoundod".
The revised Colonial Office formula, however, did 
not go so far in relieving the Zionist Organisation of 
any participation in actual control over the Schedule. 
Favouring the Zionist demands, the new scheme recommended 
the constitution of a Jewish Immigration Bureau in 
Palestine,which would be consulted before determining 
the Schedule and would have the power to classify and 16*
16. See minutes of that Conference, 14.8.22., F.O. 572/
1918 foie 196'-5/147/388.
1?. H. Young's minutes to E. Mills, undated, C.O. 733/31 
file 39243; also notes by Forbes Adam on conversation with Young, 24.8.22., F.O. 372/1918 file T9892/147/388.
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allocate the immigration certificates according to countries 
of origin. Following the High Commissioner's provisional 
approval the Schedule would be submitted to the proposed 
Palestine Immigration Committee. On the application of 
the majority of the Committee tne question would be 
referred to the Secretary of State, whose decision would 
be final.
The revised scheme of the Colonial Office, based on 
a compromise between the Zionist Executive and Samuel's 
proposals, might have had a good chance of being approved 
by both parties, if the Palestine Zionist Executive b^d 
not rejected it outright. The draft of the scheme, which 
was transmitted to the Palestine Government for 
observation,was leaked to the Palestine Executive, 
apparently by Morris. The rumours that the Zionist 
Executive in London was in agreement with these 
proposals caused angry reaction from the Palestine 
Executive. Protesting to London, the Zionist Executive 
in Jerusalem revealed the considerab]e support they had 
already gained for their cause from Morris and Norman 
Bentwic.h, the Legal Secretary, and the probable damage that 
London's "agreement" had done to their diplomatic achievement 
in Palestine. According to the Palestine Zionist 
Executive, Morris and Bentwich were of the opinion that 
the new proposals are "even more restrictive than the 
regulation at present in force, and certainly not so 
broad as the Immigration Department would like to see 
them". Morris himself, the Palestine Zionist Executive 18
18. See "Scheme t'or Control of Immigration into Palestine", •
7.9.22., in Jf.O. 372/1918 file T10876/14-7/388. '
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claimed., was ready to recommend the creation of a
considerable Labour Pool, to limit the control of
Immigration Inspectors to questions of health and political
conviction only, and to approve a Schedule of 20,000 (i)
immigrants for the following year - a figure on which he
19had based his administrative budget.
In addition to their complaints,the Palestine
Executive sent to London a long memorandum criticising
the revised scheme and presenting their own proposals.
In their opinion, the Colonial Office scheme was based
on two wrong assumptions. First, that Jewish economic ,
development in Palestine would necessarily be confined
to agriculture, whereas industrial and commercial
development would certainly afford much more room for
immigration than could agriculture. Second, that society
in Palestine was regarded in the scheme as both
"mechanical and static" and that the "creative faculty"
of immigration was disregarded. The Palestine Executive
emphasised that Jewish immigrants did "not merely fit
actually vacant posts but were the creative factors who
increased tho whole wealth of the community, who discover
the new sources and forms of production and who not only
?0employ themselves but create employment for others".
This theory found concrete expression in the Palestine 
Zionist Executive counter-proposals by requesting that 
immigration be facilitated for persons of independent
19. See "extract from a letter ..." P.Z.E» to Z.E.,
18.9-2?.; also "extract from note of interview
with the II.C. 17.9.22., both enclosed in Leonard Stein's 
letter to E. Mills, 6.10.22., C.0.733/36, file 4999.
20. P.Z.E. "Memorandum on Immigration", 21.9.22., I.S.À.11/6 .
means and those who intended to follow their academic
and professional calling in Palestine. The principal
issue, however, remained the maintenance of the Labour
Pool consisting of immigrants coming under category "E".
The Palestine Executive emphasised the economic advantages
of a certain amount of unemployment in the country,which
in its opinion was "necessary in order to render possible
development in industry, commerce and agriculture and
also to secure a proper relation between wages and capital
- in other words, to assure a constant supply of Jewish
labour irrespective of the existing demand for labour.
At the sane time, the Executive made it clear that its
demand for the Pool was in fact, only an alternative if
the Government would not accept the "wider principle" of
21the Certificate System.
Despite this statement, it_seems quite obvious that
at this stage the Palestine Executive gave first priority
to the Labour Pool, which in the short term could offer
a better alleviation for its political and financial 
22distress.
The sharp criticism and proposals coning from the 
Palestine Executive apparently surprised and embarrassed 
the London Zionist Executive. The differences of opinion 
between London and Jerusalem Zionists appeared serious. •
S. Pinkelstein, the former Secretary for Immigration of 
the Central Zionist Office in London, who was invited to 
examine these differences, suggested that it would not be 
difficult to adjust the London policy to the one suggesteo 21
21. Ibid, ibid.
22. See Chapter 4- p. 110
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by Jerusalem. Generally in favour of the Palestine Zionist 
Executive proposals, he recommended that they be adopted 
when negotiations with the Colonial Office were resumed.^ 
The Zionist Executive, however, thought differently. 
Insisting on full uniformity of the Zionist stands both 
in London and Jerusalem, the Executive dictated to 
Jerusalem their principles as follows:
1. Restoration of the guaranteed Certificate System and 
rejection of the Labour Pool as a basic determination 
of the Schedule.
2. The Zionist Organisation to be the "sole Agency" 
entitled to introduce guaranteed immigrants and 
allocate the certificates to the various centres of 
emigration.
3. Rejection of the appointment of Immigration 
Inspectors.
4-. British Passport Officers to be authorised to 
reject Zionist nominees on "special political 
grounds" only, and the visa they grant should be 
"definite and final".
5. Drastic reduction of visa fees for immigrants to• 24-Palestmo.
" \
Careful examination of the so-called "differences of 
opinion" between the tv/o parts of the Zionist Executive 
does not revoa] disagreenents of much significance. The 
dispute really lay-in mutual distrust and rivalry as well 
as in differences in emphasis and tactics. The Palestine 
Executive, well aware of its financial and political
23. "Memorandum" by S. Finkelstein, 10.10.22., C.Z.A.L3/31.
24-. S. Finkelstein to P.Z.E., 23.11.22., "confidential" ibid. . ’
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limits, preferred to act more pragmatically towards 
solving its most acute problems. Its persistent demand 
for a Labour Pool was designed to increase Jewish 
Immigration by all possible means, even beyond the actual 
needs of the country for labour The Zionist Executive, 
on the other' hand, acting more dogmatically towards 
a long range settlement, did not give up its principal 
demand for restoration of the Certificate System. Its 
main object v/as to achieve as much control as possible, 
in order to regulate immigration according to its own 
decision.
Weizmann's visit to Palestine at the end of 1922
offered a suitable opportunity to co-ordinate and unify
the Zionist stands. A few sessions of the Palestine
Executive, with representatives of the Jewish National
Council and V/eizmann present, were devoted to the
immigration question. The majority of spokesmen justified
the Labour Pool by describing its advantages from both
economic and political points of view. Considering the
impending formation of the Immigration Committee they
expressed their fears that the Schedule would be open to
constant Arab opposition and might frequently be postponed,
if the proposed procedure of referring it to the Secretary
of State were +-0 be implemented. On the other hand, the
Pool could be set up, once and for all, in an administrative
way without consulting the Arabs. Dr. Weizmann, on the
other hand, advocating the adoption of the London Executive
25policy, placed himself in the minority. 25
25. P.Z.E., Minutes of meeting , 1.12.22., C.Z.A.,, 
unclassified.
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Since the assembly could not reach a unanimous
decision it was suggested that an ad hoc committee be
nominated out of the Executive and the Council, whose
duty would be to outline a programme on which further
negotiatiors with the Government would be bas^G.
Characteristically, the.ad hoc committee adopted a Resolution
which included both schemes; namely, to obtain a Labour
Pool of 3,000 unemployed but at the same time to allow a •
continuous flow of 500 "guaranteed" immigrants per month
under category "E", irrespective of the Pool. Nevertheless,
as the Committee felt that its far-reaching demand might
not be accepted by the Government, it proposed a detailed
bargaining retreat from its original proposal, whose
final phase was a Schedule of 12,000 guaranteed immigrants
prper annum„
Eurnished with that resolution a strong Zionist 
delegation including Dr. Weizraann and Colonel Erederick 
Kisch, the new Chairman designate of the Palestine 
Zionist Executive, met Samuel and senior Palestine■Officials 
to discuss the entire immigration question. Colonel Kisch 
opened the discussion by widely presenting the Zionist 
demands. Dr. Weizmann added that a considerable margin of 
unemployed was not only favourable in a sense to Jewish 
interests, "but also a healthy economic agent" for the 
country. Basing his arguments only on the economic 
advantages of their proposals, Dr. Weizmann stated that he 
was anxious to establish a. system which could allow a 
regular influx of immigrants without the present "artificial,
26. Minutes of meeting, 3»'I2.22., ibid.
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inelastic and over-classified' scheme. In, his view, "a
more generous and comprehensive policy would stimulate
and increase effort and capital, with a satisfactory
reaction upon the capacity of the country to absorb 
27immigration".
Zionist criticism and proposals found considerable 
support among some of the British officials present at the 
meeting. Wyndham BeeGes, the Chief Secretary, Morris and 
Colonel Solomon, the Director of Commerce and Industry, 
agreed that there were at present "too many restrictions 
on immigration" and that the Schedule was "an artificial 
method". They recommended that the Zionist Organisation 
should be allowed to maintain a large Labour Pool and 
introduce guaranteed immigrants "on broad lines according 
to the immediate state of economic affairs".
Hyamson however, in defence of Government policy, 
contradicted his colleagues by arguing that the existing 
scheme had "failed" or "proved itself ineffective".( 
Describing as "somewhat exaggerated" the Zionist claims 
that unskilled Jewish workmen showed great adaptability 
for skilled trades, he insisted on the need for classifying 
the Schedule into trades. Furthermore, he rejected the 
Zionist demand for exclusivity in introducing immigrants 
and urged that the Schedule should also provide room for 
individuals, non-Jews and non~Zionists, which could apply 
directly to the British authorities.
27. See "Minutes of the Meeting ... to Consider Questions 
Relating to Immigration", i .12.22., C.Z.A. Z4/1614-6.
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Samuel, of the opinion that immigration had not, so 
far as experience showed, kept pace with the capacity of 
the country to absorb new arrivals", rejected the Zionist 
demands which he considered as even more contradictory 
to that principle. Admitting that the attempts to base 
the extent of immigration on "strict arithmetical 
calculations" had been disappointing, the High Commissioner
suggested basing the Schedule "only upon existing economic
„ . „ 28 factors".
The all round criticism of the unsatisfactory results
of the existing immigration scheme eventually brought the
High Commissioner to the conclusion that the new scheme
should not be so 'ligid" and "meticulous". Submitting his
new general observations to the Colonial Office, Samuel
stated that it was "not practical of course to exercise
so minute a control that every individual immigrant ...
can be co-ordinated with a particular vacancy". "Jewish
labour" he pointed out "is found to possess adaptability
in a high degree and very many men who belong to one
calling when they first arrive, are found in quite
different occupations later". The High Commissioner
recommended therefore that the Schedule be determined morn
frequently - every three months, fixed only six weeks in
advance, and extended during its execution if necessary.
Likewise, he suggested various amendments to the definitions
of the immigration categories in order to achieve "much
29elasticity and common sense".
28. Ibid, ibid.
29. Samuel to Devonshire, 21.12.22., C.O. 733/28 file 290.
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However, since the High Commissioner had not yet
revealed his new intentions to the Palestine Executive
and the despatch containing his proposals somehow did not
reach London until the middle of January 1923, much
nervousness had been caused among Zionist civcIC-s in
30Jerusalem and London. This excitement was not only a 
result of speculations on Samuel’s future policy, but derived 
mainly from the fear that the new scheme would not be 
operational before the constitution of the proposed 
Immigration Committee. The Zionist Executive in London 
was at pains to convince the Colonial Office "that the 
argumentative position of the Palestine Government vis-a- 
vis the Immigration Committee will be considerably- 
strengthened if the Committee, when it meets, finds a 
well considered scheme already in operation'.’^  These 
circumstances put the Zionist Executive in a race against 
the clock, as the appointed time of the Legislative 
Council Electiore came nearer and nearer.
The decisive initiative eventually came from Dr.
Weizmann. Submitting the Zionists' final proposals,
V/eizmann notified Shuckburgh of his impending visit to 
theUS.A.and his anxiety to settle the immigration question 
before his departure. The reason ho gave for that was 
that his prospect, of success in America would be "very 
materially improved",if the immigration question could he 
disposed of.32
30. F. Kisch to Leonard Stein, 9°4.23., Kisch to Stein,
16.1.23., Stein to Kisch 22.1.23; Kisch to Stein, 28.1.23, 
all in C.Z.A., Z4/16085; also Stein to Kisch 7®2.23., 
ZA/16129.
31. Stein to Kisch, 16.1.23., C.Z.A., Z4/16085.
The longed-for conference at the Colonial Office which 
took place a few days later went "far to satisfy" the 
Zionists. In many respects it was a successful repetition 
of the fateful Immigration Conference at the Colonial 
Office.in November 1921 and further evidence of Weizmann's 
diplomatic talent. The list of the Zionist achievements 
following that Conference was a long and "very impressive 
one", at least as far as the Zionist Executive was 
concerned :
1. General approval of the restoration of the Certificate 
system for "guaranteed" immigrants by the Zionist 
Organisation.
2. The "guarantee" was limited for one year only. .
3. Determination of the Labour Schedule every six 
months.
4. Allocation of the Schedule by the Zionist Organisation 
with final approval of the Palestine Government.
5. Reduction of the minimum capital required for visa 
for craftsmen and artisans, from £500 to £200 only.
6. Admission of students and orphans, providing evidence 
of sufficient means for maintenance.
7. Extension of category "D" - dependents,to include
fiancees. ^
Nevertheless, the Zionist Executive had to admit 
that its efforts to postpone the appointment of Immigration
32# V/eizmann to Shuckburgh, 16.2.23., in an attached letter 
to.Z.E.'s memo "Revised Scheme for the Control of 
Immigration into Palestine", submitted to C.O.,
15.2.23., C.O. 733/59 file,8490; also in C.Z.A., S6/274
33. See minutes of Conference, 21.2.23., C.O. 733/54
file 9748; copy of the .revised scheme in H. Young to 
Deedes, 1.3.23.^ S. Finjkelstein Z.O., London, to P.Z.E., 27.2.23., C.Z.A., , 56/272.
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Inspectors ended with failure. The Inspectors, in spite
of Zionist protests, were authorised to examine the
political as well as economic and health suitability of
all immigrants and to reject even those recommended and
34guaranteed by the Zionist Organisation.
B: LEGISLATION OF THE ORDINANCE
The Colonial Office revised Draft, embodying the
Agreement reached at the Immigration Conference of February
1925, was first presented to the Zionist Executive and then
despatched to Jerusalem. It was anticipated at the
Colonial Office that the Draft, as it had been revised in
London, would take immediate effect in the form of new
Regulations, with no further modifications. According to
the original schedule, the Draft should have been submitted
to the Immigration Committee for approval, as soon as that
35body was constituted. However, since the elections for 
the Legislative Council had been heavily boycotted, the 
whole scheme was postponed.
Nevertheless, the Immigration Department took 
advantage of this delay to consult other branches of the 
Palestine Administration. The circulars sent to all 
District Governors and the Directors of Commerce and 
Industry, Police, Labour and Health sought "urgent" 
observations concerning the new Regulations. But since 
the Draft was considered confidential and thus not attached.
34-. S. Finkelstein to P.Z.E., 15*3.23., ibid.
35* See " N o t e s  o f  Interview with Major Young ..." by 
L. Stein, 27.2.23., C.Z.A, S6/275.
to these appeals, these bodies had very little to suggest
at that s t a g e . T h i s  amounted only to the Police's request
that provisions be made for detaining persons recommended
for deportation, and a. request from the D.irector of Health
thcat medical certificates be forwarded in advance with the
original application,in order to reduce deportations on
37medical grounds. '
Norman Eentwich, the Legal Secretary, who was invited
to convert the scheme into Regulations, made numerous
amendments in the Draft. Those were designed to ensure
unequivoc.nl interpretation and to avoid loopholes and
misunderstandings of the law, but without affecting its
own flexibility. Accordingly, he suggested determining
the age at which orphans (Category "A iv") would reach
independent maintenance; to specify precisely the minimum
capital for artisans (Category "A.ii") in each trade, but
at the same time not to limit persons of independent means
(Category "A i") to investing their capital in one
particular branch. Nevertheless, these stricter definitions
of the law's clauses inevitably reduced the power of
38discretion of the Immigration Department.
Although Eentwich was careful not to interfere with 
any political aspects of the lav;, his proposition to omit 
from the Regulations all sections dealing with functions 
of Consuls, Immigration Inspectors and the Palestine Offices
36. See a copy of those circulars, all datod30.A.23. 11/1/1I
37« Deputy Inspector General of Police, A.5.23., and 
Director of Health, 16.5*23«» both to Director of 
Immigration and Travel, ibid.
38. Attorney General to Director of Immigration,- 22.7-23.,
26.8.23., both ibid.
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over actual control was extremely significant. Since these
matters were considered as "administrative” and not
"legal", it was suggested they be dealt with separately
59by direct communication with the bodies concerned. '  This
arrangement could enable the Government to act more freely
and to co-ordinate its policy according to the economic
and political circumstances in Palestine. In this manner,
actual control over immigration policy could also be
excluded from the authority of any legislative body which
4-0might be constituted.
The new Draft Regulations were issued in accordance 
with Àrticie 11 of the "Immigration Ordinance, 1920", which 
authorised the Director of Immigration with the approval 
of the High Commissioner, "to issue from time to time any 
order and regulations for the better control of immigration 
into Palestine". The Palestine Government was at that time 
of the opinion that the amendment of the Immigration 
Ordinance itself "must await the constitution of a 
legislative body" which the Administration was still 
hoping to form.
The Draft endeavoured to preserve the spirit of the
Colonial Office's final scheme by adopting in general its
definitions of the immigration categories and the principles
4-2of the Labour Schedule. The only amendment which might 
be. considered significant was the proposition to limit
99. Ibid, ibid.
4-0. See hint for that in G. Clayton, Acting H.C. to 
Devonshire, "confidential", 24-.8.25., C.0.733/4-8 
file 4384-4-,
41. Attorney General to Director of Immigration, 22.7.23.I.S.A. 11/1/11.
42. See Drait, enclosed in Clayton's confidential despatch 
24.8.23., ee note 40 above.
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the extension of the Schedule during its execution to 10%
or 300 immigrants whichever be the greater number. This
provision was approved by the Colonial Office, but under
further pressure of the High Commissioner the extension
4-4-of the Schedule was reduced to cf/o only.
Nevertheless, the separate "communique" to be
directed to the Palestine Zionist Executive, which was
probably drafted by Hyamson, went further in reducing
the Zionist demands as approved by the Colonial Office.
Outlining the proposed role of the Zionist Organisation in
the actual execution of the Schedule, the Palestine
Government insisted that "consultations" with the Palestine
Executive would take place only after its provisional
determination and not before. Moreover, the Executive
was only entitled to put forward its own proposals for
"completing vacancies in the Schedule",after the
Administration had considered applications for certificates
from private employers,who applied directly to the
A 5Immigration Department.  ^Thus, the Zionist Organisation 
lost its superiority regarding the Labour Schedule, as 
agreed in the Immigration Conference of February 1923.
The unemployment crisis in Palestine, which reached 
a peak in the summer of 1923 and was accompanied by a 
drastic drop in immigration and increase of emigration,' 
decreased the urgency for new Regulations. Due to these
4-4-. See minutes of "Discussion between Middle East 
Department and Samuel", 26.7«23», C.0.733/54-, 
file 33324.
45. See draft of proposed communique enclosed in Clayton's 
despatch, note 40 above.43. Max Nurock, Assistant Secretary, Palestine Government, 
to Director of Immigration* 18.4.23., I.S.A. 11/6;
Samuel to Devonshire, "confidential", 20.4.23., 11/1/11.
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circumstances and with the absence of substantial Zionist 
pressure to speed up the legislation process, the drafting 
of the Immigration Regulations moved very slowly. Ultimately 
the Regulations were sanctioned two years later,under 
a new Immigration Ordinance.
This long delay began in Palestine. The Legal
Secretary sent the first Draft Regulatxons to London after
a delay of three months. They were sent back to him by
the Colonial Office after a further delay of two months
to bo re-drafted, "in order to bring them into conformity
with the usual style and requirements of a legal
enactment". Nevertheless, the Secretary of State
authorised Samuel to publish the substance of the new
Scheme as a Public Notice, if he considered the matter 
4-6urgent. Contrary to the view of the Legal Secretary,
who recommended immediate approval of the Regulations,^
Samuel preferred to wait and to issue them as a legislative
.enactment. Apart from excluding Palestinian citizens
and travellers from the Regulations and consequently
relettering the categories, the revised Draft was returned
Ll qto London without any substantial amendments. y However,
three months later, a new Draft outlined by Hyamson, now
acting Director of Immigration, reached the Colonial
Office accompanied by an urgent appeal for its "early 
50approval".
4-6. Devonshire to Samuel, "confidential", 2.10.23.,
C.O. 733/4-8 file 43844-.
47- Eentwich to Chief Secretary, 18.12.23., I.S.A. 11/1/11.- -
48. Samuel to Devonshire, "confidential", 21.12.23 
C.O. 733/52/457-
49. See revised draft enclosed in Samuel's despatch ibid.
50. Enclosed in H.C. to the Secretary of State, "confidential"26.5-24., C.O. 733/66 file 19618. c':’
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After careful examination of the latest Draft and 
its co-ordination with the existing Ordinance, the Colonial 
Office came to the conclusion that not only would it be 
necessary to redraft the Regulations completely, but also 
that the Regulations could not be put into satisfactory
51shape unless the Immigration Ord..nance itself were amended". 
This conclusion launched a new round of consultation in the 
spring of 1924-, on the initiative of the Colonial Office.
The drafting of the new Ordinance and Regulations was
conducted by Gerald Clauson, who had specialised in the
immigration question of'Palestine and had most of the
52previous Colonial Office proposals to his credit. Clauson 
took advantage of the presence of Nathan Mindel, the acting 
Director of the Immigration Department, who happened to be 
in London on vacation and consulted him and Edward Keith- 
Roach,the former Assistant Secretary of the Palestine 
Government who, according to a rotation system, had been 
transferred to the Colonial Office. The participation of 
Mindel and Keith-Roach,who were well acquainted with all 
the aspects of immigration, ensured that the Palestine 
point of view would be considered and expressed accordingly 
in the lav/.'
It seems quite obvious that the main motive of the
new Ordinance, in comparison with the previous one, was .to 
make control over immigration as strict and efficient as 
55pgssible. This policy was quite plainly expressed in the
51. E. Keith-Roach to N. Mindel (undated), ibid.
52. H. Young, Middle East Department in minutes, 11.7.24., 
C.O. 755/86 file 20749.
55. See first Draft of Ordinance, ibid.
171.
measures provided,to prevent any arrival or entry of
irregular cases as well as to facilitate and accelerate
their deportation, if necess.ary. To this end, the list
of persons not to be permitted entry was significantly
lengthened, and included among others also "unsuitable
54-persons" without specifying any concrete reason (5a). 
Likewise, the list of reasons for deportation was extended . 
to include further reasons which did not appear in the 
first Ordinance, (8c, 8d, 8e, 8f). In order to facilitate 
deportations, every immigrant had to possess a valid 
passport or other document establishing his nationality 
to make his repatriation, if necessary, possible. (5g) • In 
addition, the lav; of limitation for the purpose of 
deportation had been revoked.
The Colonial Office revised Regulations emphasised 
the stricter definition of the lav;. This stood out in 
particular in the redivision of the immigration categories. 
The category of "Persons of Independent Means" (old 
for example, was divided into four new categories, ("A1^ , 
"A"2j "A"j , and "B"). "Dependents" on individuals or 
institutions in Palestine (old "D") were redivided into 
three new categories, ("A"^, "A’’^ , and "D"), while in 
practice new "D" itself was sub-divided into six sub-
categories, ("A"^^p^, 
and1 "C'p.
ff f'. i t  h  n  n  a if2(2)’ 3(2)’ A 4(2)’ "B"2’
5A. The numbers m  brackets show the final numeration 
of the Articles as they appear in_the published .
Immigration Ox’di.nance, :$ee Paleetine Ordinances, 1925,p»17H
55« See Appendices 3 and 4-„
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By the middle of July 1924, the amended Ordinance, 
accompanied by revised Regulations and Instructions to 
His Majesty's Consuls and Passport Control Officers, were 
sent simultaneously to the Palestine Government, the 
Zionist Executive, and the Foreign and Home Offices for 
observation. ^
The Foreign and the HOrae Offices came to similar
conclusions. Both indii’ectly criticised the complicated
character of the scheme by pointing out the "heavy" and
"unconventional" tasks imposed upon the British
57representatives abroad.-"
The Zionist Executive, which this time had not been 
consulted during the preliminary drafting of the lav/, 
submitted a long memorandum, including numerous 
observations and proposals. Their criticism focused round 
the changes mentioned above, i.e. the question of 
passports, the various disqualifications for entry and 
the proposed procedure for deportation. Contrary to the 
view of the Foreign and H0me Offices, they recommended that 
decisions be left to the discretion of the Consuls,in 
order to reduce the necessity for frequent referral of 
cases to Jerusalem. Regarding deportation of irregular 
or "unsuitable persons",it was suggested that such cases 
should be confined to appropriate Courts in order to avoid 
miscarriage of justice.
56. See copies of the attached letters dated 16.7.24., 
in C.O. 733/86 file 20749.
57» See copy of letters from H. Montgomery, F.O. 9.8.24; C.D.C. Robinson, H.O., 14.8.24., both addressed to 
the Under Secretary of State, Colonial Office, in
I.S.A. 11/1/11.
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The main Zionist criticism, however, lay with the 
new Regulations which gave legal interpretation to the 
scheme agreed and approved by them at the Immigration 
Conference cf February'1923. That scheme, meanwhile, 
had felt the consequences of the grave economic situation 
in Palestine and the consequences of Arab non-cooperation. 
Now presenting their observations, the Executive made 
desperate efforts to turn back the clock and bridge the 
considerable gap between that agreement and the new 
law. To this end they based their argument on the moral 
obligation of the Colonial Office's promises and agreement 
as well as on the recent economic improvement in Palestine 
which might substantially strengthen their bargaining 
stand,
No less radical and comprehensive were the observation 
made by Hyamson, the newly appointed Controller of 
Immigration. They were concentrated on three main 
objectives: to make control more effective and efficient, 
to reduce its cost and to increase its revenue as much 
as possible. As far as he was concerned, the Regulations 
wont "far too much into detail and dealt with matters 
of internal machinery" that ought to be left to the 
officers administering the control. As it had been 
constructed, "the machinery could not work and control 
would come to a standstill". However, an attempt to 
apply the Regulations would impose a large amount of 
additional work on the Consuls as well as the Permits
58. See Z.O.'s memorandum enclosed in a letter -hr, -j-hk 
Under Secretary of State, 30.7.21-., also 27 11 24 ibid. *’
Section and must increase materially the cost of control»
At the same time, the numerous difficulties and delays
placed in the way of immigrants would inevitably reduce
their numbers and affect the revenue of the Permits 
59Section.
Accordingly, he suggested extending the furetions 
of his Section and increasing the powers of discretion 
imposed on the British Consuls, in order to avoid 
unecessary references and correspondence between them.
In more concrete terms: to authorise the Consuls to 
grant visas to Palestine residents and immigrants with 
capital, without having to refer to Jerusalem; to simplify 
the system of allocation and distribution of Immigration 
Certificates, whereby they should be issued locally 
according to general authorisation from Jerusalem; to 
reduce entry of unsuitable and irregular cases by 
production of health certificates in advance and 
introducing stricter examination by Consuls; and finally, 
speeding up deportation procedure in order to prevent
l , . . „ 60extra expenses and risks of escape.
Emphasising his practical knowledge and long 
experience, contrary to the "theoretical acquaintances" 
of those who drafted the law in London, Hyamson pressed 
vigorously for adoption of his own observations.^To
59« Ilyamson to Chief Secretary, 16.10.24., ibid.
60. See Hyamson's memorandum, 16.10.24., I.S.A. 11/1/11; 
Hyamson to Chief Secretary, 15«1.25«, ibid.
61. See note 59 abo\£.
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this end, he very greatly desired to be sent Urgently
to London to take part in the final drafting of the 
62Ordinance» However, Samuel did not give much backing
to Hyamson's proposals, nor did he agree to his sudden
visit to London. ^  Without Samuel's approval, Hyamson's
proposed amendments had very sl:m chances of being
64-considered by the Colonial Office.
The new Immigration Ordinance was eventually 
published in September 1925» and came into force one 
month later, without being significantly affected,either 
by Zionist criticism or by Hyamson's proposals.^ 623*5
62. Hyamson to Chief Secretary, 11.12.24-., I.S.A. 11/1/11.
63. Max Hurock, acting Chief Secretary, to Hyamson,21.12.24-., ibid.
64-, Roland V. Vernon, Middle East Department, C.O., 
minutes and memorandum, 13.5.25., C.O.,733/92 
file 20629.
65. Compare first Draft, note 53, with published 
Ordinance, note 51- above.
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Chapter Seven
EBB AND FLOW: ECONOMIC ABSORPTIVE CAPACITY AS AN 
INDICATION FOR IMMIGRATION..........
A: INAUGURATION OF THE NEW POLICY
The principle of Economic Absorptive Capacity as 
it appeared in the Statement of "British Policy in 
Palestine" (included in the White Paper of June1922) , 
subsequently became the official credo of the Immigration 
Department. This principle stated that "immigration 
cannot be so great in volume as to exceed whatever may 
be the economic capacity of the country at the time to 
absorb new arrivals" and further ensured "that the 
immigrants should not be a burden upon the people of 
Palestine as a whole, and that they should not deprive
n aany section of the present population of their employment.
Samuel, who took an active part in the composition
of the Statement and was undoubtedly the author of the
2principle concerned , had already expressed its essence 
in his own Statement of 3rd June 1921. In fact, the new 
immigration scheme, first introduced in Samuel's 
Statement, was based entirely on this principle. The 
classification of immigrants according to their economic 
merits was designed to enable the Administration to deal
1. Cmd. 1700, June 1922, p. 19»
2. Shickburgh, minutes dated 20.6.22., C.0.733/36 
file 29270
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with every category separately and to regulate immigration 
upon the actual economic and employment needs of the 
country.
Although the High Commissioner indicated in his , 
Statement that "the conditions of Palestine are such as 
do not permit anything in the nature of a mass 
immigration", there was nothing in the scheme itself to 
limit immigration numerically, or prevent a mass 
immigration. Immigrants were able to enter the country 
as long as they could produce sufficient evidence of 
independent means for their maintenance, definite 
prospects of employment or dependence on residents who 
were in a position to support them. However, the 
implementation of this policy was a question of 
interpretation and execution by the machinery of control.
The renewal of immigration according to the revised 
policy was not followed by an immediate and adequate
¿j_change in the machinery of control. As before the
suspension of May 21, this remained mainly in the hands
of the British Consuls. In the absence of direct
communication between the Immigration Department and the
Consuls, long delays and misinterpretations of the
5policy were almost, inevitable.
3. Samuel's statement at Government House, 3.6.21., 
enclosed in his despatch 139 to Churchill, 6.6.21.,
C.0.733/3 file 30263. See also Chapter 3 above 
pp.66-67.
4. See Chapter 5 pp.132-133
5. F o r  a comprehensive review of these questions see 
"Memorandum on the Control of Immigration to Palestine 
1920-1930", 16.7.30., I.S.A. 11/40/2.
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Shortly after the announcement of the new policy by
Samuel, the Foreign Office informed the Consuls of the new
definitions of the immigration categories and instructed
them to grant visas accordingly to all immigrants ,
excepting those undeD? category "E" - labour.^ Apparently
the principles of the new scheme were not completely
understood by the Consuls: What was a definition of
"person of independent means"? What was a 'hember of
profession"? What constituted a "dependent"? These were
some of the questions raised by the Consuls and passed
7on to the Colonial Office by the Foreign Office. Due to
a lack of further instructions from Jerusalem, Colonial
Office officials spent some time on improvisatory
interpretations of the Instructions. Gerald Clauson, for
example, suggested fixing the minimum capital required for
a person of independent means at £500 at least,^ a
qualification which the Palestine Administration approved
post factum. However, it appeared that many of the
Consuls did not wait for further clarification and granted
9visas according to their own discretion.
The freedom of discretion granted to the Consuls was
not significantly reduced by the new Interim Regulations
10issued in Palestine in August 1921. The Regulations : 
authorised Consuls to grant visas without reference to -
6. F.O. to H.M. Representatives abroad, circulars 50 and 51, 
15.6.21., F.O. 371/6383 file E67~2 V I 44/88.. 78910
7. For example see correspondence in C.O. 733/10 
file 32925.
8. Clauson, minutes dated 8.7.21., ibid.
9. Z.O. Central Office, London, to Z.C. Jerusalem, 6.11.21. 
C.Z.A. S6/269.
10. See "Public Notice, Admission of Immigration into ■ Palestine, 1.8.21.", in Official Gazette No.49, 15.8.21.
See Appendix 3«
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Jerusalem, to travellers ("A") and residents of Palestine
("G") as well as to immigrants with • independent means
("B"), persons of religious occupation ("F" ) and members
of professions ("C"). Dependents on residents ("D") and
labourers with specified employers ("E") had to be
furnished with certificates from the Immigration
Department supporting their request for a visa. The
necessity for certificates for immigrants coming under
categories "D" and "E", was apparently not interpreted
by the Consuls as indispensable in all cases. At any
rate, this was the impression of the Palestine
Administration following the arrival of many hundreds of
immigrants who did not fulfil the conditions laid down
11m  the Instructions. Nevertheless, a great part of the 
blame for this state of affairs must be attributed to 
the indistinct definitions of the categories, which 
eventually provided the Zionist Commission with a 
convenient pretext to press for a more lenient 
interpretation of the Regulations.
Immediately after the issue of the Regulations, the 
Commission began negotiations with the Administration on 
this matter. According to an agreement reached with the 
Zionists in September 1921 the Administration agreed to 
reduce "in certain cases" the minimum capital required 1
11. Samuel to Churchill, tel. 502, 14.12.21., C.0.733/8 
file 62256.
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from persons of independent means from £500 to £120 or a
secure income of £6 per month.; to allow unrestricted
admission of members of professions ("C") provided
indubitable evidence of tlieir qualifications could be
supplied and to give a broader interpretation to the
definition of dependent or resident ("D"),to include-
wives, unmarried daughters and sisters without limitation
of age, and sons, brothers and apprentices up to 18 years 
12of age. However, Samuel was still firm in his decision
not to change the procedure governing admission of labour
into the country and insisted that they must be only
"shilled artisans with definite prospects of employment
18with specific employers."
Since the capacity of Zionist enterprises in
Palestine to provide new ¿jobs for immigrants was very
limited, the Palestine Executive was compelled to apply
to private employers to come to its aid. The Executive
then constituted local committees ox private employers,
whose task was to provide lists of available vacancies
in various Jewish enterprises, in order to obtain
immigration certificates for labour. At the same time
the Zionist Offices were advised by Jerusalem to ask
their fellow countrymen in Palestine to set up similar
14committccs for the same purpose. 12*4
12. Z.C. Jerusalem to Palestine (Zionist) Offices in 
■ circulars regarding immigration, 6.9.21., 20.9.21., 
C.Z.A., S6/267.
15. Samuel to Churchill, tel.560, 5*9.21., C.0.753/6 file 44737; Samuel to Churchill tel. 381, 21.9.21., 
C.0.733/6 file 47443.
14. See note 12 above.
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Yet, considering the large supply of local labour
in Palestine these measures were unlikely to achieve 
• 'i 5effective results» The supply of Jewish labour had
increased oven more by the end of 1921 *vith the termination
of public works in military projects and road construction
and the return of Arab labour to Jewish colonies following
the political tranquility which had boon interrupted by
the May Disturbances« ’ The combination of these
factors increased the unemployment rate during Spring
1922, which reached an unprecedented record in March,
17of 2,500 unemployed, most of them newcomers»
This state of affairs compelled the Higji 
Commissioner in March 1922 to introduce drastic measures 
of control, particularly where labour and "dependent"
y\ pimmigrants were concerned. These measures were primarily 
designed to reduce significantly the existing discretionary 
powers given to the Consuls and to concentrate actual 
control within the. Immigration Department. The Consuls 
had been instructed to refer to Jerusalem "all applications *1678
15« P.Z.E. to Palestino Offices, Circular Letter, 25.12,21., 
C.Z.A., 36/267.
16. P.Z.E., Labour Depa.rtment in circular to Labour • 
Departments of Palestine Offices, February 1922,
C.Z.A., 36/267.
17. W. Deedes, for the H.C., to Churchill, confidential' 
despatch, 10.3.22., C.O.733/19 'file 13565: The Z.E. had" already admitted in January that "the actual 
number of unemployed workman in Palestine is about 
2,000", but it instructed the Palestine Offices that 
"for many reasons this number ought, at the prssent 
moment, not to be made public", Circular, January 1922, 
C.S.A., ZJ/3075. See also P.Z.E. Minutes of Mooting
10.1.22., C.Z.A. unclassified.
18. Sec Chapter A above, p.110.
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for visas under categories "A", "B" and "G". In other 
words, all Emigrants except those with independent means 
had to obtain specific authorisation from the Immigration 
Department to enter the country= At the same time, the 
Department itself was instructed to suspend the issue of
20
further permits temporarily "except in very special cases".
In this manner immigration was, though unofficially,■.
temporarily suspended. However, the effect of the new
method on the actual flow of immigration was neither
immediate nor very decisive. Due to lack of direct
communication with the Consuls ,instructions from Jerusalem
were passed to them through the Colonial Office and then
21the Foreign Office with four weeks' delay. This delay
was partly caused by some hesitations at the Colonial
Office, which, while negotiating with the Arab Delegation,
feared that any suspension might be interpreted by the
22Arabs as a concession to their recent demand. Eventually
the instructions wore despatched to the Consuls at the
beginning of April ,but their effect was not felt in
Palestine until June. Although the total volume of
immigration fell by over 9-0/ during June-August, in
25comparison with the preceding q u a r t e r , s o m e  drop was
already anticipated owing to the unfavourable weather
29-conditions during the summer months." More significant' 
however, was the new distribution of immigration among 
the various categories. Immigration under category "E",
19. Samuel to Churchill, tel. 91, 9»3»22., C.0.733/19 
file 11623»
20. Ibid, ibid.
21. C.O. to F.O., 15.3.22., ibid; F.O. circular to II.M.
Consuls, 8.A.22., F„0. 372/1916 file T3303/1^7/388. .
19
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for example, dropped, during the summer quarter from
40% to 20% of the total volume in comparison with that 
25of April,  ^ while the volume of "D" increased from 
30% to 50% respectively. This phenomenon was even more 
significant in September when "labour" dropped to 15% and 
"dependents" rose to 65% of the total volume. This 
flixctuation was not only proportional but also absolute, 
since immigration under "E" di“opped from 232 in April 
to an average of 94 in June-August while immigration 
under "D" increased from 222 in April to 265 respectively.
The transition of immigrants from one category to 
another was an indirect consequence of the inauguration 
of the Labour Sphedule. Since the Schedule limited 
labour immip;ration numerically, some legitimate immigrants 
for category "E" apparently preferred to apply for visas 
under category "D". This tendency brought about further 
counter measures by the Palestine Administration which 
.will be described below, but it is first advisable to 
consider policy regarding the Schedule.
B: OPERATION OF THE LABOUR SCHEDULE
Following the Immigration Conference of November 
1921, the Colonial Office, in response to Zionist pressure, 
urged Samuel to restore the former "ration system" to 2345
22. Shuc.kburgh, minute dated 11.3.22., C.O. 733/19 
file 11623; see also Chapter 3 above, pp. 97-99.
23. Total-immigration during March-May - 2,216,
June-August - 1,334, see appendix 6.
24. "The Present Position of Immigration into Palestine", 
memo by S. Finkelstein, C.Z.A., London, 9.11.22.,
C.Z.A. L3/31.
25. Official Gazette; April-September 1922.
include all immigrants coming under the auspices o f  
the Zionist Organisation, The Zionist Executive, anxious 
to extend the Organisation's p o w e r s  of control, suggested 
that the approved immigration quotas should include not 
only labour, but also lower -middle class immigrants such 
as retail shopkeepers, craftsmen and artisans with 
limited means, all to bo selected and regulated by the 
Organisation,26 It was thus the Zionists themselves who 
had been the first to recommend limiting numerically the 
vast majority of immigrants. Samuel agreed in general 
to operate a "ration system", but insisted that all 
immigrants coming within the quota - labour or others -
27should come "under tho heading of specific enterprises"» 
Yet it was understood by all parties concerned that the 
actual operation of tho scheme had to await the 
enforcement of the new Immigration Regulations, t h e n  
being drafted.
However, in consequence of tho temporary suspension 
of labour immigration in March 1922 and tho revised 
instructions to Consuls, the Palestine Administration 
decided on tho early inauguration of a Labour Schedule 
without waiting for the new Regulation to be issued. Tho 
early operation of the Schedule «system was considered by 
tho Administration as a prompt and adequate measure "to
determine the number and classification of immigrants
o nmore accurately. This decision was welcomed by the
26. See Chapter 6, pp. 14-15-1 *-6.
27. Wyndhara Doedos, Acting II.C. to Churchill, tel.521,
30.12.21., C.O. 735/8 file 245.
28. Deedcs to Churchill, confidential despatch, 10.3.22., 
C.O. 733/i9 file 13565; C.O. to Z.O., 28.3.22.,
F.O. 372/1916 file T3850/147/388; Deedcs to Weizmanri,
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Zionist Executive, whose opinion was that "only with the
restoration of that [ration! system and the renewal of
definite responsibilities 'on the part of the Zionist
Organisation/it carries with it, will it become possible
for effective and systematic control to be readily
exercised”. The Executive emphasised however, that if
they attached importance to the early operation of the
Schedule, it was not because they expected or desii'ed
to permit any largo and immediate increase in the volume
of immigration, but merely to enable them to regain the
2Qpowers of control which they had formerly enjoyed.
The motivation of the Zionist Executive in London was 
not accepted without appeal by the Palestine Zionist 
Executive, whose foremost concern was to increase 
immigration, despite the current unemployment crisis and 
its very limited means of absorbing further newcomers. 
Although the Palestine Executive was well aware of the 
gravity of the economic situation, it could not agree to 
limit labour immigration numerically. Thus, its proposal 
for a Labour Pool as an alternative to the Schedule was 
designed to avoid any immediate correlation between 
.further labour immigration and tho actual demands for 
labour.^ Although generally accepted by the Palestine 
Administration, this principle could not be effective 
at that time, since the current unemployment rate was
31much higher than the approved Pool of 1,000 unemployed.
personal, 30.3.22., C.Z.A., Z'1-/1614-5; Shuckburgh to 
Wc-izmann, private, March 1922, Zh/1614-6.
29, L. Stein to C.O., 10.3.22., C.O. 733/36 file 11723.
30, See P.Z.E. minutes of meeting, 28.3.22., C.Z.A.; also 
Chapter 9- above, pp. 110-111.
31, P.Z.E. minutes of meeting*, 10.5*22., C.Z.A.
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Since the Zionist demand for a large pool had in
practice been turned down, the Executive, having been
asked to present its estimate for the First Schedule,
(July-Septenber 1922) submitted a list of 2,4-00 skillecj.
and unskilled "required" workers, mainly for building •
32(1,650) and agricultural (500) projects. But the
Administration, disregarding the Zionist estimate, approved
a much smaller Schedule of 425 exclusively skilled .
labourers. At the same time the Executive was warned that
any failure on the part of the Zionist Offices to
introduce genuinely skilled persons or to obtain immediate
employment for them upon arrival, would lead to the
33abolition of the entire system. From the Zionist point
of view, the outcome of the first schedule was more than
disappointing. Of the 425 issued certificates only 180
were used during the approved quarter. Subsequent to
further Zionist demands, the Administration agreed to
prolong the validity of the unused certificates for an
additional period, but oven this did not prevent the
Z4loss of about one third of them."
Before these unsatisfactory results became known 
the Administration had issued a much larger Schedule of 
1,050 certificates for the successive quarter (Oct-Dec^ 
1922). This was due to a significant improvement in 
economic activities during the summer, which had caused-
32. Kisch to Controller of Labour, 21.4.22., C.Z.A., S6/274.
33. H. Pick, P.Z.E., Director, Immigration Department, in 
circular to Palestine Offices, 18.7*22., C.Z.A., S6/267.
34. Circular to Palestine Offices, 3»^«23., S6/271; Pick 
to Kisch 7.1.23., ibid; Kisch to Controller of Labour
9.1.23., 28.1.23., both in S6/274.
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the unemployment rate to drop to 1,600 and the Government's
decision to enlarge the Pool to 1,500 unemployed.
Following this decision 400 unskilled workers were
55included in the new Schedule.  ^ The outcome of the
second Schedule however, was even worse than the first,
since this time less than one half of the Zionist
56candidates turned up during the approved period.
The failure of the Schedule system during the first
stages of its operation was due to various factors, most
of which were beyond Zionist control. First were the
principles of the system itself. According to these
principles, the Schedule had to be classified under throe
headings: particular trades, specific employers and
countries of origin. Certain candidates had also to be
57indicated by name. ' These terms made the system 
necessarily very rigid, complicated and unworkable in 
practice. As far as local employers were concerned, it 
seems that the Palestine Executive did not meet with 
many difficulties in obtaining "vacancies" with specific 
employers, despite the existing high rate of unemployment. 
However, most of these enterprises were in the building 
branch and the trades required (masons, moulders, stone 
cutters, carpenters and ¿joiners) were not too common 
among Jews of Eastern Europe.' This made the task of the 
Palestine Offices in finding qualified persons of these
35« Hyamson to P.Z.E., 3»11.22., I.S.A. 11/4.
36. During the last quarter of 1922 only 491 immigrants
under category E1 entered the country, apparently part 
of then only belonging to the preceding Schedule, Kisch 
to Hyamson, 28.1.23., C.Z.A., S6/274.
37« Sec for example Hyamson to P.Z.E., note 35 above.
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trades among their candidates for immigration very
58difficult, if not impossible»
No less considerable was the notoriety of the
economic situation in Palestine. News of the unemployment
crisis, the return of many immigrants who had failed to
settle down, the stories about the "most rigid"
examinations conducted by the immigration officials in
Palestine and finally the deportation of many irregular
cases, had apparently had a very significant effect on .
39the general desire to immigrate to Palestine. Hence, 
the real problem of the Zionists in those days was not, 
in fact, how to obtain larger Schedules, but rather how 
best to utilize then completely.
It seems that the failure of the Zionist Offices
to obtain suitable immigrants as stated by the Schedule,
compelled then to fill their quotas with available
candidates, who were not in every case qualified as
required. This might explain the large number of
irregularities within the Schedule which appeared in
various forms: boys were sent as skilled artisans, sisters
as wives or even as mothers; some immigrants, when
questioned by the immigration officials refused to
recognise their own 'hames" or.those of relatives appearing
on their passports, while others gave different trades
40than those for which they had been scheduled.
38. See report of Joshua Gordon (official of the Zionist 
Immigration Department, Jerusalem) to the Zionist 
Executive, London, on his tour to Palestine Offices, 
minutes of meeting of Z.E., 9«7«2d., C.Z.A., Z4/302/11.
39. See note 24 above. .
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The nisuse of the,Schedule system and the various 
problems which it raised»strengthened the demand of the 
Palestine Executive for abolishing the existing system and 
replacing it by the Labour Pool. A scheme based on the 
principles of the Pool would enable the Palestine Offices 
to introduce almost all their candidates for immigration» 
irrespective of the qualifications required-by the
lL ASchedule. Moreover, deportations of irregular cases
on grounds of skill or age would not occur. Nevertheless,
certain that Samuel would insist on the continuation of the
Schedule system and at the sane time accepting the
Zionist Executive's policy which was presented to then
personally by Dr. V/eiz.mann, the Palestine Executive was
eventually compelled to accept; the Schedule. However,
they did so only on condition that they might be allowed
a fixed "minimum number of certificates" - perhaps 1,500 
42quarterly.
The Zionist Executive, however, while negotiating 
with the Colonial O f f i c e  over the final draft of the 
revised scheme,_ presented more concrete and constructive 
proposals. These proposals were primarily concerned with 
the Zionist shortcomings in control over the Schedule as 
experience had shown. In order to adjust the scheme to.
40. Kisch to Stein, 22.1.25», C.Z.A., Z4/16085; Iran. Dept., 
P.Z.E. circulars to the Palestine Offices, "confidential"
20.5.23., in S6/267; Jul^ "l923, ibid; Morris's confidential memorandum regarding irregularities, 
12.10.23», C.0.733/50 file 51392; see also "Memorandum ... 1920-1930", 16.7»30., note 5 above.
41. S.A. van Vriesland, P.Z.E. to Chief Secretary, 21.9.22., 
C.Z.A., L3/31.
42. See "Revision of Immigration Regulations", memo by the 
P.Z.E. submitted to the Palestine Government, 4.12.22.,
I.S.A. 11/6; also Chaptex 6 above pp.159-160»
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the actual ability of the Organisation to control the 
Schedule in the optimal way,the Executive suggested 
various technical amendments:
a) to prolong the period of the Schedule to cover one 
year;
b) likewise, to prolong the required period for 
preparation of the Schedule from six weeks to three 
months;
c) to authorise the Zionist Organisation to apportion 
and allocate the certificates among the Palestine 
Offices;
d) to abolish the cross-division of the Schedule under 
trades and countries of origin. ^
The Zionist diplomatic campaign in London and
Jerusalem to simplify the schedule system and enlarge
their powers of control over labour immigration,. was
accompanied by the introduction of more adequate measures
for tightening central control over the Palestine Offices.
These measures were primarily concerned with the necessity
to convince the British of their ability to control the
Offices' activities more and to put an end to all
¿j.4-irregularitics and shortcomings. Pollowing the British- 
Zionist agreement in February 1923, the Zionist Executive 
promised to send an inspector to the Offices to explain 
the principles of-the new immigration scheme. HOwever, 
the main task of Denis Cohen, a former official of the
4-3. See "Revised Scheme for the Control of Immigration
into Palestine" nemo by the Z.E., 15.2.23., C.O. 733/59 
file 8490; minutes of the meeting in C.O. "to discuss the proposed revised Immigration Regulations ,
21.2.23., C.O. 733/54 file 9748; also Chapter 6 above, 
pp.. 163-165.
44. L. Stein to the Under Secretary of State, C.O. 21.9.22.,
9.10.22., I.S.A. 2/145.
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Department of Immigration and Travel, who was chosen for 
that mission, was to examine and iraprove on the spot 
methods of selection and introduction of immigrants 
within the Schedule.  ^ At the same time, the Executive 
insisted on regaining authority from the Palestine 
Executive for allocating the Schedule, in order to obtain 
direct control over the work of the Palestino Offices.
The Palestine Executive did not agree to Cohen's 
ASmission , or to surrender any of its powers of control
A 7to the Zionist Executive in London. Although they 
were also aware of the eventual hampering effects of
A8irregularities on their relations with the Government,
their first concern was the impact of the existing economic
situation in Palestino on the general volume of immigration.
In other words, how to lessen the undesirable effects of
the unemployment crisis, deportations and the increasing
rate of emigration from the country, on the extent of the
A9Schedule and its succesful execution. Since the 
Schedule was determined according to the rate of 
unemployment the chief indicator of which was the number 
of idle immigrants in the Zionist Immigration Camps, the 
Executive was at constant pains to evacuate the Camps as 
soon as possible. An additional reason for speedy 
evacuation of the Camps was tho financial distress of the 
Executive, which nado it impossible for them to maintain
A5. Stein to Kisch, 15.2.23., C.Z.A., ZA/16085.
A6. Pick to Z.E. London, 8.A.23., C.Z.A., S6/272.
A7« Kisch to Stein, 27.6.23., C.Z.A., ZA/16085.
A8. See note AO above; also Pinkelstoin to P.Z.E. Inn.. Dept.
A.5.22., C.Z.A., S6/271.
A9. See minutes of-tho P.Z.E., 12.6.23., C.Z.A., unclassified.
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a large number of immigrants for a long tine« The very 
United means of the Executive also prevented it from 
settling many newcomers in agricultural settlements 
subsidised by the Organisation» A cheaper and easier 
short tern alternative was to send the new arrivals to 
friends and relatives in the country. To this end, the 
Palestine Executive urged the Palestine Offices to assist' 
then by giving first priority in their selection to 
immigrants with a certain amount of independent means,or
with relatives in Palestine who were in a position to
52support them.
By recommending that immigrants also be included 
in the limited Schedule, when they night otherwise have 
applied for visas under one of the unlimited categories, 
the Executive was indirectly suggesting a reduction in the 
general volume of immigration. The Executive did not 
stop, however, at mere recommendations, but sent the 
largest Office iu Warsaw a list of candidates with 
relatives in Palestine to whom the Office was asked to 
give priority within its quota. Despite strong protests 
by the Warsaw Office against what they considered an 
"unbearable intervention in their powers of discretion",^3 
the Palestine Executive continued to warn and urge all 
Palestine Offices to be "strict" and "cautious" and to
50. P.Z.E. circular to the Palestine Offices, confidential, 
March 1925, 8.5.23«,.both in S6/267.
51. Circular to Palestine Offices, 2A.10.22,and
March 1923,S6/267$ P.Z.E., Minutes of meetings, 1T.3.23. 1 0 . 5 . 2 3 C.Z.A..unclassified. ’
52. Circular to Palestine Offices, secret, 16.11.22. C.Z.A., 
S6/267.
53. Pick to Palestine Office, Warsaw, 23.1.23., ibid.
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select exclusively people who would be able to settle
down in Palestine without any financial help from the 
54-Executive. Furthernore, following frequent complaints
from "exasperated" immigrants ,thc Executive instructed
the Offices to make it clear to all immigrants coming'
under the Schedule that the Organisation would not accept
any responsibility for their economic absorption in 
55Palestine. This approach seemed unavoidable, although
it vigorously contradicted the principle of the "guarantee 
system" which the Zionists were so anxious to restore. 
However, considering the existing circumstances and since> 
Samuel himself disregarded any guarantees on the part of 
the Zionist Organisation, (preferring to determine thè 
Schedule solely according to actual labour requirements), 
the responsibility of the Executive over these immigrants 
could rightly have been considered as moral rather than 
material.
But attempts by the Palestine Executive to avoid 
actual responsibility for immigrants coming under the 
Schedule, did not release them from being held morally 
responsible for their employment. This was particularly 
emphasised by the "somewhat alarming" total Jewish 
emigration of 1,4-4-3 during June-August 1923. The fact that 
1,059 of the emigrants wore newcomers and only 37^ were
54-. Circular to the Palestine Offices, 8.5.23., C.Z.A. S6/267; ibid, 2.6.24-., C.Z.A. S6/268.
55. Circular to Palestine Office, 23.1.23., C.Z.A.
S6/267.
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old residents, signified the failure of the Palestine 
Executive to absorb labour immigration.
These circumstances caused the Colonial Office, at
the end of September 1923, to consider favourably Hyamson's
proposal suggesting temporary suspension of labour 
5 7immigration. ' '  However, strong Zionist reaction left 
no doubt concerning the grave political effect oi such 
a move. Joseph Cowen, of the Zionist Executive, who was 
called to the Colonial Office in Weiznann's absence from 
London, pointed out the "most unfortunate" political 
implications of any official stoppage and suggested that 
"if immigration is to be restricted the Zionist Organisation 
should take the initiative and limit themselves to the 
figures that the Colonial Office think desirable.^ 
Nevertheless, since the current Schedule for the last 
quarter of 1923 was fixed at 100 certificates only, the 
Zionist Executive felt that if a more liberal Schedule 
could not be obtained ,"thc. Zionist Organisation would be 
in a stronger position if it was able to deny that 
immigration had been suspended or a nominal Schedule fixed 
and state in general terns that certificates were available 
and would be distributed by the Organisation in strict 
accordance with the economic situation in Palestine." '
56. Kisch to the Political Secretary, Z.O., London, 
confidential, 5.10.23., C.Z.xf., Z4/16085; during May- Novenber 1923, 2,883 Jews emigrated from Palestine:
796 residents before July 1920 and 1,875 who subsequently, 
entered Palestine, see memo on "Emigration from 
Palestine", P.Z.E., Inn. Dept., 14.12.23., C.Z.A.-,
S6/274, sec
57. Shuckburgh, minutes dated 1.10.23., C.O. 733/48,
file 45179. ■
58. Cowen's report to the Z.E., see Z.E. meeting, 9.10.23., 
C.Z.A., Z4/302/9.
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This "no war, no peace" policy found considerable
"understanding" at the Colonial Office. Sydney Moody,
who discussed the natter on behalf of the Colonia.1 Office,
agreed that dor the tine being no definite Schedule should
bo fixed and visas under category "E" should be granted
"in such numbers as the state of the labour market night
warrant". It was accordingly recognised that this
arrangement "implies in effect that the Schedule system
60is temporarily suspended". However, this "gentleman's
agreement" was not eventually approved by the Colonial
Office or by the Zionist Executive. Sliuckburgh insisted
61thaw.' "drastic restrictions are required" and informed 
the Zionist Executive that the Schedule should be limited 
to the nominal figure of 100, as approved by the Palestine 
Government. At the sane time, Cowen, recommending the 
"agreement" before the Zionist Executive placed himself 
in the minority. Despite Dr. Ruppin's depressing report 
to the Executive regarding the unemployment crisis in 
Palestine and his predictions of 3,000-4,000 unemployed
r pin November "unless immediate steps were taken", the 
Executive adopted a resolution to support the Palestine 
Executive's request for a Schedule of 500 (certificates).
It was further suggested that Cowen would meet Shuckburgh 
and offer him a new "agreement"., in which the Schedule 
should be nominally fixed at 500, but it "being understood
63that the most sparing use would be made of the certificates".
59« Stein to Kisch, 12.11.23., C.Z.A. Z4/302/9.
60. Ibid, ibid.
61. See note 57 above.
62. Z.E. Minutes of Meeting, 11.10.23., C.Z.A. Z4/302/8.
63. Z.E. Minutes of. Meeting, 16.10.23., ibid.
At that very tine, the Palestine Executive was 
confronted with the sane dilemma. But since the 
Administration had meanwhile agreed to extend the period 
of the Schedule to six months, as had been requested by 
the Zionists themselves, the actual dilemma of the 
Executive was whether to ask for 500 certificates for
6athat period or the sane figure for the next quarter only.
Professor Pick, recommending that the six month Schedule
be ' accepted, pointed out the possible advantage of long
tern planning which would enable the Executive to
introduce more flexibility in allocation of the certificates
and allow sufficient time to the Palestine Offices for
"training" and selecting the most desirable elements for
Palestine. However, as on many previous occasions, the
political considerations again overca.no the practical,
causing the Executive to adopt Sprinzak's point of view
in favour of 500 'certificates for the current quarter,
thus allowing the Executive to ask for further certificates
65for the following quarter.
The rather unexpected, but nevertheless very
significant improvement in the economic situation fron the
spring of 1924 onwards, increased the need for labour in
the country and consequently the Administration was more
66ready to enlarge the Schedule accordingly. Those 
circumstances placed the Palestine Executive in an 
unprecedented dilemma: whether to utilize all the issued 64*
64. P.Z.E. Minutes' of Mooting, 12.10,23., C.Z.A.
65« P.Z.E. Minutes of Mooting, 14«d'0.23., C.Z.A.
66. 1,500 certificates for the hall '/early Schedule, April- 
October 1925, end 7,300 for November 1925 - March 1926. 
See Minutes of Palestine Exocut Council, 1.5.25.,
9.6.25., 14.10.25., all in C.O. 614/21.
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certificates at once or to act more cautiously and despatch
67then to the Palestine Offices by instalments. ' Spnnzak, 
pressing for a more daring policy advocated immediate use 
of the whole Schedule and even an attempt to secure a 
supplementary one. Moreover, pointing out tho recent 
enormous response to immigration in Eastern Europe and 
tho unlimited demand for labour in the country, ho further 
suggested that the time had come to abolish the Schedule 
system and allow "free immigration". This, ho explained, 
could release the Executive from any moral or material 
responsibilities for immigrants coming under the Schedule, 
and would enable the Organisation to use the money at 
present spent on the operation of the system for more 
constructivo projects, which could create further jobs 
for immigrants. Colonel Kisch, although admitting that 
the Zionists' 'Ultimate aim" should be to secure the 
recognition of the principle that "every Jew had a natural 
right to come to Palestine", could not favour the idea of 
lifting control over immigration entirely. As far as 
he was concerned it would be "fatal" to allow anything 
like "free immigration", particularly during the early 
stages of the building up of tho National Home when 
immigration "must be selected so as to ensure the maximum 
and most productive contribution to the structure"
Since the Executive apparently anticipated that 
tho Administration would not finally approve their 
complete demands,they-preferred to inflate then in order 678
67. P.Z.E. Minutes of Meeting, £8.5-24-., C.Z.A.
68. Ibid, 18.6.24-; Kisch, Palestine Diary, p.130.
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to secure a better bargaining stand. These calculations, 
however, more than once placed the Executive in a 
delicate position when the Administration approved a 
larger Schedule than they had originally expected. In 
the spring of 1925, for example, the Executive asked for ■
10.000 certificates for the bi-annual Schedule starting 
in April. The Administration approved a Schedule of
6.000 - rnoro, it seems, than the Zionists had expected.
The Treasurer, van Vriesland, brought the attention of 
his colleagues to the financial difficulties of the 
Executive, which would prevent proper absorption of large 
numbers of immigrants at once and recommended the allotment 
of the certificates by instalments. Furthermore, 
contradicting the "optimistic" predictions regarding the 
future demand for labour, van Vriesland insisted on the 
Executive itself reducing the Schedule by suspending part 
of the certificates already approved. In his view, 
"immigration should be regulated according to the economic 
demands of the country and not upon the demand for 
immigration abroad". Kisch, however, rejected the idea
of suspending part of the certificates,as he feared this
might lead to the Government's loss of confidence in the
reliability of future Zionist estimates, particularly
since their original demand had already been drastically'
reduced. Instead, he suggested despatching the whole
Schedule at once, but to instruct the Palestine Offices
60to allocate their quotas strictly by instalments. y
69. P.Z.E. Minutes of Meetings, 17.2.25., 3.5.25., 18.3.25., 
1.5.25., 3.5.25., 15.7.25«, 19.7.25., C.Z.A.
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The apparent evasion of its well recognised powers 
to regulate labour innigration by relying on the Palestine
iOffices on this natter, brought the Palestine Executive
to a very critical position by the end of 1925. During
the last four months of 1925 an unprecedented record of
5,600 labourers (apart from their families) entered the
country, raising the number of unemployed to 3,000. Yet,
since the Executive did not realise the severity of the
situation and failed to anticipate the impending economic
crisis, they refused to adopt any precautionary measures,
such as temporary suspension or regulation of the flow
of additional labour into the country. Despite the fact
that a further 10,000 immigrants were already expected
for the first quarter of 1926, the Executive persisted in
its radical policy. In the absence of Dr. Ruppin and
van Vriesland, the more moderate members of the Executive.
Kisch often placed himself in the minority by advocating
a more realistic and moderate policy. • Professor Pick and
Sprinzak, the two other members, who remained Directors
of Immigration and Labour respectively, constantly pressed
for an enlargement of the Schedule and for securing
supplementary and advance quotas against tho Schedules to
come, in order to supply the need of the Palestine Offices
for more certificates. As far as they were.concerned, the
existing crisis which they believed would soon most likely
disappear, should by no moans affect the Executive's policy.
Anxious to avoid discouragement of immigration b;y revealing
their difficulties, they emphasised the importance of
70obtaining large Schedules. 70
70. P.Z.E. Minutes of Meeting. 3.12.25., ibid
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Nevertheless, Pick end Sprinzak disagreed over the 
instructions to be sent to the Palestine Offices. Pick, 
concerned about the expense of maintaining the immigrants 
in Immigration Camps, suggested instructing the Offices to 
select only those with relatives in Palestine who would 
be able to support then. Sprinzak, on the other hand, 
pointed out that in fact most of those "relatives" did 
not take care of their "dependents" anyhow, and insisted 
that the Offices should give first priority to real 
pioneers whose "Zionist consciousness" and "physical 
fitness" wore undisputed. Accordingly, the Executive 
rejected Kisch's proposal in favour of 1,200 for the first 
quarter of 1926 and recommended a larger one of 3,000 to 
consist of 700 "dependent" immigrants, 300 pioneers and
2,000 selected according to the discretion of the Palestine 
Offices.^
The Government's definite rejection of the Zionists' 
demands and the remarkable increase in unemployment which 
reached 5,000-6,000 during the winter, eventually compelled, 
the Palestine Executive to adopt Kisch's point of view and 
to reduce their original, demand to 500 immigrants only.^
No less considerable was the increasing rate of emigration 
from Palestine during the first half of 1926 which reached 
an unprecedented record of 980 emigrants in June only.^  7123
71. Ibid, 22.12.25.
72. Ibid, 13.2.25. '
73. During 1926, 9,426 emigrated from Palestine, 7,3.65 of 
them were Jews; 416 residents before July 1920 and 
6,952 who entered the country subsequently, Palestine■Administration Report, 1926. '
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Nevertheless, it took the Executive almost a year from the 
first signs of the new crisis, until they admitted, the 
severity of the situation and agreed to adopt drastic 
measures.
At the end of August 1926, when the distribution of
a new Schedule was on the agenda, the Palestine Executive
finally reached a unanimous resolution in favour of
*
immediate enforcement of all the precautionary measures 
which they had hitherto hesitated to adopt, namely:
a) temporary suspension of half of the 2,900 certificates 
approved for the current Schedule by the Executive 
itself until a significant improvement in the economic 
situation could be seen;
b) suspension of the allotted certificates by the Palestine 
Offices until further instructions from the Palestine 
Executive ;
c) to inform directly from Jerusalem all candidates for 
immigration the truth about the economic conditions in 
Palestine ;
d) to instruct the Palestine Offices to introduce most
strict selection criteria regarding the candidates'
Zionist consciousness, their genuine dependence on
relatives in Palestine and possession of sufficient
means for maintenance during their first months in 
74Palestme.
The drastic measures adopted by the Palestine 
Executive after such delay were very unlikely to restrain 
the swiftly increasing unemployment rate,or to case the 
great flow of emigration from the country. Nevertheless, 
although the volume of labour immigration from September 
1926 onwards dropped very significantly, this could not 74
74. P.Z.E. Minutes of meeting, 28.8.26., C.Z.A.
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be exclusively attributed to the Government's restrictions 
on the Schedule, or to the new course endorsed by the 
Palestine Executive. The natural impulse for migration 
which derives from the obvious desire to improve one's 
livelihood was taking its toll, as a result of the 
economic crisis in Palestine. As a natter of fact, a 
remarkable decline in labour immigration had already 
begun.in January 1926, a long time before the new 
restrictions were actually introduced. Furthermore, 
only A,000 out of the 10,000 immigrants expected to 
arrive during the first quarter of 1926 eventually 
entered the country.
Most of these candidates, already furnished with
immigration certificates, apparently changed their
minds and postponed their departure. This night be attributed
chiefly to the discouraging reports coning from Palestine
and the thousands who returned to their countries of
origin, bearing dreadful and discouraging stories about 
75the country. x
In the light of these consequences it would not be 
inaccurate to conclude that the economic conditions in 
Palestine had a far more Substantial effect on the general 
desire to immigrate to Palestine than.had the actual 
British or Zionist policies. Moreover, it seems obvious 
that the principle of Economic Absorptive Capacity found 
its most reliable interpretation in the natural mechanism 
of immigration which official policy and political 
considerations coufLd not entirely distort.
' - ' ■■  ... ' ■ 'p    ■ .. . .... " ' '  
75. See J. Gordon's (Acting Director, Zionist Immigration 
Department) ^report to P.Z.E., meeting, 6.8.26., ibid.
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C: IMMIGRATION UNDER CATEGORY "D": THE CASE OF THE
FIANCEES
Since the Labour Schedule was limited numerically
and consisted mostly of skilled labour, the Palestine
Offices faced serious difficulties in securing visas for
all their candidates for immigration. Under these
circumstances the Offices were compelled to seek other
alternatives to obtain visas for those people,. One such
alternative was to "enlarge" families of immigrants by
attaching to them "relatives" who had failed to obtain 
76a visa. ' A second option which apparently proved more
practical, was to claim "dependence" on residents of
77Palestine under category "D". These tactics might to 
a large extent explain the numerous irregularities, 
particularly during the new scheme's first year of
nooperation.
Once the Administration realised that a large number 
of these "dependents" were in fact workers who eventually
entered the labour market, aggravating the country's
79 'unemployment, y policy regarding category "D" became,
in many aspects, identical to that of category "E".
Immigrants coming under both categories had to possess
immigration certificates to support their claims for a vis§? 76890
76. Kisch to Z.E., 22.1.23., C*Z.A., ZA/16085; circular . to Palestine Offices, confidential, July 1923, S/2*& 7
77. Ibid, 20.5.23., ibid.
78. See note 5 above.
79. Wyndhan Deedes for the H.C. to Churchill, confidential despatch, 10.3.22., C.O. 733/19/filc 13565.
80. See Public Notice, 1.8.21., n.ote 10 above.
When labour immigration was temporarily suspended in March
3^11922, certificates for dependents were also suspended.
Likewise, when it was decided in May 1922 to resume labour
immigration, this tine according to Schedules, the ban on
dependents was lifted accordingly.  ^ Nevertheless,
considering that immigration under category "D" was not
limited numerically, in times when restrictions over the
Schedule wore imposed, many legitimate candidates for the
83Schedule apparently used Category "D" as a substitute.
For this reason the Palestine Government, while considering
the inauguration of the Labour Schedules, suggested
regulating the immigration of dependents more adequately by
84including them in the Schedule.
This proposition eventually did not materialise, at 
any rate, not during the years of economic depression, 
when the Schedules were mostly devoted to skilled labour. 
Therefore the Palestine Offices were forced, in some 
cases, to "adjust” the qualifications of their candidates 
to the requirements of the Schedule. ^ However, it was 
almost impossible to persuade the British Consuls that 
young females were genuinely skilled workers, trained in 
various branches of building, industry or agriculture. At 
the same time the Zionists could not remain indifferent 812345
81. Dennis M. Cohen for Director, Immigration Department, 
to District Governors, 13.3.22., I.S.A. 11/4.
82. Morris to District Governor, 8.5*22., ibid.
83. See pp.182-183 above.
84. Deedes, Acting H.C. to Churchill, confidential despatch11.5.22., C.O. 733/21 file 24592. ’
85. Kisch to Z.E., 22.1.23., C.Z.A. Z4/16085; Morris’s confidential memo regarding irregularities, 12.10.23., 
C.O. 75.3/50 file 51392.
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to the indirect restrictions on immigration of women,
whose presence in Palestine was described as "vital" from
both social and economic points of view. The Palestine
Executive, v/hen pressing for the constitution of the
Labour Pool, had indicated that the Pool could solve this
86question entirely. On the other hand, the Zionist
Executive, while negotiating the final draft of the new
immigration scheme in London, eventually succeeded in
securing the Colonial Office's peinission for fiancSes
of residents of Palestine to be allowed to obtain ^isas
87under Category "D". ' The immediate results of the 
enforcement of this provision wore very significant, 
considering the steep rise in immigration of women during 
the second quarter of 1923, and the fact that single
OOgirls constituted over 75% of the total figure. °
v
The method for obtaining certificates for fianebes 
appeared to bo rather simple and at the same time it was 
almost impossible to prove it had been done with the 
deliberate intention of evading the law. Originally, if 
the applicant could prove that he was in a position to 
maintain a wife, his word and that of his guarantors 
wore accepted and his application approved. Whether or 
not the applicant later married his fiancee was difficult 
and costly to follow up. However, in those cases where,
86. Van Vriesland to Chief Secretary, 21.9.22., C.Z.A.,
L3/31; P.Z.E."Memorandum, on Immigration" 21.9.22.,
I.S.A. 11/6.
87. See minutes of Conference on Immigration, 21.2.23,.
C.O. 733/54 file 974-8; S. Pinkelstein, Z.O. London, to P.Z.E., 27.2.23., C.Z.A., S6/272.
88. 351 single girls as compared with 65 married, P.Z.E. 
Immigration Department, Short Report and Budget proposal, 8.7.24-., C.Z.A. S6/268.
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after a reasonable interval enquiries revealed tho.t .marriage 
had not taken place, the Administration stood helpless in 
the face of the reply that "the couple had changed their 
minds".89 .
Albert Hyanson, then Controller of Labour, was
convinced that unfair advantage had been taken of that
humanitarian provision and that at least 75/ of the
applications concerned had been made in bad faith. As far
as he was concerned, "much of the unemployment among
Jewish women had to be attributed to the success of those
90fraudulent applications". However, he was unable to
take any direct action on that question until November
1923 when he became Acting Director of the Immigration'
Department and subsequently Controller of Permits. His
first undertaking in that direction was to consult the
Attorney General regarding legal and administrative
91measures "which might put an end to that abuse".
As regards legal measures to be adopted, Norman 
Bentwich drew Hyanson's attention to relevant articles 
of the existing lav;, in which proceedings could be brought 
against both the eligible applicant and his "fiancee" on
1 92charges of false pretences and statements. Such action, 
however, could not be very effective because of its 
deterrent rather than prohibitory nature. Moreover, the.
89. Hyamson in memo to Chief Secretary, 12.4.29., I.S.A. 11/4/12.
90. Hyamson to C. Lambert, Immigration Officer, Jerusalem24.4.24., ibid.
91. N. Mindel for Acting Director, Immigration Department, to Attorney General, 25.11.23., ibid.
92. Attorney General to Director of Immigration, 26.11.23., ibid.
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subsequent legal proceedings and possible deportations
from the country were likely to lead to heavy expenses and
93undesirable political friction m  the case of deportation»
Regarding administrative measures, the Attorney General
suggested that applicants should be required to produce a
contract of engagement (to marry) as a necessary document
94to obtain a certificate for a fiancee. The last
93proposal was eventually adopted,  ^ but apparently 
failed to bring about any satisfactory results. Although 
Hyanson had no doubts that the Zionist Organisation and 
particularly the Office in Warsaw v/ere not only 
encouraging, but even organising that "fraudulent practice 
whenever possible", he could not do more than instruct 
the British authorities concerned to exercise stricter
96examination and if necessary, investigation in each case.
A radical, although temporary solution to this
unpleasant question, was found in July 1925» Since most
of the girls coning under category "D" belonged to the
working class, they entered the labour market whether
they got married or not, so that the question of their
being a genuine or false fiancee consequently became
irrelevant. As category "E" was intended to include all
persons who found employment in Palestine it therefore
seened proper to admit these girls not under category "D"
97but category "E". ' Accordingly, the Administration 
came to the conclusion that a provision in category "D"
93. See note 89 above.
94. Attorney General to Director of Immigration, 8.2.24.,
I.S.A. 11/4/12.
95. Hyanson to District Governors, 24.A.29-., ibid.
96. Hyanson to Cartwright, Immigration Officer, Warsaw,
10.6.24., I.S.A. 11/4.
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should be made, in which "Jewish women who belonged to the 
working or the lower middle class and were between the 
ages of 18 and 35 and able bodied", had to be included in 
the Labour Schedule. However, women who answered these 
requirements only in part or not at all continued to be 
eligible for immigration under category "D" according to
the previous procedure. The Zionists acquiesced to
. . 98this provision.
The difficulties concerning admission of fiancees
were thus removed, although not for long. During the
economic crisis of 1927-28, when the Schedules were
severely restricted and eventually suspended, immigration
of all Jewish girls, whether they were genuinely fiancees
or merely dependent on Palestine residents, war
99temporarily postponed. Thus, the Zionists'acquiescence 
to the above-mentioned provision might retrospectively 
be considered to have been erroneous.^ ^
At any rate, the lack of reaction on the part of. the
Palestine Executive to the new method of admitting women
was undoubtedly attributable to the fact that at that
tine, the Labour Schedules were larger than ever before
101and consisted of vast numbers of females. These
97. See note 89 above.
98. Hyanson to District Commissioners, 27.8.25«, I.S.A. 
11/4/12.
99« See note 89 above.
100. H. Sacher, P.Z.E. to Chief Secretary, 18.3.29., 11/4/12.
101. 1,500 skilled and unskilled women for April-Septenber 
1925 and 2,500 for October 1925 - March 1926, see 
minutes of Palestine Executive Council, 1.5»25., and
i4.IO.25., respectively, C.O. 814/21.
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circumstances apparently enabled the Palestine Offices 
to introduce most of the women „pioneers within the 
Schedule. Furthermore, irregularities under category "D" 
were likely to be reduced. Where mass immigration was 
concerned, the Palestine Executive was interested more 
than ever in consolidating its control over labour
immigration and in preventing the unselcctive flow of
„  , , 102 so-called fiancees.
From the Zionist point of view, the advantages of
these arrangements were even more significant during the
economic crisis. The new method enabled the Palestine
Executive to restrict the immigration of women more
adequately by reducing their ration in the Schedule and
105using their certificates for introducing men. These
measures were indispensable, considering the grave
unemployment among women workers, many of whom were
109-suffering the distress of hunger. Nevertheless,
the Palestine Executive never openly admitted that they 
regarded this unwritten arrangement favourably.
Finally, it is worthwhile pointing out that the 
Zionist policy regarding category "D" as a' whole was to 
a large extent ambiguous and inconsistent. This attitude 
derived mainly from lack of social and economic uniformity 
within this class. 1 The two main relevant qualifications.
102. P.Z.E. Minutes of Meetings, 5-12.25., 22.12.25., C.Z.A
103. Ibid, 13-2.26.
109-, Ibid, 3-12.25.
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were; a) the extent of dependence on the Palestine 
residents, and b) the degree of productivity of the 
dependent himself.
During the economic depression when labour
immigration was restricted and the Schedules consisted
mainly of skilled labour, the Palestine Executive was in
a dilemma regarding immigration under category "D". The
fundamental question was whether to encourage unlimited
immigration of "dependents” under this category, or to
include them in the labour Schedule, which meant restricting
their numbers. Eventually, the latter policy was adopted
and the Palestine Offices were instructed to give priority
to "dependents" in the Schedule, even at the expense of
their relative lack of productivity and Zionist conscious 
105ness.  ^During the economic boom, the Executive did not 
interfere much with the Offices' control over dependents. 
However, towards the end of 1925 when economic crisis 
became apparent, the Executive brought back its previous 
policy in stricter form by recommending the issue of 
special certificates for the exclusive use of "dependents"
s\ Q0coming under the Labour Schedule.
D : MIDDLE CLASS IMMIGRATION
One must realise that Palestine during the period 
concerned was only one among many other destinations to 
which Jews could have migrated and from several points of 
view net the most attractive one. When considering economic
105« See pp.192-193 above.
106. P.Z.E. Minutes of meeting, 22.12.25«, C.Z.À.
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or personal security,Western Europe and the overseas 
countries were more likely to offer better conditions than 
Palestine« To a large extent this might explain the 
relatively low volume of immigration into Palestine in 
comparison to other countries and particularly the
107insignificant numbers belonging to the middle class. r
Despite a considerably liberal policy towards 
immigration during the first year of the Civil Administration 
loss than one fifth of the total Jewish immigration came 
to Palestine independently, i.e. not under the auspices
/| QOof the Zionist Organisation. This rate was not 
significantly changed during the three following years as 
immigrants under category ”13r averaged about 15% of the total 
volume. The low percentage of middle class immigrants 
during this periodvcould be attributed chiefly to the 
discouraging effects of the economic depression in Palestine, 
the Arab violence, as well as to the enforcement of the 
new immigration policy.
As will be remembered the Colonial Office suggested, 
and Samuel agreed that the minimum capital required for 
immigrants under category "B" should be at least £500 or 
a secure income of £6 per person per month. A comparison 
of these two qualifications might indicate the considerably 
high worth of the required capital,which was considered to 
be sufficient for establishing a n immigrant in industry,
10?. During 1920-1923 - 10#, 1921-1931 - 21#, Giiadi, _p,28.
108. 1,815 out of 9,899. Palestine Administration Report, July 1920 - June 1921.
109«. See p. 178o above,
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agriculture or commercial business. However, in economic
and currency terms of Eastern Europe this figure was
apparently unattainable for most of the lower middle class,
110the likeliest class for immigration.
The Zionist Commission, concerned about the
administrative obstacles in the way of this class, urged
and eventually succeeded in obtaining, a provison for
artisans and craftsmen in possession of at least £.120, to
be slowed to come under category "B" provided specific
authority of the Immigration Department was given in 
111each case. When negotiations on the new scheme were
taking place in London at the end of 1921, the Zionist
Executive suggested and the Colonial Office agreed, to
legitimise this provisional arrangement by creating a new
category "H". This category had to consist of persons
v/ho,while not strictly speaking of independent means were
nevertheless likely to be able to make a living for
themselves,either as retail shopkeepers or as craftsmen
working on their own. However, Samuel, out of his concern
about unemployment in the country rejected the proposal
of creating a new category -which might have allowed a flow
of destitute immigrants who would eventually enter the
labour market. Regarding this class as potential labourers
he suggested including them within category "E" under the
112heading of specific enterprises. #
110. See- Lichtheim, Zionist Office Berlin, to S. Einkelstein Z.^ O., London, 15-6.22., C.Z.A. Z4-/14-4-3.
111. See Note 12 above.
112. See Chapter 6 above, pp. 146-.14-7.
Similar, though, much stricter, was the policy regarding
category "C", members of learned professions such as
physicians, engineers, lawyers etc., who intended to
follow their calling in Palestine. In order to restrict
immigration of this class and at the same time to prevent
entry of artisans and the like, who had also claimed visas
under category "C", the Immigration Department insisted that
all applications for this category should also be referred
to Jerusalem for approval. In considering these
applications the Department intended to take into account
the profession of the applicant, the demand for this
profession, age, capital, past experience, dependents etc.
However, all these qualifications were not distinctly
defined, leaving entire control over this category to the
11/1exclusive discretion of the Department. Immigration under
category "C" thus became insignificant, constituting less
than one per cent of the total volume, until it was finally
abolished in November 1924.  ^Subsequently, legitimate
immigrants for category "C" were divided between category
"B" and category "E" according to the amount of their 
116capital. The logic behind this reclassification was
eventually approved by the P.Z.E. itself, which for reasons
of its own instructed the Palestine Offices to include
artisans, members of professions and persons with limited
117means within the Labour Schedule. ' Nevertheless, the '
113. See note 19 above, also Eder to Morris 20.7.22., I S A11/4/2/1. . . .
114. Morris to Eder, 28.7.22., ibid.
115. Only 70 immigrants during these three years.
116. Hyamson to Cartwright, Imm. Office, Warsaw, 20.11.24.
I.S.A., 11/4/2/1; Hyamson to P.Z.E., 29.5.25.
117. See Note 54 above.
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Executive insisted that immigrants belonging to these 
trades who were in possession of £200 should be allowed 
to enter under category "B" without being referred to
/ l / I OJerusalem. In the final draft of the immigration scheme
which was agreed on between the Colonial Office and the
Zionist Executive in Eebruary 1923 such a provision was 
11°made,'' but its implementation was officially postponed 
until the enforcement of the new Ordinance in September 
1925.
Meanwhile, the Department of Immigration conducted 
itself according to its provisional agreement with the 
Zionist Commission (of September 1921) and was ready to 
consider favourably immigrants of independent means, 
even if their capital was limited to £50 only, provided
12special authority fror.1 Jerusalem was given for each case.
This policy was endorsed by the Director of Commerce and
Industry who offered the assistance of his Department for
121the satisfactory economic absorption of such immigrants.
Nevertheless, despite the liberal policy regarding
immigrants of independent means, neither their numbers nor
their aggregate capital could bo considered significant.
Immigrants with substantial capital refrained from coming,
122apparently because of the economic depression. ' At the
118. P.Z.E. Memorandum on Immigration, 21.9.22., I.S.A.11/6 .
119. See Chapter 6 above, p.164.
120. Eder to Morris, 20.7.22.{Morris to Edcr 26.7.22., both m  I.S.A. 11/4/2/2.121. Director, Commerce and Industry to Kisch, 11.1.23. 
C.Z.A., S6/27J.
122. Pick, in draft memorandum regarding middle class 
immigration, undated, S6/276.
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same time, with the lack ox adequate public and Zionist 
resources or import of private captial, any radical 
improvement in the economic situation was unlikely.
This obstacle was finally removed in summer 1924. by
an unanticipated flow of middle class immigration.' During
the following 18 months (from June 1924 to November 1925)
an unprecedented 16,000 immigrants entered the country
under category "B", in possession of an average capital of
12Zabout £600 per family. ' However, ibis remarkable influx 
of middle class immigration could by no means be attributed 
to the incentive policy of the Government regarding this 
class, but rather to external factors. As a result of 
radical monetary and fiscal reforms in Poland at the 
beginning of 1924, the economic position of the local 
middle class, which consisted mostly of Jews, was severely 
affected. In the same year, entry to the United States, 
particularly for immigrants from Eastern Europe, became 
almost impossible, following new restrictions on immigration. 
The incidental combination of these two factors made 
Palestine, for the first time, the major country in the 
world for Jewish immigration. In the course of two years 
55,000 immigrants entered the country, almost doubling the 
figure of the existing Jewish population.
The greater part of the new arrivals, particularly 
those belonging to the middle class, turned.to Tcl-Aviv, 
the now Jewish town near Jaffa, whose population was 
subsequently increased from 21,000 in June 1924 to 40,000 
at the end of 1925. This extraordinarily rapid growth
125. D. Giladi, The Yishuv during 1924-1929: Economic and 
Political Aspects, p.51.
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during such a short period had an immense effect on the
density of living accommodation in the town and consequently
on the increasing demand for housing, plots, building
materials and on their respective prices. In response to
this demand and the very promising profits in the building
industry, economic activity in the town concentrated
around this industry. Three quarters of the total
investment in 1925 (about £1.5 million) was devoted to
building and many other industries were designed to meet
124the immediate needs of this branch. Everything appeared 
to depend upon the continuous influx of middle class 
immigration, bringing capital with them, building a house 
and then apparently waiting for the next lot of immigrants 
with capital to provide them with a living. At the same 
time, the constant flow of money into the market caused 
a sharp increase in prices and correspondingly raised the 
cost of living. y
The Palestine Government, seriously concerned about
this, regarded the abnormal development of Tel-Aviv as an
unhealthy and risky phenomenon which was likely to lead,
sooner or later, to an unavoidable crash, unless some
"really productive" industries would be established in the 
126town. Hyamson however, was of the opinion that an 
immediate remedy for such a disaster might be found in 
new restrictions on middle class immigration. As far as
124. Ibid, p.34.
125. Shuckburgh, memorandum to Secretary of State. 25.5.25.C.O. 733/110 file 24403. ’
126. Ibid, Shuckburgh wrote this memorandum following 
conversations with Hyamson and other Palestine officials 
while accompanying the Secretary of State on his
visit to Palestine in April 1925.
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he v/as concerned, immigrants with £500 and less led to an
undue proportion of "non-productive elements" which took
to peddling, shopkeeping, land speculation and moneylending
and were almost "at the end of their tether". In view of
their ages, training and mentality he was convinced that
most of thorn wore unsuited for manual labour if such'were 
127available. Anxious about the type of middle class
immigration and the recent reports from Eastern Europe
suggesting that about a million Jews (i) were intending
1 2.8to come in the near future, he advocated urgent 
restrictions on immigration of persons ox independent 
moans. In practical terms this meant excluding people who 
had only between £500 to £1,000 by raising the minimum 
qualification to the latter figure, J
The news about Hyamson's new plan and that he had
apparently succeeded in persuading Samuel and John
Shuckburgh of the necessity to restrict middle class
immigration,caused anger and anxiety among Zionist circles 
150in London. V/eizmann regarded Hyamson's proposal as 
"dangerous" and "preposterous" and made a strong represent­
ation to the Colonial Office in an attempt to revoke it.
The Sccrctaty of State, on the advice of Shuckburgh, asked 
Weizmann to approve a Committee of Enquiry to go to
127. Hyamson in a memorandum to the Chief Secretary, 22 12 251.5. A., 11/4/2/6. ‘ ’ ’
128. See minutes of joint mooting of representatives of Palestine Offices abroad, with Hyamson, April 1925
1.5. A. 11/2/6.
129« S. Moody, for Acting Chief Secretary in reply to 
Hyamson, 27.7*25., i.S.A. 11/1/1.
150. Weizmann to Alfred Mond, 15.6.25«, W.A,
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Palestine to study the question of Tel-Aviv and immigration
in general. This was also rejected by Weizmann, who
undertook to furnish the Colonial Office with a memorandum
setting out the views and proposals of the Zionist
181Executive on this natterf The Zionists thus succeeded
in evading any immediate amendments of the Regulation and
securing the Colonial Office's assurance that such changes
"will not bo imposed without further consultations with 
182then". When the promised memo was eventually submitted
188to the Colonial Office, after a delay of seven months, 
the proposed amendments had already lost their acuteness 
following the developments which took place in Palestine.
While these negotiations wore taking place in London, 
Hyanson did not abandon the subject, examining all possible 
ways of tightening control over immigration of this class.
As far as amendments of the Regulations were concerned,it 
seems that he could not have chosen a more inconvenient 
time for his campaign than the summer of 1925» Samuel, 
whose term of office in Palestine was coning to an end, 
leaving in its wake unprecedented prosperity, was very 
unlikely to recommend such controversial restrictions on 
the eve of his departure. However, it was not inconceivable 
that his successor, Lord Pluner, would impose them during 
his first days in office. Nevertheless, in the middle of
151. Sec V/oizmann's report, minutes of Z.E. meeting,
8.7.25», C.Z.A., ZV302/12.
152. Kisch's report to the Zionist Executive regarding his interview with Ormsby Gore and Major Young, minutes 
of Z.E. meeting, 23.7.25., ibid.
133. Shuckburgh to Weizmann in a reminder, 13.1.26., and
Stein's replies, 15.1.25'., 21.1.26., all in C.O. 733/110 
file 2AA03.
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September, the new High Commissioner summoned a conference
on immigration questions in the presence of the Chief
Secretary, the Attorney General and the Controller of
Permits and also invited Colonel Kisch to represent the
views of the Palestine Zionist Executive» Hyanson took
this opportunity of recommending ¿he raising of capital
qualifications for immigrants of independent means to
£1,000 or even £1,500 and immigrants with smaller amounts
would be left to the discretion of the Permit Section»
Likewise, agricultural settlers would be limited
numerically according to the .resources of the Palestine
Zionist Executive and "other responsible bodies". Kisch,
emphasising the large amount of the aggregate capital which
was being brought by those immigrants .and the extent to
which the development of the country was dependent on their
resources, strongly deprecated Hyamsonsl „ proposals. As
far as Kisch was concerned, middle class immigration would,
when necessary, restrict itself "through the normal
intervention of economic laws" and thus any arbitrary
restrictions would bo superfluous. The High Commissioner,
although expressing himself rather strongly with regard to
the excessive proportion of immigrants with small moans,
1Z4avoided an immediate resolution on this matter.
The proposed amendment of the Regulations regarding' 
immigrants of independent means soon lost its acuto 
importance, following the enforcement of the now Immigration 
Ordinance in September 1925» The direct cause of this 
was Article 4- (1) of the now Regulations which stated that
134-. Soc minutes of the Conference, 14-.9.25«, I.S.A.
11/1/5; also Kisch's notes in his Diary, p.24-.
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no immigrant would bo allowed to enter Palestine unless
he possessed an Immigration Certificate granted by the
Chief Immigration Officer. Accordingly, all applicants
fox' visas to Palestine, '.without exception, had to be
referred to Jerusalem for .approval. The effect of this
procedure on immigration in general and particularly on
persons of independent means was immediate and very
substantial. Their volume dropped drastically during
the last quarter of 1925, to 1,4-14- immigrants, in
comparison with 3,314- under this category in the previous
quarter, (a reduction of over 60$)and to a monthly average
of less than 200 during the first six months of 1926. The
total immigration of persons of independent means in 1926
cionsisted only of 13% of the corresponding volume of the
previous year, 1,325 as compared with 10,127 respectively.
In view of these small returns, amendment of the Regulation
regarding immigration of independent moans was superfluous.
Yet Hyamson was still of the opinion that the qualification
of immigrants under new Category "A" should be increased
from £500 to £1,000 and of "3" from £250 to £500 and that
a provision should be added to the latter stating that
"subject to the discretion of tho Chief Immigration Officer,
whose discretion v/ill be guided by, inter alia,, the
previous occupation of the prospective immigrant, his
prospective occupation, his apparent suitability for it
and his prospects of success therein m  view of his means
135and experience".
135».Hyamson to Chief Secretary, 11.5.26., I.S.A., 11/1/1/A.
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Although Hyamson's prop sals were not officially 
enforced until May 1926 following revised Instructions to 
the Consuls, his system had been operative from September 
1925 in consequence of the implementation of Article 4(1) 
The reference of all applications to Jerusalem could enable 
the Permit Section to decide upon the merits of each case 
concerning the issue of an Immigration Certificate. 
Moreover, in view of the enormous additional work which 
this procedure involved and the very limited staff of the
Section, delays of two to three months were almost
. , , , 136 unavoidable.
The Zionists, alarmed by the fact that since the.
enforcement of the new Ordinance not a single visa had
been granted,and anticipating delays which the new
procedure might involve, had already stirred themselves
into action at the beginning of October. Weiznann called
at the Colonial Office again and made "very serious
representations" to the Secretary of State. Referring to
the deteriorating economic situation in Poland which was
rapidly devaluing the financial moans of the local middle
class, he described the procrastination in granting
Certificates as "tantamount to stopping the immigration" of
this class. He asked for the intervention of the Colonial
Office in shortening the procedure to a reasonable time •
137such as a fortnight at the most.
136. See the proposed Instruction enclosed in Plumer*s 
confidential despatch to Amery, 8.4.26., C.0.733/111 
file 15'19 •
137. Wcizmann to Kisch, 12.10.25., C.Z.A. Z4/16110.
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Simultaneously, Kisch made "sharp representations"
to the High Commissioner and to Symes, the new Chief
Secretary. At his meeting with Synes, Kisch pointed out
that the failure of the Permit Section to dispose of
Certificates for persons of independent neans was keeping
158not less than £100,000 a month out of the country. This 
argument seems to have convinced Symes, who granted all 
the additional staff for which Hyamscn had been fighting 
and witiin two or three days all the outstanding applications 
from immigrants of independent means had been disposed o
Nevertheless, the implementation of the controversial 
Article 4-(1) and the inevitable delays which it involved 
continued to occupy both the Government and the Zionists - 
throughout 1926 and eventually brought about fresh 
reorganisation of the immigration nachineryrand revised 
Regulations. However, the actual effect of these issues 
on the extenc of middle class immigration constantly 
diminished, following the economic crisis in both Poland 
and Palestine. Kisch's indication, at the Immigration 
Conference mentioned above, that middle class immigration 
would, when necessary, restrict itself through the normal 
intervention of economic laws, materialised sooner and far 
more substantially than was anticipated at that moment.
138. Kisch to Weizmann, 23.10.25., ibid., also Kisch's , Diary pp.211-212.
139. Ibid, p.212.
14-0. See all the correspondence regarding the reorganisation of the Permit Section in C.0.733/112 file C4-955 and 
C.O. 733/117 file C20839.
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In fact, the decrease in immigrants of independent means 
had already begun in July 1925, two months before the
141eforcement of the new Ordinance«. Although this tendency 
was very significantly accelerated by the implementation 
of the Ordinance its continuation was undoubtedly 
inevitable because of the economic factors.
The turning point in Poland camo during the middle
of 1925, when the value of the zloty against foreign
142currencies began to fall rapidly. A middle class
applicant who had reasonable hope of producing £500 at
the time of his application might not be able to produce
this sum after two or three months, when his application
147,wss finally approved. This might explain the vigorous 
Zionist campaign to sliorten the procedure concerned but 
nevertheless could hardly Justify their complaint that 
this procedure was the dominant cause of the sudden 
drop of middle class immigration.
In addition to the effects of the economic crisis 
in Poland the reports from Palestine towards the end of 
1925 might have had an even more discouraging influence. 
Most of the applicants of this class who were eventually 
supplied with Certificates had ceased to show any interest
141. 1,085 in July, compared with 1,437 in May and 1,608 
in June.
142. See note 127 above.
143. Stein to Shuckburgh 23.12.25., 0.0.733/10? file
5>Q037-
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in then, presumably preferring the devil they knew 
than the one they did not. In view of these circumstances 
fresh Zionist initiative focusing itself round the 
demand for authorising the Immigration Officer in Warsaw 
to dispose of applications for visas under the independent 
means category without reference to Jerusalem, ' was 
very unlikely to bring about any radical change in the 
situation.
144. See "extracts from a letter from the Warsaw Palestine
Office", 4.12.25., enclosed in Stein to Shuckburgh 
ibid. ’
145. See "Observations of the Palestine Zionist Executive on the Immigration Ordinance", 17»5»26., C.O. 753/116 file C17954-.
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The most commonly accepted version of the question 
of Jewish immigration into Palestine conceives it mainly 
as political and disregards, or at least underestimates, 
economic, psychological and bureaucratic factors, which 
significantly influenced both the policy and the extent of 
immigration. According to this version, the Zionists 
constantly pressed for large scale immigration, while the 
Arabs demanded its complete suspension and the British 
reacted in accordance 'with these pressures. This rather 
schematic description, insofar as it broadly fits the 
circumstances of the 1930's and 194-0's, does not 
accurately reflect the situation in Palestine during 
the five years of Sir Herbert Samuel's rule.
Herbert Samuel, the British statesman who played 
a major role in Zionist activity in London during World 
War I and subsequently became senior adviser of the 
Zionist Organisation on enonomic and political matters, 
was appointed to the post of High Commissioner in 
Palestine by virtue of British and Zionist confidence.
His leading principle in the establishment of the Jewish 
National Home was, as he termed it himself, "gradualist".
As far as it concerned Jewish immigration, this principle 
did not intend to limit immigration numerically, but to 
adjust its extent and economic structure to the absorptive 
capacity of the country. In practical terms, this meant
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that immigrants would be able to find employment upon 
their arrival and become integrated economically, without 
becoming a burden on the Administration.
Samuel did not change his approach as a result of 
the May Disturbances. However, during his first year in 
Palestine, he became less confident in the Zionists' 
ability to encourage middle-class immigration in possession 
of private capital and mobilize sufficient funds for the 
satisfactory absorption of labour immigration. Once 
convinced that the Zionists had failed to carry out these 
tasks successfully, Samuel came to the conclusion that it 
was necessary to reduce their power to select and regulate 
immigration and transfer control to the British authorities. 
Prom this point of view, the May Disturbances, although 
they added a certain dramatic dimension to the revision 
of policy, merely served to accelerate an unavoidable 
decision which Samuel would have reached sooner or later.
The principle of Economic Absorptive Capacity included 
in thé White Paper of June 1922, gave official appi^oval 
to a policy which had been in force since the beginning of 
the Civil Administration. Although the announcement of 
this principle affected Zionist prestige to a certain 
extent, it did not necessarily intend to restrict their 
activities in Palestine. This was proven during Samuel's 
last year in Palestine when, as a consequence of an 
unprecedented flow of middle class immigration and capital 
into the country, labour immigration was considerably 
increased.
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Samuel's sensitivity to the controversial nature 
of the immigration question and its political implications, 
caused him to play it down as far as possible and to 
ensure that the making of policy would remain exclusively 
in his hands. This was shown by the limited powers 
granted to the Immigration Department and his avoidance 
of consultation with representatives of the population on 
matters regarding immigration. The lesson of the May 
Disturbances and Arab pressure to participate in control 
of immigration caused Samuel to change his former stand 
and propose setting up representative bodies,which 
would be authorised to discuss immigration questions. Yet, 
the proposed powers given to these bodies could not 
determine the policy nor the extent of immigration. On 
this issue, both Samuel and the Colonial Office were 
firm in their opinion that the only relevant principle 
to influence the policy should be economic and not 
political.
However, the implementation of the policy was a 
question of interpretation and execution by the machinery 
of control. In this matter there was a radical change 
after May 1921. The new Immigration Regulations of 
August 1921, the classification of immigrants and the 
inauguration of the Schedule System from July 1922 onwards, 
caused considerable bureaucratic difficulties to 
prospective immigrants and delays in receiving Immigration 
Certificates and visas, which inevitably reduced immigration.
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It seems that Samuel was not seriously concerned with 
the bureaucratic difficulties or with their effect on 
restriction of immigration. On this matter, he was 
drawn into conflict not only with the Zionists, but also 
with Major Morris, the Director of Immigration, whose 
task was to implement the policy. Samuel's disagreement 
with Morris did not stem from the necessity to make 
control stricter and more efficient, on which point they 
both agreed, but how to reorganise the machinery of 
control: whether by Palestine Immigration Officers
situated in the main centres of immigration, which would 
facilitate a smooth stream of immigration,as Morris 
suggested; or to leave the job for the British Consuls 
who would be instructed to refer every case to Jerusalem 
(Samuel's suggestion), a system which was liable to 
cause .long delays and red tape.
The Zionist; approach to the question of Jewish 
immigration during the period concerned was much more 
complicated and inconsistent than that of the British.
The principal problem of the Zionists was their inability 
to make use of the opportunity placed at their disposal 
as a consequence, of the Balfour Declaration, the .San 
Remo Desolation and the appointment of Herbert Samuel 
as High Commissioner to Palestine. Their financial 
distress brought them, shortly after the setting up of 
the Civil Administration, to a humiliating position in 
which they were forced to ask the British to tighten
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control and restrict immigration. However, one year
later, when Samuel inaugurated the new schemes of control,
which intended to achieve the same aims, he was
confronted with strong Zionist opposition. In this
connection, Samuel wrote to Weizmann, in January 1922,
"if I had not enforced fairly close restrictions on
immigration during the last few months and incurred a
good deal of censure from the Zionist world for doing so,
the Zionist Organisation would have had to act in the
same direction, and borne the odium itself» I hope
1you will appreciate my friendly servie*!"
The leading principle of the Zionist immigration 
policy was the principle of selection and regulation. On 
this issue the Zionists were in agreement with the 
British in their objection to "free immigration", 
particularly during the early stages of the building up 
of the Jewish National Home, since in their opinion, 
immigration had to be selected "so as to ensure the
maximum and the most productive contribution to the
2structure". The difference of opinion between the 
British and the Zionists was on the question of who would 
do the selecting and regulating. However, even on this 
issue, the Zionists were not unified. The question was 
whether to ask for full control over immigration, or to
1. Samuel to Weizmann, 20.1.22., c.Z.A., Z4/16146'
2. i£isch's notes in his Diary p. 130; in P.Z.E. meeting
18.6.24., see p .197 above.
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ask only Tor closest co-operation while the final 
decision would be left to the British. This latter 
approach, which was supported by V/eizmann, could ensure 
a convenient position for the Zionist leadership within 
the Movement, reduce criticism from their own people, 
conceal their financial difficulties and place 
responsibility for the restricted policy on the British. 
Nevertheless, the Zionists were firm and consistent in 
their demands that primary control and selection of 
immigration should be left to their own discretion. On 
this issue, Weizmann succeeded in obtaining British 
agreement to his stand. His success was due to his 
ability to pinpoint the main British fear - the danger 
of infiltration to Palestine by politically undesirable 
elements who could cause agitation and unrest - and to 
offer the Zionists' help in this task.
The attitude of the Palestinian Arabs towards the 
question of immigration was plain, consistent and 
extremist. Their uncompromising demand for total 
suspension of a.11 Jewish immigration left very little 
room for manoeuvre to both the British and the Zionists. 
Their unconditional rejection of the British proposals 
to set up representative bodies which could give them, 
if not control, a certain influence over'the policy,closed 
for them the door to even token participation in the 
making of policy.
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Considering the political dependence of the Zionists 
on the British and their limited economic ability to 
absorb large scale immigration during the period concerned, 
it would have been possible to reach an Arab-Zionist 
agreement regarding the policy and the cjent of immigration 
which may have satisfied the Arabs* Yet, the Arab 
rejection of such an agreement gave the Administration a 
free hand over control, which made possible the flow of 
immigration during 1924 - 1925»
252
APPENDIX T: IMMIGRATION ORDINANCE', 1 9 2 0 *
W H E R E A S  h is necessary to make 
provision for regulating the entry into 
Palestine of persons desiring to reside 
there, permanently or temporarily;
JT IS H E R E B Y  O R D E R E D  
A S  FO LLO W S:—
i . Entry into Palestine, either for 
permanent or temporary residence, 
shall be regulated by thè High 
Commissioner front time to time 
according to the conditions and 
needs of the country. 
i. The High Commissioner may ap­
point a Director of Immigration and 
other Immigration Officers to con­
trol the entry of all persons into
Palestine. The Director and the '. 
officers so appointed shall have the 
p«nvur to enter ori board any vessel 
or railway train, to detain or exa­
mine any person desiring to enter 
Palestine, and to require the pro­
duction from such person of any 
letters, written messages or memo­
randa, or any written or primed 
matter, including plans, photographs, 
and other pictorial representations.
3. Every person who desires to enter 
Palestine, whether by sea or land 
or air, must be in possession of a 
passport or other permit or papers 
of identity. The photograph of the 
holder, save in the ease of Moslem 
women, shall be attached to the pas­
sport or permit or papers.
4. Every person resident in Palestine 
at the date of this Ordinance who 
leaves the country and intends 
to return shall obtain in accordance- 
with the Palestine Passport R egu­
lations a pas.qxwt or J.aissez-Passer, 
which he shall produce on demand 
to the Immigration Officer.
5. No person shall tinier Palestine 
except with the leave of Utc Director 
of Immigration, or an Immigration 
Officer duly authorised by him, unless 
he has been permanently resident 
in Palestine since the British Occup­
ation or was so resident within a 
year óf the outbreak of war. The 
Director of Immigration shall refuse 
leave, unless the person satisfies the 
following conditions *
*OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF THE
(a) That hu is in possession of a 
passport nr permit endorsed or 
visc at a British Passport Office 
or by a British Consul or other 
official authorised to grant visas 
or permits on behalf of H. M. 
Government.
(b) That he has in his possession or 
. is in a position to obtain the
means of supporting himself and 
any dependants who 'desire to 
enter with him.
tc) That he is not a lunatic, idiot, or 
metally deficient.
(d) That he is not the subject of a 
certificate given by a Medical 
inspector that on medical grounds 
to be specified by order from 
time to time he should not be 
permitted to land.
(<■ ) That he has not been ^sentenced 
in a foreign country for any 
crime for which extradition may 
be granted.
(f) That he has not been prohibited 
from entering the country by the. 
High Commissioner,
(gf That he fulfils such other requir­
ements as may be prescribed by 
any general or special instructions 
ol the Director of . Immigration.
(h) Such fee shall be payable by an 
immigrant on admission as may 
be determined by the High 
Commissioner by the regulation.
6. (uj A11 Immigration Officer or a 
Medical Inspector may inspect 
any person seeking to enter Pa­
lestine and may detain him pro­
visionally.
(b) Where leave to outer is refused, 
the person may be temporarily 
detained in shell manner as the 
High Commissioner may direct 
at some place and while so 'd e­
tained shall be deemed to bo in 
legal custody.
(c) The Director of Immigration or 
an Immigration Officer duly au­
thorised by him may order that 
a person arriving on a ship to 
whom leave to enter is refused 
shall be removed from Palestine 
by the Master of the ship on
GOVERNMENT OF PALESTINE, 16. .1920.
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whi ch h r  arrived nr hv the 
o wn e rs  or a ge n t s  of tfiat ship, 
to the c ount ry  of which ho is a 
national or from which ho e m ­
b ar k e d  for Palestine.
7. A n v  person al lowe d to enter shall 
within is  davs  of his arrival in P a ­
lestine register at the Pol ice H e a d ­
quarters of the District in w h i c h  he 
resides the particulars set out in the 
s chedul e hereto.
T h i s  provision shall not apply to 
persons certified b y .  die Consular 
v i u1 I" he travellers, c r  persons in 
transit to another  country,  whose 
stay in Palestine will not e xc e e d  
throe months from the date of entry. 
In ease a n y  person so eerl ihed o v e r ­
stays  the period lie shall  register 
immedi atel y at the place in which 
he  is . esidont and shall a ppl y  to the 
D i r e c t o r  of Immipration for a permit 
to stay for a further period in 
Palestine.
8. T h e  Ifiph Commi ssi oner  m a y  m a ke  
an order  in either ol the fo l l ow ing 
cases  for the deportation,  within l i v e  
y ea rs  of his entry into Palest ine o  ^
a n y  person w h o lias not her oi ne  a 
citizen of Palestine,  and m a v  hv 
such order require such person to 
l e a v e  and to r emai n thereafter out 
of Palestine:
(a) If a n y  court certifies that he has 
b een sentenced to a term of  i m­
prisonment exceedi ng;  one. month 
for an offence under this O r d i ­
nance or otherwise,  and r e c o m ­
mends that an order for d e p or ­
tation should lie made in his case. 
q!i) ll anv Court ccrt ihes within one 
vrnr ot his last entry into P a l e ­
stine that he has been found w a n ­
dering, without ostensible means 
i'il subsistence, or has hern sen­
tenced in a foreiyn cotint'rv for 
a crime for w hi c h he is l iable to 
be extradited.
(ci If the I hm , Commi ssi oner  d ee ms 
ii to be c ond uc ti ve  to the public 
e imd In m a k e  muT. an o r d e r . .
,\ person apainst w h o m  mu h an 
Ollier is made m a y  be expel led iroll) 
Palest ine and sent to the eounl rv of
whi ch lie is a national.  T h e  order 
m a y  extend to the dependants  of 
such person.
I he l l i yl i  Commi ssi oner  muv a ppl y  
any mon ey  or property of such 
person in pa ymen t  of the e x p e n s e s  
ot his journey and the maintenance,  
until his departure,  of himself  and 
his dependants.
A n  order m a d e  under  this article 
nt.tv lie subject  to any condition 
whi ch the l l i p h  C ommi ssi oner  m a y  
think proper. A  person with respect  
to w h o m  a deportat ion order  has 
been ma de shall l ea ve  Palest ine in 
a cc or dan ce  with the order, and shall  
thereafter so l oop as the order is in 
force remain out of  Palestine.
U- If any person a rt s  in contravention 
of or fails to c o m pl y  with a n y  of 
the provisions of  thi s ' 'Ordi nance or 
anv or der  or rule made thereunder,  
or aids or ai»i is in anv such eon- 
travein i. ,c or harbours  a nv person 
w h o m  be k no ws  or has r easonable  
pr om id for hel icvinq ;o have acred 
in contravention of Ins Ordi na nc e.
lie shall be ‘.i'lliltv ot all ' 'flum e
apainst this <’ 'r<iiimies•. A n v  pe rson 
.sliall .be v■ 1111! v ol an offence if he. 
laj R e f u s e s  to a n s w e r  anv quest ion 
reasonably  pul m him by tin- 
Director of 1 nun i prat ion or a n y  
official act inp u n de r  his ¡ orders  
o r  to produce a u v  document in 
his possession.
(b) M a k e s  any false leinrn or false 
statement. ^
(cl A l t e r s  a nv certi f icate .,r n i p t  of 
a c itiificaie or a n y  entry m a d e  
in niirsuance of  this Ordinance.
((b) O b s tr u ct s  or i m p e de s  an official 
in the ex er ci se  of  his duties. 
in) W i t h o u t  l awful  authority uso.s or 
has  in his possession any f or ce d,  
til lered, or i r reg ul ar  passport or 
permit  or other document ,  or a n y  
passport or d oc um en t  on whi ch 
any visa or endor sement  has 
b een altered or forped.
If) R e m a i n s  in Palest ine after an
order' for his deportation bus 
b een ii'ititied to him.
A n y  person found guil ty >•{ a 
contravention will be  l iable t<> a 
line not e x c e e d i n g  /,K.  ion or m 
imprisonment for a term e x c e e d i n g  
(' months, without prejudice to any 
prosecution to whi ch he ni.iv be 
l iable under  a ny  other law.
10. T h e  H i g h  Commi ssi oner  may 
direct that a ny  person or class of 
persons shall be e xe m p t e d  whol ly  
or in part, anil cither unconditionally 
or  subject to such conditions as he 
m a y  impose, from the provisions of 
this Ordinance.
N o t h i n g  in this < »romance shall 
a ppl y  to
fa) A n y  duly accredited head of a 
foreign diplomatic mission or  anv 
m e m b e r  of his household or of 
his ofhoial staff, or to a ny  duly 
accredited Consul  de Carriere.
(b) Any member of the British 
Military, Naval, and Air forces 
in uniform and any member "f 
the Civil Government entering 
or leaving Palestine on duty, 
i i. The Director of Immigration may 
with the approval of the High 
Commissioner issue from time to 
time any orders or regulations 
for the better control of immigr­
ation into Palestine. 
it . This Ordinance shall be known as 
the immigration Ordinance iijsa 
and shall come into force from 
i st September.
Herbert Sam uel
H i g h  C ommi ssi oner  
for Palestine.
Government House.
Palest ine.  .?bth A u g u s t  iu»>o,
Kef. 7001/O.
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$Admission of ImimgTc.nts into Palestine. 236
Now regulat ions .have now boon drawn up governing the 
admission of immigrants into Palestine. Apart  from Travel -  
: lers, th a t  is to sav, persons who do not in tend to rema in  in 
Palestine more than three months, and  re turn ing residents,;  
Immigrants  into Palestine are divided into the five u n d e r ­
ment ioned ca tegor ies :—
"B" (1) Persons of independent  means who intend to ta k e  up .
permanent, residence in Palestine,
" C "  (2) Members of professions who intend to follow th e i r  
calling.
"D" (3) Wives, chi ldren and other  persons wholly dependent  
on-.-residents of Palestine.
" E ” (4) Persons who have a definite prospeet  of employment  
with specified employers or enterprises.
" P "  (f). Persons of religious occupations, including the class
of Jews  who have come to Palest ine in recent yea rs  .. 
from religious motives and "’ho can show that, they 
have means of maintenance here.
A person who desires to settle in Pales tine must ob ta i n  a 
visa from a British Consul or other British Passporl Control 
Officer whom he will have to satisfy t h a t 'h e  belongs to one of 
thy above-mentioned categories.
Members  of professions will have to produce,- thei r d ip ­
lomas in- oilier indubi tab le  evidence of qualification in t h e i r  
professions.
Wives, children and other  persons -wholly dependent, o n .  
residents in Palestine will be requi red to produce evidence that, 
their  relatives in Palestine .w- both -willing and in a  posit ion 
to suppor t  them.
The quickest, and most, sat i sfactory method is tor  the rela­
tive in t'alestine to apply to the (¡overnor of the. district, in 
which be lives ei ther  direct  or  through sonic, person or  orga­
nisation of a. representat ive character  for a certificate in. the 
following terms:— “ l (All), hereby certify that (the. pros- '
prel ive immigrant)  is the wile, child, etc., of (the resilient in 
Palestine ) who is both willing and in a posit ion 1 «.support, him 
. ( h e r ) . "  This certificate '"hen completed and signed should 
'he sent to the prospective immigrant, with instructions to  take  
jit lo tin- nearest Br i t i sh  (Mosul or Passport, ( ’otilrol Officer in 
'support ,  of his request for a visa for Palestine, 
j Much time will also he saved if persons who wish to intro-
Iduoo immigrants  belonging to category 4 into Palest ine will,
i| communicate in the first place wi lh 1hc Department  of Iminig-
| ration & Travel. Jerusalem,  stilting the name and present  a d ­
dress of  the prospect ive immigrant,  the. na tu re  of the employ-’
mcn( offered to him, and the name ao.-l a d d o f  the prospec­
tive employer.
.AhPMRT M. ITVA.MSON
1 August ,  1021. Immigrat ion  &. Travel.
*OFFICIAL GAZETTE, 15.8.1921.
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APPENDIX'4 : IMMIGRATION ORDINANCE, 1923*
ARTICLE 2 ;
' ARTICLE <- ) X<> person shall lie "muled an ¡»iiin.ymlhm<• i■ r!iIu■;iii> uiiir;,- in- l><'K>n,5^s In niit' of llif following; catep'ories : -
! A } Persons nl iih11• 11(■ i)11(‘111 means, which- term shall I'd tIcemci|. Id include :
(i) Any person who is in b 'n in  ( h i e possession, and IVeeJv ilis|idsrs, of n capital dl' uni less Ilian .‘£ IA Alin, and is tpiali- lied in n |n'dlcssidii ni' inlniils lo enpapr in commerce nr aprk'nllhit! ; ami
(iii Any person who is in h m m / h ie ]iossdssidii, anil Ireely disposes, nl' a rapilal of not less Ilian £K. -•'() and is skilled in a Irade or cral'l : and
(¡¡it All}' persdii wild has a sernre inroine of nol less Ilian ■tl'l. lilt per aniniii). evelusive of earned income: and
(ivl Any nrplian nl less Ilian Mi years oI' ape whose iiiainlenanre is assured nnlil such linio as lie is aide In sup­port 11 i 111 si ■ 11’; and
(v) Ain1 person ol religions nccnpalion whose inainlen- ance is assured : and
(A if An}' slndenl whoso inainlenaiiee is assured nnlil sneh lime as lie is aide lo snpporl himself.
(I!) Persons who are not in ' bi n/// j h l c possession, or do md freely dispose, of a rapilal of Hie hill amount of £K. diiO. hnl would otherwise have helonped Id ('.ateporv A (i).
(Q Persons who have a definite prosper!' of employ­ment in Palestine.
f I>) Dependants of permanent residents or of immipranls lielonitii'ip to Categories A. II ami other than Categories A fiv) and ( vi j ; .
Provided that iiii immigration eerfifirale mu} Me p'ranled
hv the Chief Immipraiion Ol'lirer, at his iliserelion. to'any near relative of a permanent resident, who is wholly and direrlly 'dependent upon sneh permanent resident, notwithstanding that ?: lie miiv nol. fall within the definition of ■•Dependant'’ in theOrdinance.
*GOVERNMENT OF PALESTINE, ORDINANCES 1925«
('.alr'^nrii's ni
f  '¡I I D p A l IV  A .
( dtf C^'nt y !».
< nr\' 
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APPENDIX 5: JEWISH MIGRATION INTO PALESTINE ' 
JULY 1920 - APRIL 1921*
Month With Z.C. 
(Guarantee
Without Z.O. 
Guarantee
Total
July 1920 413 - ' 413
August 1105 - 1105
September m 0 in 1—i - 1503
October 674 126 790
November 1166 18 1184
December 1133 307 1442
January 1921 524 182 706
February 463 178 641
March 1061 183 1249
April 1145 472 1619
TOTAL 9191 1461 10652
Based on Samuel's reports to Foreign Office and Colonial 
Office and on Zionist sources, Z/4 1269.
239.
6: JEWISH IMI1:lG2.ATI0!'T INTO PALESTINE 1919 - 1923
MOT TREND
• "Hiere was no classification bj categories prior to 1922 
* Die Einteilnng nach Kategorien beginnt erst im Jahre 1922 
r.^-bp ‘Cb cVtprr/f-X 
*5 192t
APPENDIX 7= JEWISH IMMIGRATION INTO PALESTINE 1919- - 1928 
DISTRIBUTION BY CATEGORIES *
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